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Abstract  
 
New Zealand’s productivity under-performance, despite its good quality institutions, has 
remained a puzzling phenomenon.  This topic has generated spirited debates among academia 
and public policy experts seeking to provide an answer to this age-old paradox. Solving ‘The 
New Zealand Productivity Puzzle’ is not a straightforward proposition. Previous studies in this 
area attempted to pin down the main determinants behind the extent to which New Zealand’s 
actual GDP per capita growth has undershot its predicted rates based on policy settings (Barnes 
et al., 2013). The recent New Zealand Productivity Commission (2014a) report shows the three 
key determinants accounting for such a gap are New Zealand’s weak international connections, 
low innovation and low managerial quality. This paper seeks to go further than merely 
highlighting the determinants (symptoms) of poor productivity performance in New Zealand, to 
the cause(s) of the problem by asking ‘why’ these key determinants (symptoms) of poor 
productivity performance occur. The analytical process of piecing together key results and 
findings (from available data, literature, and empirical studies) enables one to build a richer 
picture of New Zealand’s relatively poor productivity performance, to better understand the 
mechanism behind this puzzling phenomenon. The findings unraveled in this paper verify that 
this phenomenon is not paradoxical but simply an issue of firm/corporate governance. The sort 
of issues uncovered here is neither one of poor corporate governance in a conventional manner 
or an issue of managerial competency alone. Rather problems arise largely as a consequence of 
inappropriate incentives unintentionally generated by a certain ownership structure. This paper 
discusses how high ownership concentration associated with lower firm performance in New 
Zealand negatively affects managerial effectiveness by exacerbating the agency costs associated 
with managerial entrenchment. The paper shows that together New Zealand’s relatively lower 
managerial competency and managerial effectiveness associated with lower firm performance, 
can account for New Zealand’s lack of international connections, low innovation and low 
managerial quality, and thus potentially explain ‘The New Zealand Productivity Puzzle’.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
The study by Barnes et al. (2013) pulls together previous empirical studies mostly carried 
out by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to construct a 
framework that assesses the impact of a wide range of structural policy reforms on Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at various horizons for a number of OECD countries, 
including New Zealand. The report suggests that given New Zealand’s policy settings in the 
areas of taxation, regulation, innovation and education affecting GDP per capita New Zealand’s 
GDP per capita, as predicted by these relationships, should be about 20% above the OECD 
average. This, however, is not the case. New Zealand’s GDP per capita is actually 20% below 
the OECD average. The question of ‘why’ that is the case has generated spirited debates among 
academia and public policy exerts seeking to provide an answer to this age-old paradox. 
 
Previous studies in this area pin the reasons behind such phenomenon down to three 
factors. They are weak international connections, low innovation and low managerial quality 
(New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014a). Experts argue that New Zealand is indeed 
lacking in these aspects and that New Zealand needs to do more in these areas to improve its 
productivity performance (Grant Thornton, 2014; Rotherham, 2014). However, the question of 
‘why’ that is the case remains relatively unanswered. ‘Why’ it is that many of New Zealand 
individual decision makers make the decisions that lead to such poor performance in these areas? 
What factor(s) cause New Zealand decision makers to make different choices to similar people 
operating in other OECD countries, who opt to be more active in the international market, invest 
much more heavily in Research and Development (R&D), and in management?  
 
The argument of being small and geographically isolated as a factor impeding New 
Zealand’s economic performance, preventing better engagement in the international market, 
investment in R&D and in management, may not hold water. Before the 1970s, New Zealand 
was among the richest per capita GDP countries in the world. The ‘New Zealand Economy’ was 
even smaller then and located exactly where it is now. Hence, by analytically piecing together 
key results and findings from available data, literature and empirical studies, this paper aims to 
construct a richer picture to help better explain the mechanism behind the puzzling phenomenon 
of New Zealand’s productivity performance.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes ‘The New Zealand 
Productivity Puzzle’ and explores the fundamental determinants behind New Zealand’s 
relatively poor productivity performance. Section 3 discusses the debates among experts on this 
topic and proposes New Zealand’s productivity under-performance as an issue of firm/corporate 
governance related to (A) managerial competency and (B) managerial effectiveness. The former 
measures the ability of managers to be successful and efficient, while the latter considers the 
degree to which such ability translates into desired outcomes. Section 4 and 5 investigate each of 
these two factors in detail, providing evidence for the above proposition and the extent to which 
these factors (managerial competency and managerial effectiveness) explain New Zealand’s firm 
and related productivity under-performance. Section 6 explains how New Zealand’s relative low 
firm performance due to these factors cause New Zealand to be less active in the international 
market, invest much less in R&D, and in management. I argue how this can potentially account 
for New Zealand’s relative weak international connections, low innovation and low managerial 
quality, the three main determinants (symptoms) of poor productivity performance in New 
Zealand (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014a). Section 7 provides the conclusion.  
2.  The New Zealand Productivity Puzzle Overview 
 
A common understanding is that a country’s per capita income rank 100 years ago is a 
reasonable predictor of where that country ranks today, for the most part, countries that were 
very rich then still are today (Glaeser et al., 2009). However, New Zealand (NZ) along with 
Uruguay, Romania and Argentina are amongst the key exceptions to this rule. Angus Maddison1, 
a renowned economic historian of global macroeconomic trends, estimated that in 1913 NZ’s per 
capita income were among the two or three highest in the world, rivaling those in the United 
States and Australia (as cited in OECD, 2013). Even in the 1950, NZ incomes were still among 
the very highest in the world. However, of the countries that had relatively advanced economies 
in 1913, now only Uruguay, Romania and Argentina experienced greater relative falls than NZ. 
Unlike these countries, NZ has been a stable democratic country with a functioning market 
economy and the rule of law over the entire century. NZ’s underlying productivity under-
performance despite its strong institutions is a puzzling phenomenon, an age-old question, which 
many experts have sought to explain. Yet, until now the reason behind such puzzle is still not 
well understood (OECD, 2013).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Maddison’s data are available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/orrindex.htm 
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The study by Barnes et al. (2013) made use of the empirical studies carried out 
previously by the OECD on the impact of a wide set of structural policy indicators on economic 
performance through each of the sub-components of GDP to develop a simple simulation 
framework. The framework is built around the identity that the differences in GDP per capita 
growth is the sum of the differences in labour productivity (defined as GDP per hour worked), 
average hours worked (per employed person), the employment rate (employment as a share of 
working age, 15-64) and the dependency ratio (the share of the working age population in the 
total population)2. In so doing, this framework takes into account the multiple channels through 
which structural policies may affect economic performance to produce estimates of their overall 
effects on GDP per capita growth.  
 
The study’s model is built on the assumption that structural policies improvement means 
having low tax, less stringent market regulations, high R&D incentives, a more open economy 
and more educated workforce. These are all characteristics of better quality institutions (rule of 
the game or humanly devised constraints – North, 1990) suggested to create the business-
friendly environment essential for growth and productivity to occur (consistent with the growth 
theory with a focus on institutions literature; see North & Thomas, 1973; North, 1990; Acemoglu 
et al., 2005)3. In theory, given NZ’s relatively better policy settings in these areas NZ’s GDP per 
capita growth should be above the OECD average. More importantly, NZ’s GDP per capita 
growth should be at a higher rate today than in the past because, on many counts, NZ has had 
better policies after the economy’s radical reform in the 1980s and 1990s (OECD, 2008). This, 
however, is not the case. NZ’s GDP per capita and productivity performance is actually below 
the OECD average and they are lower today than in the past, despite NZ’s relative better policy 
settings today, and hence ‘The New Zealand Productivity Puzzle’.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The study by Barnes et al. (2013, p. 6) - Equation 1: ∆𝑔𝑑𝑝  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 = ∆𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 + ∆ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟  𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑 +∆𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + ∆𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛;   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  ∆   𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎  denotes the differences vis-à-vis a baseline scenario 
with no reforms and lower case variables denote logs of their upper case counterparts (i.e. GDP per capita, LABOUR 
PRODUCTIVITY, HOUR WORKED, EMPLOYMENT RATE, WORKING POPULATION).   
3 For more information on institutions see Tong, S. (2013). Does the Failure of a Staple Economy Imply the Failure of 
‘The Staple Theory’? A Comparative Analysis of New Zealand and Argentina (1890-1960) (unpublished honours 
dissertation). Victoria University, Wellington. Article available upon request from p_sodany@yahoo.co.uk.  
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2.1 The Growth Theory with a Focus on Institutions 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) voluminous survey of the growth literature’s focusing on 
institutions supports the hypothesis that economic institutions explain significant portions of the 
observed differences in per capita GDP. Though in the literature institutions may be termed 
‘economic institutions’ (Acemoglu et al., 2004), ‘structural policies’ (Persson, 2005), ‘social 
infrastructure’ (Hall & Jones, 1999), or simply ‘institutions’ (Rodrik et al., 2004), they are all 
similar measures with different labels (Eicher & Röhn, 2007). What label the author(s) prefer 
simply depends on the aspect of institutions he/she wished to emphasise. For instance, Persson 
(2005) prefers the label ‘structural policy’ to emphasise that regulatory and trade regimes result 
from purposeful collective choices under a set of more fundamental political arrangements 
(consistent with the argument of Glaeser et al., 2004). Whatever the label may be, for the above 
authors, they are used to refer to identical or very similar fundamental data. That is, institutional 
indicators originate from reliable sources such as the World Bank, the OECD, the International 
Risk Country Guide, the Fraser Institute (Eicher & Röhn, 2007) and the like. 
 
Recent growth theory’s focus on institutions also suggest that besides explaining 
differences in per capita income, institutions may account for the variations in observed cross-
country growth rates. Adam Smith (1776; 1937) proclaimed that the path to economic prosperity 
starts with a general presumption of economic freedom (or free economies) from government 
intervention (see also Dawson, 2007; Bundă, Moise-Ţiţei & Jaliu, 2012). Thereafter, the classical 
liberal economists like Hayek (1954) and Friedman and Friedman (1980) continued the tradition 
under the terms capitalism and freedom of choice. In 1973, following the seminal work of 
Douglas North and Robert Thomas the link between institutions and economic performance 
quickly emerged to the centre of much academic discussion of growth theory. The institutions 
based literature on economic growth originates with the seminal work of Douglas North and 
Robert Thomas (1973) who argue that factors such as capital accumulation or innovation ‘are not 
causes of growth…they are growth’ (North & Thomas, 1973, p. 2). More specifically, they argue 
for the following causal relation: 
 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 → 𝑇𝐹𝑃4,𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙,𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 → 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐  𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Total Factor Productivity (TFP), also refer to as Productivity Change (PC) or Multifactor Productivity (MFP). 
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North and Thomas (1973) describe the proximate factors: innovation (TFP: Total Factor 
Productivity), education (Human Capital) and capital accumulation (Physical Capital), 
corresponding to factors of production embodies in the aggregate production function, as not 
causes of growth but growth in themselves. They made clear in their arguments that no doubt 
rich countries have greater levels of TFP (innovation), human capital (more educated workers), 
and physical capital (more machines, tools, factories, etc.), but these they argue are simply what 
it means to be prosperous. They are not an explanation of the sources of differences in 
prosperity. In their view, in order to explain the sources of differences in prosperity one must 
answer the questions why some countries are so much more innovative than others, why they 
invest much more resources into educational systems, and why people save and invest to 
accumulate physical capital. North and Thomas (1973) propose institutions to be the underlying 
explanation for these. They argue economic growth (defined as a per capita long-run rise in 
income/GDP) will simply not occur unless the existing economic organisations are efficient. 
Such proposition defines the basic logic of institutional theorists of economic growth, whereby 
the cause of economic growth is to be found in the economic organisations and that efficient 
economic organisations are necessary for economic growth (Huang, 2009).   
 
Brou and Ruta (2006) also provide evidence for this argument. They show in an economy 
with poor institutions rent seeking activities (the resource-wasting behaviours of individuals and 
groups seeking wealth transfers)5 reduce the growth rate in two ways. Firstly, when firms use 
real resources in rent seeking instead of investing them in production and research and 
development (R&D), such wastage of resources on unproductive activity would reduce the 
growth potential of the economy. Secondly, a negative effect on the economy’s market structure 
would result if the returns from rent seeking activity expenditures did not outweigh the 
economy’s losses of resources associated with such behaviour. Such a reduction in gross profits 
forces some firms out of the market. Less market competition reduces the incentive of active 
firms to innovate. A lower level and rate of innovation and hence technological progress would 
negatively affect the long-run rate of growth of an economy. By contrast, Brou and Ruta (2006) 
show that in an economy with well-functioning institutions, where markets are economical and 
less stringent, the effect of rent seeking on market structure would be positive as competition 
forces firms to compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For more detail analysis on rent seeking behaviours see Tong, S. (2013). Does the Failure of a Staple Economy 
Imply the Failure of ‘The Staple Theory’? A Comparative Analysis of New Zealand and Argentina (1890-1960) 
(unpublished honours dissertation). Victoria University, Wellington. Paper available upon request from 
p_sodany@yahoo.co.uk.  
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higher level and rate of innovation and hence technological progress would positively affect the 
long-run rate of growth of an economy. This can counteract the first negative effect of real 
resource wastage on growth. Hence, institutions in this sense may be described as humanly 
designed to shape the incentive structure that can be either positively propel or negatively 
impede the productive activity and thus development of a given economy (North, 1990).  
 
More recently, Baumol’s (2002) distinction between productive and destructive 
entrepreneurship also indicates that rent seeking would be discouraged if institutions facilitate 
and reward innovative private sector activity and provide no incentives for rent seeking political 
favours. Even in Gwartney and Lawson’s (2007) empirical study, prosperity has been accredited 
to good institutions that incentivise people to engage in productive entrepreneurship instead of 
destructive rent seeking ones. The growing evidence on the benefits of institutions to date 
suggests that institutional quality does matter and that, perhaps more than anything else, it is the 
institutional framework of an economy and the implied incentive structure that explain the 
welfare of a nation (Rohwer, 2011).  
 
However, because of the inherent difficulty in measuring institutions there remains a lack 
of attention on institutions in the empirical growth literature. Unlike capital and labour, 
institutions are not directly measurable. Hence, research into the institutional determinants of 
economic performance largely use indicators that proxy for specific variables of interest (Eicher 
& Röhn, 2007). Nevertheless, over the years, a wide body of OECD and other empirical 
evidence regarding the effects of structural reforms on various aspects of economic performance 
has been accumulated. The voluminous empirical findings accumulated over time enable Barnes 
et al. (2013) to develop a framework pulling these findings together. The simulation framework 
developed in Barnes et al. (2013) was constructed based on the voluminous empirical studies of 
the impact of a wide set of structural policy indicators6 on a broad range of indicators of 
economic performance 7  which have shown to matter to economic growth. Through this 
mechanism Barnes et al. (2013) were able to directly predict the impact of structural policies on 
economic performance and thus the overall GDP per capita growth for a number of OECD 
countries, including NZ.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I.e. labour and product market regulations, human capital, social transfer programmes, tax systems, trade and 
foreign direct investment policies, R&D incentives.  
7 I.e. TFP, factor accumulation, labour force participation, employment or hour worked. 
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2.2 New Zealand ‘Before the Reform’ 	  	  	   From an early stage, the availability of cheap stock from neighbouring Australian 
colonies and ample pasture shaped New Zealand’s (NZ’s) predominantly agricultural economy. 
The historiography of NZ for the years from 1890 has highlighted the role of refrigeration-
related pastoral exports in transforming the nation economic prospect (Te Ara, 2012a). In NZ, 
the introduction of refrigeration technology has led to a distinctive staple export boom, of dairy 
and meat products. The higher incomes generated from such export boom not only increased 
margins of cultivation (cf. typically result), but the effect went much deeper, leading not only to 
improvement in NZ’s agricultural sector productivity but also to economy wide productivity 
improvement (Hussey & Philpott, 1969; Hawke, 1985; Greasley & Oxley, 2009). Such 
prosperity was largely attributable to the establishment of co-operative institutional 
arrangements, which arose as a natural solution to the problems concerning coordination, control 
and ownership occurring under the market conditions where numerous, small producers compete 
to supply large, concentrated agricultural processors, and where distributors also have some 
market power due to product perishability (Evans & Meade, 2005). 
 
Co-operative institutional structure8 essentially brought together thousands of fragmented 
NZ farmers supplying commodities for sale to powerful international customers. This allowed 
NZ dairy processors, and meat freezing alike, to achieve economies of scale in transaction costs 
and synergies from pooling resources. Such collective strength also enables farmers to overcome 
market inefficiency (Evans, 2012). Market inefficiency may arise from high farm input costs and 
because of the perishable nature of primary products. In the former case, NZ’s co-operative 
farmers responded by investing together upstream to create buying groups for their key farm 
inputs, and subsequently giving rise to the formation of ‘Combined Rural Traders’. In the latter 
case, the limited shelf life of primary products gives powerful buyers the ability to suppress the 
price for farm products. A co-operative institutional arrangement enables farmers to invest 
together in downstream assets to move the negotiation point away from where the farmer’s 
product is perishable to a point where they have more bargaining power. This point is usually at 
the processor level, whereby the natural imbalance of power to suppress the price of milk does 
not reflect the risk taken to produce it.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A co-operative is a type of institutional structure in which “those who transact with the organisation also own and 
formally control the organisation” (Evans & Meade, 2005, p. 1; International Co-operative Alliance, 2014). 
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Hence, the establishment of co-operative institutional structure enables the vertical 
integration of NZ’s primary production, processing and marketing, allowing NZ producers to 
maximise the potential linkages between these industries and to capture their fair share of cash in 
the value chain by minimising market inefficiency (Greasley & Oxley, 2009). Consequently, for 
many years (1890-1950), farming and its subsidiary servicing industries have provided NZ 
citizens with the dependable long run occupations and incomes. The economy also engaged in a 
modest diversification of exports to include commodities such as butter, cheese, timber and coal, 
predominantly sold to the United Kingdom (UK).  
 
As political structure matured, the provincial governments were abolished and central 
government became responsible for all major decisions relating to the development and 
management of the NZ economy. Government policies in the late 19th century encouraged 
further agricultural activity, which heightened export earnings from that sector (State Services 
Commission, 1998). Among these are policies that facilitated smallholdings. The rise of 
refrigeration that opened up export markets for meat and dairy products made small farming an 
economic proposition. Subsequently, NZ’s government legislated policies aimed at dismantling 
the great estates in favour of closer settlement9 intended to aid the development of small farmers. 
The policy entailed the disposal of Crown land to genuine farmers, the extension of State 
leasehold and the repurchase of large estates for subdivision by the Crown. It has also entailed 
the introduction of land tax to enforce subdivision and cheap finance for the development of new 
farms. The Land for Settlement Acts of 1892 and 1894 were established to enforce the above 
policy objectives (Hylton & Lucas, 1966). Consequently, the subsequent demand for improved 
infrastructure heightened public borrowing and a cycle of policies that produced a nation 
increasingly dependent on its agricultural sector.  
 
Though the Great Depression of the early 1930s shocked NZ in the same ways as most 
other Western countries, as the international economy recovered, NZ’s single minded production 
and export of commodities to its assured UK markets continued. NZ’s preferential access to the 
UK market made prosperity an apparently permanent state of being for the well-insulated 
economy. Its citizens in this respect regarded NZ as “God’s own country” (State Services 
Commission, 1998). However, NZ’s lack of products and market diversification, reliance on a 
small range of products and a single major market made the economy vulnerable to shocks and it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The term closer settlement refers to “the intensification and expansion of agricultural settlement and rural land 
use” (Davison & Brodie, 2005).  
	  	  
	   15	   
	  
 
	   	  
suffered deeply when substantial shocks flowed through the economy. Two major shocks 
occurred when the world wool price plummeted in the late 1960s, and then when the UK joined 
the European Economic Community, abandoning its ‘Imperial Preference Scheme’, which 
radically restricted access to NZ as a previously taken-for-granted market (Borkin, 2009).  
 
By the early 1970s with prices for agricultural products on a worldwide high, a measure 
of economic prosperity somewhat returned only to be dampened again shortly after by the mid-
1970s oil price crises (see Figure 3). Subsequently, NZ’s terms of trade fell by nearly half in a 
year. As government struggled to stabilize the economy, inflation rose into double figures, 
unemployment increased substantially and to top it all off, the previously healthy trade surplus 
became a billion dollar deficit within two years (State Services Commission, 1998). The NZ 
government, in turn, responded with an array of policies to maintain employment levels and 
control consumer prices through subsidies and regulations and to make NZ less dependent on 
imported energy sources. These initiatives were funded via high taxation and substantial 
overseas borrowings. In addition to extensive price controls from the war period, NZ’s 
regulatory and trade policies also extended its pre-war isolationist stance on trade. Hence, 
throughout the twentieth century to 1984, a centralised government control regime in NZ meant 
that NZ industries were heavily regulated (Claus, Lattimore, Le & Stroombergen, 2011). 
 
However, as each policy ran into difficulties the government responded with further 
controls and more regulations, leading eventually to a comprehensive ‘wage and price freeze’ 
(State Services Commission, 1998). Though the government held much control of the economy 
(more than many other market economies), the NZ economy had become all but stagnant (see 
Figure 3), an outcome consistent with the growth theory with a focus on institutions literature. 
This literature predicts that heavily regulated markets, high tax burden and high share of 
discretionary taxes, and restricted trade, were all characteristics of a more stringent business 
environment unlikely to encourage investment and innovation necessary for growth and 
productivity to occur (North & Thomas, 1973). Thus, as expected in spite of these policies 
inflation remained high, unemployment increased, and real GDP per capita growth continued to 
stagnate. Consequently, by 1984 the NZ annual budget deficit and public debt was at an all-time 
high and the economy was at risk of a financial crisis. The only solution was a swift and radical 
reform of both the economy and the State (State Services Commission, 1998).  
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2.3 New Zealand ‘After the Reform’ 	  	   The radical reform of the New Zealand (NZ) economy, since the late 1980s and early 
1990s, has led the government to embark on a programme of sweeping liberalisation. The 
programme encompassed the removal of prices and exchange rate controls, the establishment of 
a broadly based low rate consumption tax, reduction of some punitive income and sales tax rates. 
The programme also abolished a whole range of agricultural and consumer subsidies and import 
licenses and export incentives. Attention then turned to the condition of the State. By the 1980s, 
the government owned a wide range of departments and trading enterprises, from winery to 
merchant and retail banks and commercial forests to utilities such as telecommunications, 
railways, electricity generation and marketing, and postal monopolies. All of these accounted for 
substantial GDP expenditure and gross investment but was providing very low returns (State 
Services Commission, 1998). By then it became clear that State owned and operated monopolies 
trading in tightly regulated markets were simply not going to provide the impetus needed for a 
vigorous and expanding economy.  
 
Consequently, beginning in 1990s many of these trading enterprises were transformed by 
the government into state-owned enterprises, with the dual objectives of reducing the Crown’s 
financial liabilities and achieving greater returns and efficiencies. The new approach to State 
enterprises at the turn of this century therefore encompassed corporatisation (or 
commercialisation), deregulation and privatisation (State Services Commission, 1998). 
Corporatisation began after the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 was established. Deregulation 
of various industries began prior to 1986. The financial, media, and transport sectors were 
amongst the first to feel the effects of deregulation, and soon after the State dominant industries 
such as electricity generation and distribution, postal services and the telecommunications sector 
were deregulated. Privatisation was intended to redefine the ‘role of the State’ and fiscal 
principles, recognising that ministers were not in the best position to make essentially 
commercial decisions and that privatisation would reduce the demand for government capital for 
development purposes and the subsidisation of inefficient operations.  
 
Following the radical reform of the 1980s and 1990s, NZ has transformed its economy 
from being among the most heavily protected and regulated into one of the most market-oriented 
and open internationally (WTO, 1996 as cited in Evans & Richardson, 1998). For example, in 
1996, the average applied tariff on all dutiable lines in NZ was only 10.3%, a drop from the 27% 
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rate two years earlier (Evans & Richardson, 1998). To date tariffs on imported material have 
largely been removed, only a 5% and 10% tariff duty applies to some goods. Furthermore, under 
NZ’s existing free trade agreements, preferential tariffs might apply to goods imported from 
specific countries when certain conditions are met, and thus such goods would have an even 
lower rate of tariff duty than otherwise applied. Additionally, a good may also become duty free 
by way of a tariff concession, which is approved for goods where no suitable alternative is 
produced or manufactured locally (New Zealand Customs Service, 2014).  
 
However, the economic transformation in NZ, whereby NZ went from a highly regulated 
economy to a highly deregulated one, greatly affected the business environment of 
agribusinesses. By the late 1980s, all input and output subsidies had been removed. The New 
Zealand Companies Act was rewritten in 1993 and following concerted lobbying by various 
agricultural leaders the New Zealand Co-operative Companies Act was rewritten in 1996 
(previous Co-operative Companies Act 1956). The reform of the Companies Act in 1993 was 
part of the government initiative to improve the governance of securities by incentivising greater 
director accountability (Bhabra, 2007). This was intended to strengthen internal control, and 
hence discouraged managerial entrenchment10, which is necessary to improve firm performance. 
On the other hand, a key aspect of the Co-operative Companies Act 1996 is that co-operatives 
registering under this act are indeed companies and that such companies must operate according 
to the principle of mutuality with members having an implied common interest in working 
together for mutual benefit (Woodford, 2008). The Co-operative Companies Act 1996 was 
written as a companion act to the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993. Hence, the conditions of 
the latter also apply to the former unless specifically specified otherwise. This provides great 
flexibility to co-operatives and some co-operative companies specifically register under both acts 
without incompatibility. This reduced the costs of compliance.  
 
The move to greater deregulation has also led to the dissolution of many of the statutory 
marketing boards with monopoly power in NZ. This, in effect, caused coordination problems in 
international marketing efforts of many NZ agricultural products (Dana & Schoeman, 2010). The 
formation of large mega co-operatives representing a vast proportion of the nation’s processors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The entrenchment argument says higher equity ownership by the manager (or a certain individual or group) may 
decrease firm performance because large managerial ownership stakes (or when majority shareholder find it 
beneficial to work with management) make managers so powerful that they do not have to consider the minority 
other stakeholders’ interest. They may also be so wealthy that they no longer intend to maximise profit but get 
higher utility from maximising market share etc. (Morck et al., 1988).  
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of specific agricultural commodities was introduced as a solution to this problem. The formation 
of Fonterra required special legislation, the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act of 2001, to 
authorise the consolidation of NZ’s two largest co-operatives (New Zealand Co-operative Dairy 
Company Ltd and Kiwi Co-operative Dairies Ltd). The New Zealand Ministry for Primary 
Industries administered this act. The act defined the resulting ownership of all the shares held by 
Fonterra in the New Zealand Dairy Board. The act also imposed specific conditions on 
Fonterra’s operation, including open membership and some restrictions on its powers to 
dominate internal dairy markets within NZ. In conjunction with the Commerce Act 1986, this act 
requires an open entry and exit of farmers into and out of the co-operative and up to 600 million 
litres of raw milk made available to competitors. The latter is intended to prevent the monopoly 
position of Fonterra from being anticompetitive.  
 
In summary, less stringent market regulations, lower taxations, a more open economy and 
more supportive policies to facilitate the development of key industries, all of these according to 
the growth theory’s with a focus on institutions literature, would infer improved institutional 
quality. Hence, one might expect NZ’s improved institutional quality based on its better policy 
settings after the 1980s and 1990s reforms, from full liberalisation of NZ’s agricultural sector 
and trade or financial flows to least restrictive market regulations, to pay-off in terms of higher 
productivity growth. An outcome predicted by the stimulation framework developed by Barnes 
et al. (2013), whereby based on NZ’s policy settings in the areas of taxation, regulation, 
innovation and education NZ’s GDP per capita, as predicted by the framework, should be about 
20% above the OECD average.  
 
However, apart from providing effective boost to labour utilisation, McCann (2009) 
reports that NZ’s GDP per capita and productivity have remained mediocre relative to many 
others advanced economies (see also Figure 1 to 4). Barnes et al. (2013) also report that NZ’s 
GDP per capita observed in 2009 is actually about 20% below the OECD average (see also 
Fallow, 2013; New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014a). Thus, to the conclusion that NZ 
is a clear outlier to the extent to which actual GDP per capita growth has undershot its predicted 
rates based on policy settings (Barnes et al., 2013). In other words, despite NZ’s good quality 
institutions, the economy GDP per capita is actually growing at a rate significantly below the 
OECD average. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of such a gap.  
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Figure 1 below revealed some concerning features for New Zealand (NZ). It appears that 
given NZ’s good structural and macro-policy framework, as judged by a wide body of OECD 
and other empirical studies underpinning the study by Barnes et al. (2013), NZ’s GDP per capita 
should be much higher than Greece (GRC) and much closer to that of Australia’s (AUS) and the 
United States’ (US).  However, NZ’s GDP per capita observed in 2009 was actually closer to the 
level observed for GRC and much lower than the level observed for AUS and the US.  
 
Figure 1: The Gap Predicted from Various Structural Policies vs. Observed Gap in GDP 
Per Capita Relative to the OECD Average11 
 
Note: The predicted overall GDP per capita gap was calculated on the basis of estimated impact of various structural 
policies (excluding product market regulation and labour protection legislation) from past OECD studies. The 
empirical studies that underpin the simulation framework identify the effects of policy settings on the basis of their 
time-series variation after controlling for all other unobserved factors (i.e. geography) contributed to explain cross-
country differences in performance. Key: NZ (New Zealand); GRC (Greece); PRT (Portugal); FRA (France); LUX 
(Luxembourg); BEL (Belgium); NOR (Norway); IRL (Ireland); SWE (Sweden); AUT (Austria); FIN (Finland); 
KOR (Korea); JPN (Japan); ESP (Spain); CHE (Switzerland); NLD (Netherland); CAN (Canada); AUS (Australia); 
GBR (United Kingdom); ITA (Italy); DNK (Denmark); ISL (Iceland); USA (United State); DEU (Germany). 
Source: graph constructed from data on the policy variable and the observed GDP per capita gap in 2009 (in %) 
from Barnes et al. (2013).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Luxembourg not included in the sample. Luxembourg presents a special case and is typically excluded from the 
regression because of the issue surrounding its GDP per capita being distorted by the fact that relatively large 
proportion of the country’s workforce do not actually live in the country (small population) and the country’s large 
amounts of external hot money invested in the Grand Duchy (see TheMoneyIllusion, 2010; Hennigan, 2014). 
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Furthermore, it appears that over the past 40 years New Zealand (NZ) per capita GDP has 
slipped from being above the OECD average to around 20% below it, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 below shows contrary to Australia (AUS), Norway (NOR), the United Kingdom (UK), 
the United States (US) and even Ireland (IRL)12 NZ’s GDP per capita growth over time has not 
improved but declined. In fact, NZ’s gaps in per capita GDP and productivity vis-à-vis the 
‘upper half of the OECD countries’13 has widened significantly since the 1970s. Despite the deep 
structural reforms and good macro-policy framework in place after the 1980s-1990s reform, such 
gaps have not begun to close.  
 
Figure 2: GDP Per Capita - New Zealand vs. Other Selected OECD Countries 
 
Note: 1996 to 2012 values calculated based on OECD (2014a) GDP per capita, US dollar, constant prices, 2005 
PPPs. 1976 and 1986 values sourced from Te Ara – The Encyclopedia of New Zealand (2012b). 
 
 
Even more concerning, the data seems to suggest that productivity in NZ is not catching 
up with other advanced economies. Figure 3 illustrates this. Figure 3 below shows the gaps in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ireland, a special case - through its drastic structural reforms during the Celtic Tiger period of 1996 to 2007, has 
also increased its GDP per capita from a level well below the OECD average to a level higher than the OECD 
average (for detail see O’Connor, 2009). 
13 Defined by the OECD as the percentage gap with respect to the simple average of the highest 17 OECD countries 
in terms of GDP per capita, GDP per hour worked and GDI per capita (in constant 2005 PPPs) (see OECD, 2013).  
See ANNEX 1 - detail on the OECD countries. Statistical Link: 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/fig4_e%20(2)%20NZ2013.xlsx.  
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NZ’s per capita GDP and productivity vis-à-vis the upper half of the OECD countries11 has 
widened since the late 1970s and even more so during the 80s and 90s. After the 1990s, although 
the gap in NZ’s per capita Gross Domestic Product/Gross Domestic Income (GDP/GDI) 
remained wide, data seems to suggest some sign of improvement (but at a very slow rate). The 
same cannot be said, however, for productivity.  Since the 1990s, the gap in NZ’s GDP per hour 
worked (proxy for labour productivity) has continued to widen. The divergence between NZ’s 
GDP per hour worked and per capita GDP/GDI performance observed in Figure 3 occurred 
because since the 1990s NZ’s GDP/GDI per capita performance had been driven by strong 
employment growth and improvement in the trade balance, while NZ’s labour productivity has 
continued to fall relative to other OECD countries (Conway & Meehan, 2013). Hence, offsetting 
the effect of declining productivity in NZ were its strong employment growth and terms of trade 
improvement. 
 
Figure 3: NZ's Gaps in Per Capita GDP and Productivity Persists: Gap to the Upper Half 
of OECD Countries13, Percent   
 
Note: The ‘Upper Half’ of the OECD countries is the simple average of the highest 17 OECD countries in terms of 
GDP per capita, GDP per hour worked and GDI per capita. Source: OECD (2013).  
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NZ’s productivity relative to other OECD countries highlights serious concerns for the NZ 
economy going forward. Of those concerns, one is the issue relative to the diffusion of 
technologies into the NZ economy. Another, more important issue, is that going forward as 
labour market participation and terms of trade gains reach their natural limits14 given the scarcity 
of resources and the limits to demand (D’Alessandro & Drago, 2003; Osenton, 2004), without 
improvements in productivity performance, NZ’s per capita GDP/GDI will stagnate.  
 
2.4 New Zealand’s GDP Per Capita Gaps  
 
Figure 4 below confirms that the gaps in New Zealand’s (NZ’s) GDP per capita to a 
number of other most advanced OECD countries have not begun to close irrespective of the 
1980s-1990s reform (except Greece, Italy and Spain).  
 
Figure 4: Per Capita GDP Percentage Gap Relative to New Zealand 
	  
Note: The graph is constructed from data on ‘Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per 
capita GDP’ for New Zealand and other 17 selected OECD countries obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, 2013.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 There is a physical (natural) limit to an economic level of living because of scarce natural resources.  
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2.5 New Zealand’s Productivity Under-Performance 	  
In recent times, measuring the change in productivity15 is carried out using index 
numbers, involving the measurement of changes in the level of outputs produced and inputs 
used. Index numbers measure the changes in the levels of a set of variables between a base 
period and the current period. Indices used for measuring productivity include Laspeyres (1871), 
Paache (1874), Fisher (1922), Törnquist (1936) and Malmquist productivity indexes (1953). 
Among these, Malmquist productivity index16 is one of the most extensively studied and 
developed in the non-parametric framework by several authors (see Caves et al., 1982; Färe et 
al., 1994; Chung et al., 1997; Shestalova, 2003; Oh & Heshmati, 2010). This is because the 
problem with using Laspeyres, Paache, Fisher and Törnquist indexes17 to measure productivity 
change is that they all required quantity or price information to determine the weights as well as 
assumptions about the structure of technology and the behaviour of producers (Tone, 2004). 
These variables are relatively ambiguous, hard to measure and unobservable.  
 
However, unlike Laspeyres, Paache, Fisher and Törnquist indexes, the Data Envelopment 
Analysis based (DEA-based) Malmquist productivity index (MI) makes use of output distance 
functions (the distance of an economy from its production frontier), comparing actual and 
potential production functions, to measure productivity change. It does so without constraining 
the results to fit any functional form of the production technology (Rao, 2004). Hence, in recent 
years the DEA-based MI productivity decomposition method has become standard in the 
investigation of productivity performance of firms and nations (Tone, 2004). In principle, MI 
approach enabled decomposition of ‘Productivity Change’ into ‘Technical Change’ and 
‘Efficiency Change’ components. The index captures (a) the shift in the best-practice production 
frontier that indicates ‘Technical Change’, and (b) the shift in the firm's location relative to the 
production frontier indicating the ‘Efficiency Change’ that may arise from learning by doing, 
managerial practices improvement and change in efficiency under existing technology (Zheng, 
2012).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Productivity change (PC), Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Multifactor Productivity (MFP) will be used 
interchangeably.  
16 Malmquist Productivity Index first introduced by Malmquist (1953) and further developed by several authors 
(including Caves, Christensen & Diewert, 1982; Färe & Grosskopf, 1994; Thrall, 2000) to analyse MFP changes of 
countries/firms over time (Tone, 2004). 
17 Laspeyres uses the base period quantities or prices as weights, Paache uses the current period weights; Fisher uses 
the geometric mean of Laspeyres and Paache indices and Törnquist uses a log-change form and represents the 
weighted average change in the log of the price or quantity of a particular commodity (Tone, 2004).  
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Since the 1970s, a number of authors have also proposed and tested various modified 
versions of the MI for a selected sample of OECD countries for the period 1970-2003 (see Oh 
and Heshmati, 2010). These include the original Malmquist (denoted as M; see Färe et al., 1994), 
Sequential Malmquist (denoted as SM; see Shestalova, 2003), Malmquist-Luenberger (denoted 
as ML; see Chung et al., 1997), and Sequential Malmquist-Luenberger (denoted as SML; see Oh 
and Heshmati, 2010). Given the sample of countries and the time period examined in their 
studies, their empirical results provide a good snapshot of the NZ productivity position relative 
to other OECD countries for the period 1970 to 2003. Evaluating the accuracy and measurement 
of the original MI model against its various extensions and modifications is outside the scope of 
this paper, since the aim of this exercise is to provide inferences of the NZ productivity situation 
relative to its OECD counterparts. Hence, Figure 5 below provides the range of MFP 
(multifactor productivity; also called total factor productivity or productivity change) estimated 
under various Malmquist Productivity Index (MI) methodologies for the sampled OECD 
countries to which a general inference of where the original MI stands relative to its various 
modifications can be judged.  
 
Figure 5 below illustrates that in general, for the majority of countries including NZ, the 
original MI (denoted as M) yield the lowest estimates of MFP among the various versions of MI. 
Whilst Sequential Malmquist-Luenberger (denoted as SML) yield the highest estimates of MFP. 
SML is a later modified version of MI. SML approach to ‘Productivity Change’ (MFP) 
measurement combines the concept of the successive sequential reference production sets and 
the concept of the directional distance function (Tulkens & Vanden Eeckaut, 1995; Luenberger, 
1992 as cited in Oh & Heshmati, 2010, p. 1346). In SML’s technology, technical change is 
assumed to enable more production of desirable outputs and less production of undesirable 
outputs. In so doing, Sequential Malmquist-Luenberger index (SML) is supposed to give a better 
measure of environmentally sensitive productivity growth that is free from spurious technical 
deterioration. While the original Malmquist index (M) is defined in terms of output distance 
functions, which seeks the greatest feasible expansion of all outputs, both good and bad, and 
where long run technical deterioration is possible (see Oh & Heshmati, 2010). Unlike M, SML’s 
technology assumed that technical deterioration is not possible. This explains why SML would 
yield relatively higher estimates of MFP than M (Finland and Norway however appear to be an 
exception to this rule).  
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Figure 5: The Range of MFP Outcomes Across M, SM, ML and SML Approach, 1970-2003 
 
Note: M, SM, ML, SML denoted Malmquist (see Färe et al., 1994), Sequential Malmquist (see Shestalova, 2003), 
Malmquist-Luenberger (see Chung et al., 1997), and Sequential Malmquist-Luenberger (see Oh & Heshmati, 2010), 
respectively. Key: countries’ name abbreviation see note to Figure 1. Source: own collaboration constructed using 
data from Oh and Heshmati, 2010.  
 
 
In Figure 5, the index value equals ‘one’ means that there have been no changes in 
productivity over the two time periods (e.g. time t and t+1). If there has been an increase 
(decrease) in productivity the index value would be greater (less) than ‘one’, respectively. To 
that end, it can be inferred that even under the most optimistic estimates – SML – the index value 
for NZ being smaller than unity (‘one’) confirms that, on average for the period 1970-2003, 
productivity in NZ has been declining. Decomposing NZ’s and the other OECD countries’ MFP 
(Multifactor Productivity or ‘Productivity Change’) in Figure 5 into ‘Efficiency Change’ and 
‘Technical Change’ allows one to look further into the issue. Figure 6 illustrates this. The result 
in Figure 6 highlights NZ’s poor performance on these measures relative to the sampled OECD 
countries, even under the most optimistic view (SML – where technical deterioration is not 
possible).  
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Figure 6: SML - Efficiency Change and Technical Change, 1970-2003 
 
Note: SML denoted Sequential Malmquist-Luenberger Productivity Index. Blue (Black) circles denoted positive 
(negative) productivity change (% growth), whereby the larger the circle the more positive (negative) is the 
percentage change in productivity. Ireland (IRL) is an outlier, an exception to the rule, to the extent that a drastic 
reform has taken place (see O’Connor, 2009). The positive correlation  between ‘Technical Change’ and ‘Efficiency 
Change’ increases with the removal of IRL from 0.045 to 0.108, but the relationship is still weak. Data source: Oh 
and Heshmati, 2010.  
 
 
In Figure 6 above, SML productivity index is decomposed into ‘Efficiency Change’ and 
‘Technical Change’ components. In this model ‘Efficiency Change’ represents the movement of 
a decision-making unit (countries in the study) towards the best practice frontier from time t to 
t+1. Whereby, Efficiency Change Index being greater (less) than one means there has been a 
catching-up movement (a movement away from) the frontier in period t+1, and hence the 
economy in question has become more (less) efficient, respectively. On the other hand, 
‘Technical Change’ measures the amount of a shift of frontier between t and t+1. Recall under 
SML approach the Technical Change Index is not less than unity because technical deterioration 
is not possible. Hence, the Technical Change Index from time t to t+1 is expected to be greater 
than one or otherwise equal one. This explains why Technical Change Index estimates for all 
countries under the SML approach are greater than unity/one. Consequently, in this set up, a 
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given economy’s relative Technical Change Index is assessed against the average Technical 
Change Index of the sample, not the unity value ‘one’.  
 
To this end, Figure 6 informs us if the Efficiency Change Index (EC) of a country is 
larger (less) than unity it is considered as being in the state of catching up (lagging behind) the 
world frontier technology. Likewise, if the Technical Change Index (TC) is larger (smaller) than 
the average technical change of the sample, its innovation ability can be considered as being 
better (worse) than the virtual average country. On this basis, one can categorises the sampled 
countries in Figure 6 into four groups. They are Group A: more innovative and catching up 
economies (TC > sample average and EC > unity); Group B: more innovative but lagged 
economies (TC > sample average and EC < unity); Group C: less innovative but catching up 
economies (TC < sample average and EC > unity); Group D: less innovative and lagged 
economies (TC < sample average and EC < unity) (Oh & Heshmati, 2010). Consequently, NZ’s 
relative low score on both Technical Change Index (TC) and Efficiency Change Index (EC) 
dimension in Figure 6 suggested that NZ would belong to ‘Group D: less innovative and lagging 
behind’ (1970-2003). Under such categorisation, one can interpret NZ’s relative position on 
‘Productivity Change’, ‘Efficiency Change’ and ‘Technical Change’ in Figure 6 as follows. 
Overall, Productivity Change (PC) in NZ was negative (approximately by 2.6%). On the scale of 
Efficiency Change, NZ was below unity at the rate of 3.9%. Though Technical Change in NZ 
being greater than 1 at 1.0013 this indicates that there is technical progress at an annual average 
rate of 1.3% for 1970-2003, this rate is below the average annual rate achieved in the sampled 
OECD countries of 3.7%. Hence, in sum one can infer that on average, between 1970 and 2003 
NZ had been relatively less innovative and inefficient compared to other OECD countries. These 
in effect, accounted for NZ’s relative poor ‘Productivity Change’ (PC) of negative 2.6% for the 
period 1970-200318.  
 
Note that United States’ EC was also below unity in this sample.  This may in part be due 
to the dotcom bubble burst and the 9/11 terrorist attack. Such events greatly affected United 
States’ business operations between 2001 and 2003. Economies with United States (US) 
multinationals also experienced disruption to their operations, and thus experienced lower EC 
scores than expected otherwise. However, low EC observed for the US may also be due to the 
fact that EC is a measure of change (rate) not level. An economy such as the US that has 
experienced greater efficiency from the very early stages (cf. the beginning of industrialisation), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For more information on Malmquist Productivity Index and productivity growth see Boussemart et al (2001).  
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the incremental change in efficiency thereafter may be relatively small. The US high rate of TC 
observed in Figure 6 also reinforces this point by suggesting that high level of efficiency (from 
the very early stages and accumulated over time) may have facilitated the US’s very high rate of 
TC. Likewise, a country that started with a very low level of efficiency would experience 
relatively larger changes. Ireland’s dramatic improvement in EC after its drastic structural reform 
after a very long period of inefficiency confirms this (see O’Connor, 2009).  
 
In line with this, a study by Pires and Garcia (2012) on the source of economic growth 
between 1970 and 2000 provided similar results. Pires and Garcia (2012) use a growth 
accounting method to decompose output growth (GDP) into labour and capital input growth and 
Multifactor Productivity (MFP) growth. They then adopted a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach to obtain estimators of MFP components, before decomposing MFP (or Productivity 
Change) into its respective Efficiency Change and Technical Change components.  
 
Table 1 below summarizes their results and informs us about NZ’s relative poor position 
on the improvement in innovation (Technical Change growth ranked 15th out of 17), in efficiency 
(Efficiency Change growth ranked 16th out of 17) and in overall productivity (Productivity 
Change growth ranked 16th out of 17) compare to its OECD counterparts for the period 1970-
2000 (consistent with the finding of Oh & Heshmati, 2010).  Table 1 also informs us that, on 
average between 1970 and 2000, NZ’s relative position in terms of growth in labour inputs was 
also high (ranked 4th), while NZ’s growth in terms of capital inputs and Multifactor Productivity 
(MFP) were relatively low (ranked in the bottom percentile). This confirms that the driver of 
output growth in NZ during this period was due to strong employment growth. However, the 
lower capital to labour ratio and MFP in NZ suggests that NZ was relatively capital shallow and 
less productive compared to other OECD countries in the sample during 1970-2000. 
 
	  	  
	   29	   
	  
 
	   	  
Table 1: Sources of Economic Growth 1970-2000 (in Average Annual Percentage Change) 
	   	   	   Productivity Change Decompose into                  Technical and Efficiency Change Components  
Country  Output growth (1) 
Capital 
inputs (2) 
Labour 
inputs (2) 
Total 
factors  
TFP/MFP 
Productivity 
Change (3) 
  Technical 
Progress 
(TC)  
 
Efficiency 
Change 
(EC) 
=E+S+O 
 ε (3) 
   
  R  R  R   R  R  R  
AUS  
(Australia) 4.16 3 1.17 13 1.06 2 2.23 0.93 15 0.3 6 0.64 15 1 
AUT  
(Austria) 3.74 8 1.7 10 0.3 14 2 1.77 2 0.25 10 1.51 2 -0.03 
BEL  
(Belgium) 3.29 13 1.6 12 0.31 13 1.91 1.4 8 0.23 12 1.16 6 -0.02 
CAN  
(Canada) 4.14 4 1.87 6 1.1 1 2.97 0.98 13 0.26 9 0.72 14 0.19 
DNK 
(Denmark) 2.61 15 0.89 16 0.35 12 1.24 1.39 9 0.27 8 1.11 8 -0.02 
FIN  
(Finland) 3.65 10 1.76 8 0.37 10 2.13 1.45 6 0.18 14 1.27 5 0.07 
FRA  
(France) 3.43 12 1.79 7 0.47 8 2.26 1.75 3 0.41 3 1.33 3 -0.57 
GRC  
(Greece) 3.67 9 4.37 1 0.3 14 4.67 -0.46 17 0.05 16 -0.5 17 -0.55 
IRL  
(Ireland) 6.03 1 2.18 4 0.61 5 2.79 0.97 14 -0.05 17 1.01 10 2.27 
ITA  
(Italy) 3.53 11 2.14 5 0.29 16 2.43 1.24 12 0.35 4 0.89 13 -0.14 
JPN  
(Japan) 5.26 2 3.54 2 0.58 6 4.12 2.42 1 0.56 1 1.83 1 -1.28 
NOR  
(Norway) 4.09 5 1.75 9 0.4 9 2.15 1.53 4 0.25 10 1.28 4 0.41 
ESP  
(Spain) 3.97 6 2.79 3 0.54 7 3.33 1.3 11 0.23 12 1.06 9 -0.66 
SWE  
(Sweden) 2.57 16 0.96 15 0.36 11 1.32 1.44 7 0.28 7 1.15 7 -0.2 
UK  
(United 
Kingdom) 
2.73 14 0.99 14 0.27 17 1.26 1.33 10 0.32 5 1 11 0.13 
USA  
(United State) 3.97 6 1.7 10 0.84 3 2.54 1.49 5 0.52 2 0.96 12 -0.07 
NZ  
(New Zealand) 2.39 17 0.47 17 0.77 4 1.24 0.76 16 0.15 15 0.61 16 0.39 
Note: (1) Growth of GDP (output) = 𝑦; (2) Growth rates adjusted by income shares; (3) TFP/MFP/Productivity 
Change and random shock (ε) obtained as residual of output growth and productivity change, respectively; R = rank 
where 1 = best. Efficiency Change (EC) is the sum of Technical efficiency (E), scale effects (S), and allocative 
efficiency (O). Source: Data extracted from Pires and Garcia (2012). Their model estimation was conducted using 
STAT. Their database consists of a non-balanced panel for aggregated output and production factors (capital and 
labour) of a sample of countries obtained from Penn World Tables version 6.1 (1950-2000). Data for factor shares 
were obtained from the System of National Accounts 1968 (United Nations, 2003) and from the Annual National 
Accounts of OECD (OECD, 2003)19. 
 
 
Though indefinite growth in GDP cannot be sustained through input accumulation alone, 
capital accumulation (deepening) nonetheless has a direct impact on the level of output and 
productivity. This is because a rise in capital directly influences labour productivity by 
increasing the quantity and quality of machinery, equipment and infrastructure available to each 
worker (Hall & Scobie, 2005). Hence, higher capital intensification would, in this sense, lead to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Annual National Accounts for OECD Member Countries – Data from 1970 onwards. Table 3: GDP by Income, 
2003.  
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higher labour productivity and vice versa. If labour productivity increased (decreased) beyond 
the level of capital input growth (contract), due to better (worse) capital utilisation, MFP would 
be higher (lower). This in effect makes capital accumulation indirectly linked to MFP. 
Consequently, relatively low capital accumulation and intensification leading to low MFP, due to 
lack of investment and innovation, in NZ may very well explain the economy’s relative 
economic under-performance. This is consistent with a point made by Kaldor (1957; 1961 as 
cited in Altman, 2013) that in many circumstances technological change requires capital 
accumulation or investment.  
 
For New Zealand (NZ), its relative poor position illustrated in Figure 6 (or Table 1) is 
quite worrisome given that much of the fluctuation of NZ’s output growth appears to be largely 
driven by MFP (as illustrated in Figure 7 below) and that MFP is an important driver behind 
NZ’s labour productivity fluctuations (as illustrated in Figure 8 below). Even more concerning 
for NZ, an examination of Statistics New Zealand’s industry productivity statistics 1978-2011 
reveal an ongoing decline of NZ’s average annual labour productivity change (see Figure 9 
below), capital productivity change (see Figure 10 below) and MFP change (see Figure 11 
below) in the primary, goods-producing and services industries since the 1997-2000s growth 
cycle20 (Statistics New Zealand’s productivity statistics: 1978-2013, 2014a; See Figure 7-8 note). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Productivity data presented as annual averages within Growth Cycle. Estimating productivity growth over cycles 
is preferable because the methodology used in compiling the estimates implicitly assumes that the proportion of 
capital stock used in production (capital utilisation) does not change. Therefore, any real world change in the extent 
to which capital is utilised in production will be recorded as change in productivity. 
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Figure 7: New Zealand’s Productivity in the Measured Sector: Contribution to Output 
Growth from Capital Input, Labour Input and MFP, 1970-2013 
 
Figure 8: New Zealand's Labour Productivity Decomposition - Contribution from Capital 
Deepening and MFP, 1979-2013 
 
Figure 7 – 8 Note: the measured sector is ANZSIC06 divisions, a subset of the economy. Industry coverage under 
ANZSIC06 included the primary sector (AAZ, BB1), goods-producing sector (CCZ, DD1, EE1), and service sector 
(FF1 to RS2); services available from 1996. See the data quality section on www.stats.govt.nz for more details21. 
Source: Graphs constructed using data from Statistics New Zealand’s productivity statistics: 1978-2013 (2014a). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Direct: 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/productivity/ProductivityStatistics_HOTP78-
13/Data%20Quality.aspx#industry 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
A
nn
ua
l %
 C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
Year 
Capital Input Contribution Labour Input Contribution 
Multifactor Productivity Contribution Output Growth 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 
A
nn
ua
l P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
Year Capital	  deepening	   MFP	   Labour	  Productivity	  
	  	  
	   32	   
	  
 
	   	  
Figure 9: Labour Productivity by Sector, 1978-2011 
 
Figure 9 shows NZ’s primary industries, goods-producing industries and service industries all faced ongoing decline 
in labour productivity growth since the 1990-97 Growth Cycle. Among these the primary sector has experienced the 
greatest fluctuation in average annual growth rate by Growth Cycles. Data Source: figure derived from data made 
available by Statistics New Zealand’s Industry Productivity Statistics: 1978-2011 (2013). 
 
Figure 10: Capital Productivity by Sector, 1978-2011 
 
Figure 10 shows NZ’s primary industries, goods-producing industries and service industries all faced ongoing 
decline in capital productivity since the 1990-97 growth cycle and have became negative since the 2000-08 growth 
cycle. Data Source: as in the Note to Figure 9.  
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Figure 11: Multifactor Productivity by Sector, 1978-2011 
	  
Figure 11 shows that NZ’s primary industries more so than its goods-producing industries and service industries 
experienced larger ongoing decline in multifactor productivity (MFP) since the 1990-97 Growth Cycle. Primary 
industries’ MFP has been negative since the 1997-2000 Growth Cycle, while the goods-producing and the service 
industries’ annual average percentage MFP growth only became negative in the 2008-11 growth cycle. The periods 
are not equal because a growth cycle is the period between two peaks of output, the peak-to-peak time period. This 
accounts for capacity utilisation at the start and end points of a cycle when an economy’s resources are most in use. 
Productivity is best analysed between growth cycles rather than individual years because factors such as capacity 
utilisation do vary from year to year, and can be high during times of strong economic growth but negative when 
economic activity declines. Hence, annual movements can be affected by changes in capacity utilisation rather than 
actual productivity change. Such a noise can be accounted for by matching years when capacity utilisation was at its 
peak and thus the growth cycle approach to analysing productivity change. Data Source: as in the Note to Figure 9.  
 
 
Of these, NZ’s capital productivity and MFP performance are of most concern. Both 
capital productivity and MFP average annual percentage change by growth cycles have declined 
significantly, from their higher positive rates to a substantially lower negative rates, between the 
1990-97 growth cycle and the 2008-11 growth cycle. Statistics New Zealand (2014b) defines a 
growth cycle or business cycle as the period between two peaks of output (a peak to peak time 
period). By reflecting the points in time when resources in the economy are most in use, growth 
cycles take account of capacity utilisation at the start and end points of a cycle. In principle, 
productivity is best analysed between growth cycles because annual movements can be volatile 
and can be driven by changes in capacity utilisation rather than actual material productivity 
growth. Hence, by analysing productivity between growth cycles, and thereby matching years 
when capacity utilisation was at its highest, one can compare productivity growth when 
economic activity was at a maximum.  
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An important difference between the Oh and Heshmati (2010) and Pires and Garcia 
(2012) studies is the implicit inclusion of the effects of the dotcom bubble burst and 9/11 
terrorist attack in the former but not present in the latter. This may account for the weaker 
positive correlation between Technical Change (TC) and Efficiency Change (EC) in Figure 6. 
However, when regressed Technical Change on Efficiency Change using Pires and Garcia’s 
(2012) data for 1970-2000 to check whether the exclusion of these effects would produce a 
stronger positive relationship between Technical Change and Efficiency Change, the result is 
only a small positive improvement. The relationship remained weak. When one also excludes 
Ireland and the United States (outliers) from the regression the positive relation between 
Technical Change and Efficiency Change improved but remained relatively weak. However, if 
one splits the sample into two, group one in the dashed oval and group two in the dotted oval, the 
positive association between Technical Change and Efficiency Change for each group is stronger 
(see Figure 6). Additionally, there appear to be a relative shift of the Technical Change-
Efficiency Change function between the first and the second group.  
 
Such a pattern suggests, at least for the sample of countries examined, greater efficiency 
may give impetus to greater technology diffusion and innovation. Likewise, greater 
technological progress may generate greater absorption leading to greater efficiency. However, 
whether or not such causal relationships occur and how strong the effect may be can be driven by 
other factor(s), which dictates the extent to which an economy is exposed to external 
technologies on the one hand and the efficiency with which it absorbs them on the other hand. 
This ‘other factor(s)’ the paper hypothesizes to be one related to the issue of ‘firm/corporate 
governance’, specifically which of managerial competency and managerial effectiveness, which 
will be explored in detail later in Section 3 to 5.  
 
2.6 New Zealand’s Productivity Under-Performance despite Its Strong Institutions 
 
Before the 1970s, New Zealand (NZ) was among the highest income countries in the 
world, with a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in the years leading to World War 
II (WWII), ranking in the top 5 internationally. Though the level of productivity and ranking 
dropped slightly during the Great Depression in the 1930s, and WWII, it quickly recovered 
thereafter with accelerating productivity, placing NZ between 2nd and 7th place on the 
international ranking chart in terms of real GDP per capita between 1934 and 1960. However, 
the positive association between good quality institutions and economic performance seems to 
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break down for NZ after the 1990s reform. NZ’s institutional quality in the post reform period 
based on policy settings in the area of taxation, regulation, innovation and education judged by 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and various institutional 
indexes developed more recently has shown to be much higher than what it was in the past. Yet, 
NZ’s GDP per capita and productivity performance seem to be much worse today than in the 
past. NZ had fallen from having ranked 7th in 1967 to 23rd by the 1980s in terms of real GDP per 
capita (see Figure 12 below). Even after the NZ radical economics reform of the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s there seems to be little change to NZ’s relative real GDP per capita position on 
the international ranking chart as measured by Angus Maddison. Figure 12 illustrates this.  
 
Figure 12: NZ’s International Ranking Based on Real GDP Per Capita, 1890-2010 
 
Note: Graph constructed from data made available by the University of Groningen (2004).  
 
 
Figure 12 shows that the first big relative decline in GDP per capita took place in the 
mid-1970s and 1980s. Another relative decline occurred in the late 1980s, and since the 1990s 
NZ’s real GDP per capita (and productivity) performance on the international ranking chart 
remained relatively mediocre (Mason, 2013: Investigating New Zealand-Australia Productivity 
Differences at Industry Level). To date, though NZ’s institutional quality is of a high standard 
(The World Bank Group, 2013), NZ’s GDP per capita, in contrast, is much lower and 
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significantly lags behind its OECD counterparts (as illustrated in Figure 1 to 4), with NZ ranking 
at the bottom end of the OECD productivity league (Agarwal et al., 2013).  
 
It is a puzzling phenomenon that in spite of the wide-ranging and far-reaching reforms of 
the 1980s and 1990s NZ’s GDP per capita and productivity remains significantly below the 
OECD average. Despite having perhaps one of the better institutions relative to its OECD 
counterparts today, NZ’s per capita GDP growth and productivity seems to perform much worse 
today. According to the Institutions Climate Index, developed by the Ifo Institute in 2007 to 
assess institutional quality across the OECD countries and its relationship to economic growth, 
NZ institutional quality has greatly improved from its 1994 level. Between 1994 and 2010, the 
quality of institutions in NZ has greatly improved, moving from an index ranking of 18th to 3rd 
out of the OECD countries examined in the study (Rohwer, 2011). However, the same cannot be 
said for NZ’s GDP per capita and productivity. One must, therefore, ask the question – ‘why’ is 
productivity not catching up, given NZ’s good macroeconomic and structural policies and 
comparatively low productivity levels to begin with? In many respects such phenomenon 
appears to be something of a paradox (Barnes et al., 2013; OECD, 2013). For NZ, improvement 
in the quality of institutions after the radical reform of the 1980s and 1990s to the present time 
(The World Bank Group, 2013), for some reason, has not translated into improved productivity 
performance.  
 
3. New Zealand’s Relative Productivity Under-Performance – The Debates 	  
Solving ‘The New Zealand Productivity Puzzle’ is not a straightforward proposition. The 
puzzling phenomenon of New Zealand’s (NZ’s) economic performance has generated spirited 
debates among academia and public policy experts seeking to provide an answer to this age-old 
paradox. Within these debates, there are broadly two schools of thought. One focuses on NZ’s 
geographic isolation as a constraint to its economic performance. The other school of thought 
focuses on the adverse effect of NZ’s high interest rate and our persistent overvalued real 
exchange rate as the constraining factor to growth in our (more productive) tradable sectors. 
Therefore, generating poor economic performance. However, this paper brings forward a third 
line of argument, explored more recently, with respect to the links between firm/corporate 
governance, firm performance, stock-market development and economic prosperity.  
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3.1 NZ’s Productivity Under-Performance: An Issue of Relative Geographic Isolation 
 
In this case, it is maintained that New Zealand’s (NZ’s) small size and geographic 
isolation constraint its economic performance. Rather than from an institutional or free-market 
perspective versus interventionist arguments to explain NZ’s low productivity, this line of 
argument maintains that from the perspective of economic geography, there is nothing puzzling 
about NZ’s productivity (McCann, 2009).  It is argued that being the most isolated of all OECD 
countries makes global integration more challenging (OECD, 2008). Both the endogenous 
growth and economic geography literatures argue that there can be positive spillovers from size 
and connectedness that lead to greater technological progress and thus growth (Smith, 2011). 
Boulhol and de Serres’ (2010) study show that being small and geographically isolated could 
result in a lower GDP per capita by up to 10%.  
 
However, in the geographic isolation case, NZ and Australia’s good policy settings and 
strong institutions (Barnes et al., 2013) should overcome geographic barriers (OECD, 2013). 
Further, there are few empirical results from the literature relevant to cross-country income 
comparisons in this area (Smith, 2011). More importantly, as shown earlier, before the 1970s NZ 
was among the highest per capita income countries in the world, with a high real GDP per capita 
in the years leading to the 1970s, ranking in the top 10 internationally (see Figure 12 above). 
Moreover, NZ’s productivity for the period 1896-1960 was also increasing, as illustrated in 
Figure 13 below ($GK denoted Geary-Khamis or International Dollar).  
Figure 13: NZ's Productivity (Output per worker in 1990 $GK), 1896-1960 
 
Note: Graph constructed from data made available by Long (1958) and the University of Groningen (2004).  
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NZ was even smaller then and located exactly where it is now. Hence, the argument of 
being small and geographically isolated as factor impeding NZ’s economic performance, 
preventing better engagement in the international market, investment in R&D and in 
management, simply may not hold water. This is relevant even more so today than in the past, 
given the advancement of technology at present, i.e. cloud computing, geographical isolation as a 
constraining factor to doing business becomes less and less relevant. 
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology defined cloud computing as a ‘model 
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage, applications and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider 
interaction’ (Mell & Grance, 2011). In other words, instead of storing, managing and processing 
information using a local server or a personal computer, cloud-computing practice enables all of 
these to be carried out using a network of remote servers hosted on the Internet. Such internet-
based computing, where large groups of remote servers are networked, allow sharing of data-
processing tasks, centralisation of data storage, and online access to computer services or 
resources.  
 
This network connection system allows employees, customers and partners to work 
together in a secure and reliable manner from anywhere (and anytime). Though NZ’s internet 
infrastructure (data centres and connectivity) to date remain relatively insufficient in both its 
capacity and capability to enable NZ to be a global source for cloud computing resources, it does 
not stop NZ from using global cloud computing services to address global markets. The internet-
based access to overseas cloud computing services allows NZ’s businesses access to a cost based 
service that only a global scale can provide. Hence, at the most fundamental, macroeconomic 
level, such internet-based networks allow NZ’s businesses to overcome the physical limitations 
of market size and the tyranny of distance (Kumar, 2014). At the firm level, cloud computing 
enables firms to reduce the costs of Information Technology benefits previously achieved via 
capital expenditure to mere operational costs.  
 
3.2 NZ’s Productivity Under-Performance: An Issue of Relative High Interest Rates 
 
A second school of thought argues that high real interest rates since the 1990s depressed 
business investment and exacerbated imbalances. This helps to explain New Zealand’s (NZ’s) 
failure to close the GDP per capita and productivity gaps between NZ and other advanced 
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economies. This happened at a time where higher rates of investment were required to maintain 
capital-labour ratios given high levels of immigration driven by policy change since the early 
1990s (Smith, 2011). Further, despite the large, decades long and continuing deterioration in 
NZ’s relative productivity, the real exchange rate on average has not decreased. The argument is 
that the exchange rate has not adjusted largely because average NZ real interests have remained 
so much above those abroad. The persistently overvalued exchange rate – itself a symptom of 
imbalances across the economy – can be argued to be important in understanding why, despite 
the far-reaching reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the large gap between NZ’s GDP per 
capita and that of those in other advanced economies has not even begun to close. This line of 
argument claims that had interest rates settled at around typical advanced economy levels, NZ’s 
exchange rate would have fluctuated around a much lower average level, allowing better-
balanced, stronger and more sustainable growth in per capita incomes and productivity (Reddell, 
2013).  
 
However, in the case of high interest rates, one of the distinguishing features of open 
economies is that domestic investment and savings need not be equal. This means an economy 
can finance higher investment via running current account deficits. Hence, an important question 
to this argument is why cross-border financial capital mobility failed to maintain the physical 
capital-labour ratio at an appropriate level. Further, Kendall and Ng (2013; p. 19) show between 
1992 and 2012 both NZ’s and Australia’s long-term interest rates behaviour had been broadly 
similar and high relative to interest rate in the United States, but why has only NZ’s productivity 
trailed behind? The differences in investment rates and per capita GDP gaps in NZ, therefore, 
had to be due to some other non-interest factor(s) (Smith, 2011). 
 
A non-interest factor affecting NZ’s economic potential, which has quickly worked its 
way to the centre of academic discussion, is the influence of the fundamental changes in the 
global marketplace. Increasingly, one of the major problems facing many of NZ’s resource based 
industries is that its margins have fallen and its returns have become more volatile. This is due in 
part to the poor profitability of the industries NZ competes in (i.e. primary production) and in 
part to its position in these industries (exports of raw material and not so much on value-added 
exports). Why? Because world trade is fundamentally changing and increasingly goods-
producing and service sectors contributed more to growth through greater value-added than the 
primary sector (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014b; Crocombe et al., 1991).  
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Faced with the fundamental change in the composition of world trade (see Table 2), NZ’s 
relatively high concentrated exports position in a few products (primary-based) in sectors with 
slower than average world export growth, contributed to NZ’s relative poor economic 
performance in the post 1970s. The United Nations COMTRADE database statistics on 
merchandise exports as a percentage of total nominal exports, 2000 and 2008, shows that NZ’s 
composition of merchandise exports remained heavily weighted toward food and beverage 
exports, relative to the comparator OECD countries (MED, 2011). Additionally, according to the 
‘export drivers matrix’ constructed by Coriolis (2010a), the major share of NZ’s food and 
beverage exports remained in the dairy sector. NZ produced more milk than consumed – a small 
economy with a small population but many cows (see graph on page 9 in Coriolis, 2010a). In 
fact, the dairy sector, to date, remains the main driver behind NZ’s export growth, followed by 
meat, timber and oil (see graph on page 14 in Coriolis, 2010a). Dairy and meat together account 
for about 70% of NZ’s food and beverage export value (see graph on page 15 in Coriolis, 2012). 
This indicates that NZ’s exports are still dominated by a handful of key traditional primary 
industries (except oil22 - rapidly emerging in the recent decade). 
Table 2: NZ’s GDP – Composition, by Sector (as % of GDP)  
 1953 1960 1982 2006 
Primary  26 21 11 7 
Agriculture  24 19 9 4 
Non-Agriculture  2 2 2 3 
Secondary  22 22 24 16 
Food 3 6 5 5 
Non-Food 19 16 19 11 
Tertiary  52 57 65 77 
Other Services  13 13 18 30 
Source: Table 2 constructed from data made available by Claus, Lattimore, Le and Stroombergen (2011).  
Note: More recent figures estimated for 2013 for NZ can be obtained from Central Intelligence Agency World 
Factbook (2012). The estimates for NZ in 2013: agriculture (5%), industry (25.5%) and services (69.5%).  
 
 
This is not to say that specialisation in primary commodities necessarily means lower 
growth. Other countries (Scandinavian countries – Norway, Demark and Sweden) also focusing 
on agricultural and similar such sectors are much wealthier in terms of per capita GDP than NZ. 
Why? Much more of value-added focus, and thus what at issue for NZ is not what we got but 
what we do with what we got. Saunders & Dalziel (2014; also Saunders et al., 2011) speak 
explicitly about this issue. These authors maintain that to grow our wellbeing NZ needs to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The oil industry in this recent decade experienced rapid growth following the oil discovery at the Taranaki basin 
and with NZ’s 17 other basins in the process of exploration. This industry holds great future growth potential for 
NZ. 
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concentrate on high value-added of agricultural products and hence obtain from its export 
markets a premium for what it is good at. Though NZ’s small domestic market size may mean 
that firms have to export earlier in their lifecycle than is typical done overseas and NZ’s distance 
from markets can make market positioning more difficult, good collaboration and joint ventures 
can help NZ overcoming these challenges.  
 
Collaboration (or alliance) and joint ventures can improve the competitive position of the 
partners and develop a business in a way or to an extent or at a speed that is not achievable by 
the partners separately. Alliance and joint ventures can minimise the risk of entry into a new 
market or developing an existing market further, achieving minimum size for operating in a 
market and overcoming legal constraints on operating in certain countries (Park, 2014). All of 
these can help to enhance both the market size and the competitive position of NZ’s businesses. 
Moreover, high research and development (R&D) and hence innovation can further increase 
value-added products and better position NZ’s existing exports in overseas markets. However, it 
appears NZ is not performing so well on these leverage points with headlines like ‘low 
innovation and weak international connections limit productivity’ (Scoop, 2014) and with The 
Global Innovation Index 2014 indicating NZ’s relative low performance on ‘joint 
venture/strategic alliance deals’ (score 26.6 out of 100) compare to Singapore (68.3/100) and 
Hong Kong (70.2/100)23.       
 
Another factor affecting growth and productivity worth considering is the weakening of 
inter-industry linkages between NZ’s manufacturing sector and the agriculture sector since 1982. 
Claus, Lattimore, Le and Stroombergen (2011) use the input-output tables constructed by 
Statistics NZ available from 1953 and the Leontief (1936)24 and Ghosh (1958)25 models to 
examine the changes in NZ’s production structure. In so doing, their study reveals that since 
about 1982 the primary processing backward linkage and agriculture forward linkage had 
weakened relative to that of 1953 and 1960. Table 3 on the next page reports the results of Claus, 
Lattimore, Le and Stroombergen’s (2011) study on NZ’s 1953-2006 Structural Indicators. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/content.aspx?page=data-analysis 
24 The Leontief Model is given by  𝑥 = [1   −   𝐴]!!  𝑓, where x is a (Nx1) vector of industries’ gross output (both 
intermediate and final demand), N = number of industries’, f is a (Nx1) vector of industries’ final demand, I 
(identity) = (NxN) and 𝐴 = [𝑎!"] is a (NxN) matrix of technical coefficients. The matrix [1   −   𝐴]!! is the Leontief 
inverse or total requirement matrix, showing how much output is required directly and indirectly from each industry 
for every dollar’s worth of output produced for final use – its elements are denoted by 𝑏!" . 
25 Ghosh’s Inter-industry Model is given by 𝑥! = 𝑝  [𝐼   −   𝐴]!!, where p is a (1xN) vector of industries’ primary 
inputs, 𝐴   = [𝑎!"] is a (NxN) matrix of direct sales coefficients with is the Ghosh inverse – its elements are denoted 
by 𝑏!"  –measures the output of industries that is necessary to absorb primary inputs. 
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Table 3: 1953-2006 Structural Indicators 
  1953 1960 1982 1987 2006 
  
Backward 
Linkage 
(“BL”) 
Forward 
Linkage 
(“FL”)  BL  FL  BL  FL  BL FL BL  FL  
Agriculture/Farming  5 3 5 1 9 5 10 11 11 11 
Fishing & Hunting  11 12 19 21 18 20 19 17 20 12 
Forestry & logging  12   21 10 16 18 15 19 17 15 
Mining  10   20 12 21 9 20 9 18 14 
Primary Processing (Food, 
beverages, Tabacco)  1  11 1 17 1 15 3 16 3 18 
Textiles, apparel & leather  N/A N/A 6 19 6 19 7 20 15 20 
Wood & wood products  N/A N/A 12 11 13 16 13 15 14 16 
Paper, products and 
printing  N/A N/A 13 6 12 11 12 4 13 5 
Chemicals, petrol, rubber 
etc.  N/A N/A 14 3 10 6 11 8 9 10 
Non-metallic mineral 
products  N/A N/A 18 9 20 12 21 12 21 9 
Basic metals  N/A N/A 15 14 15 13 16 14 16 17 
Fabricated metal products  N/A N/A 8 7 5 4 6 7 19 13 
Other manufacturing 
(include: electrical, 
vehicle and transport 
products)  2 1 17 20 19 17 18 18 7 19 
Electricity, gas, water  9 10 11 13 14 7 14 10 10 6 
Construction  6 7 2 8 4 14 4 13 4 8 
Trade, restaurants, hotels  N/A N/A 3 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 
Transport and storage  7 5 9 4 7 10 9 5 8 7 
Communication  N/A N/A 16 15 17 8 17 6 12 4 
Finance, insurance etc.  8 9 10 16 11 1 8 1 6 2 
Owner-occupied 
dwellings  N/A N/A 7 18 8 21 5 21 5 21 
Other services  4 6 4 5 2 3 1 2 1 1 
Source: Table constructed based on data made available by Claus, Lattimore, Le and Stroombergen (2011).  
 
Claus, Lattimore, Le and Stroombergen’s (2011) results reported in Table 3 inform us 
that since approximately 1982 the primary processing backward linkage and agriculture forward 
linkage have weakened relative to that of 1953 and 1960. The indicator values in Table 3 ranked 
from one downwards on the estimated coefficient, with ‘1’ being the strongest. Table 3 
highlights that in 2006, if anything, the strength of forward linkage (FL) and backward linkage 
(BL) have weakened for NZ’s agriculture/farming and primary processing manufacturing, with 
the estimated coefficient fallen from 1,1 (FL, BL) in 1960 to 3,18 in 2006 (Claus, Lattimore, Le 
& Stroombergen, 2011). Hirshman (1958) and Altman (2003; 2005) also point out the 
significance of such linkages on economic growth and development. These authors maintain that 
by way of primary sector’s complex linkages with the rest of the economy, the productivity 
spillover and spread effects which primary exports generate, can contribute directly to the 
growth process of other sectors, and thus to the economy as a whole. Hence, even if primary 
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exports eventually constitute a small percentage of GDP, this does not mean that the sector has 
become less significant given its inter-industry connectedness with the rest of the economy. 
Rather, it would be more a case that the other internal factors have taken over “the driver’s seat 
in directing the process of economic change” (Altman, 2003, p. 237). 
 
In contrast, backward and forward linkages in the service sector have gathered more 
momentum over recent years, moving from being moderate to strong. The outstanding performer 
is the ‘other services’ industries, moving from moderately strong inter-industry linkage to very 
strong and achieving the estimated coefficient of 1,1 by 2006. Given firms increased spending on 
services, deepening linkages of the service sector with the rest of the economy should not come 
as a surprise. According to the New Zealand Productivity Commission’s (2014b) report, firms 
now on average spend about 40% more on services than they do on wages and that services 
cover 50% of the value of NZ’s exports when the value of services (transport and finance) 
embedded in goods exports are included.  
 
In sum, NZ’s relatively low capital to labour ratio and its relative poor position in the 
value chain of the industries it competes in (exports of agricultural raw material and not so much 
on value-added exports – weakening of NZ’s inter-industry linkages26) when world trade is 
fundamentally changing explained why NZ’s economic performance is not up to the standard it 
once achieved in the pre-1970s. However, one would expect improvement in institutional and 
policy regimes at the international and national levels after the 1980s and 1990s radical reform to 
have helped NZ overcome these challenges. One would expect being more open and less 
regulated to have facilitated faster and greater trade flows, induced greater investment in 
innovation and in management, and thus the development of NZ’s industries leading to stronger 
inter-industry linkages. However, the symptoms experienced in NZ are to the contrary. 
According to the New Zealand Productivity Commission’s (2014a) report NZ’s international 
connections are weak and its innovation and managerial quality are low. Hall and Scobie (2005) 
and the Treasury (2008a) report NZ’s equity market as being relatively underdeveloped and 
capital shallow. Coriolis (2012, p. 15) report NZ’s exports are still dominated by a handful of 
key traditional primary industries, whose structures are changing. Change is not bad per-se, the 
issue is how it is changing – the changing face of NZ’s agriculture at the start of the second 
decade of the 21st century is one of ‘deepening corporate consolidation’ (Small, 2013).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See the important of linkages in Hirschman, 1958; North, 1959; Altman, 2005. 
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Indeed, the trend towards larger dominant firms through mergers and acquisitions is a 
common phenomenon occurring internationally not just within NZ as countries are moving to 
greater deregulation (Dana & Schoeman, 2010). Greater trade liberalisation induces greater 
competition in the global market, making the formation of larger firms through mergers and 
acquisitions an important strategic choice for securing firms’ and industries’ international 
competitiveness (Gupta, 2012). For instance, in the case of dairy in NZ, the argument is that the 
formation of large mega co-operatives representing a vast proportion of the nation’s producers of 
specific agricultural commodities would ensure greater efficiencies and economies of scale 
necessary to secure the international competitiveness of the industry.  
 
However, the employment of such a supposedly efficient structure in NZ, over a decade 
onward, has not translated into improved economic growth and productivity for NZ. If anything, 
the result is the contrary. Although NZ’s larger co-operatives, like dairy processor Fonterra, have 
moved the furthest in term of its efforts in achieving cost leadership in milk production and 
processing, the same cannot be said for NZ’s on-farm production costs. Despite the fact that the 
formation of ‘mega dairy’ has enabled NZ’s processing plants to achieve greater volume and 
efficiency, NZ’s on-farm production costs are increasing. Evidently, NZ’s on-farm production 
costs have been rising much faster than a number of NZ’s pastoral-based competitors (see graph 
on page 10 in Coriolis, 2010a). This indicates that NZ is loosing its comparative advantage in 
milk production.  
 
By international comparison, evidence show NZ’s large firms are performing poorly and 
that NZ also lacks in the relative total numbers of large firms that can be found in a number of 
other OECD countries (Treasury, 2008b). Hence, one must ask why large firms in NZ are 
performing poorly, despite the seemingly higher capacities enabled by the formation of a larger 
firm with greater pools of resources? Is it because of: (A) NZ’s lack of managerial competencies 
to manage such larger firms? It was suggested that the size and international operation of the 
larger new co-operative structures required new and unique skills and management competencies 
(Dana & Schoeman, 2010). The level of competencies in which the NZ’s present managerial 
system may be lacking. And/or (B) had the process of consolidation simply gone too far for NZ? 
Although consolidation in itself may be a worldwide phenomenon, occurring alongside a highly 
concentrated firm ownership structure, consolidation may come at significant costs to managerial 
effectiveness, and thus firm performance and productivity.    
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Rationalisation for operation efficiency through consolidation in itself led to the 
formation of dominant firms. For instance, under the mega co-operative structure Fonterra 
effectively holds monopoly control of the dairy industry. Alliance-Silver Fern Farms would hold 
a similar dominant position if the proposed mega meat merger was successful (New Zealand 
Herald, 2008). On the other hand, NZ’s highly concentrated firm ownership structure means that 
NZ’s firms are either one of managerial control (i.e. owner-manager in small businesses) or 
majority control (i.e. high percentage of dominant stockownership in publicly listed firms). The 
mix of dominant control of the firm and dominant control of the domestic market created a 
business environment in which managers are relatively free from both internal and external 
pressure to deliver on performance. The internal pressures on managerial performance have to do 
with shareholder–managers monitoring relations, whereas the external pressures have to do with 
the degree of competition within the domestic market. This paper argues that the absence (or 
lack) of these pressures on management provide a conducive environment for managerial 
entrenchment (Stulz, 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 1995; Leach & Leahy, 1991; 
Holderness et al., 1999; Jiang et al., 2009 have provided evidence for this). The subsequent costs 
to the economy that follow may be reflected in low levels of innovation and productivity 
improvements and a general cost-plus attitude (cf. a largely predictable state for a dominant firm 
or monopoly operating in a mature market).  
 
Consequently, the issue of NZ’s relative productivity under-performance despite its 
strong institutions may not be paradoxical but an issue of firm/corporate governance. Contrary to 
the argument that NZ’s productivity under-performance as an issue of relative geographic 
isolation or that of relative high interest rates, this paper develops an explanation of NZ’s 
productivity under-performance as a product of NZ’s issue(s) of firm/corporate governance27. 
The focus is on the issue(s) that inherently impede NZ’s principle of good firm governance from 
translating into good firm performance. Subsequently, the paper will be argue that a coherent 
understanding of NZ’s productivity under-performance can be gained by examining the missing 
links between firm governance and firm performance, their effect on stock market development, 
and thus on growth and productivity. Understanding the mechanisms behind such a process 
would point us in the right direction to uncover the truth of ‘what went wrong’ for NZ to cause 
such a transition, from being one of the top performers to trailing behind to the extent that it is 
today.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The term firm and corporate will be used interchangeably in this paper.  
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3.3 NZ’s Productivity Under-Performance: An Issue of Firm/Corporate Governance  
 
Previously, some work in this area has attempted to provide evidence for how the issues 
of firm governance in New Zealand (NZ) explain NZ’s firm under-performance, equity market 
underdevelopment, and thus poor economic performance (Healy, 2003; Frances, 2004; 
Xiaochuan, 2004; Kleinschmidt, 2007; Haque et al., 2012; OECD, 2012). While others explicitly 
examine NZ’s equity market underdevelopment and capital shallowness as a factor that impedes 
economic growth and productivity in NZ (Helpman & Krugman, 1985; Romer, 1990; Castalia 
Strategic Advisors, 2003; Hall & Scobie, 2005; Mason & Osborne, 2007; Capital Market 
Development Taskforce, 2009; NZIER, 2014). The rest of this paper aims to connect these points 
to provide a coherent story explaining NZ’s productivity paradox. Hence, this paper argues that 
understanding the issues behind NZ’s firm governance, its effects on firm performance, stock 
market development and productivity could provide us with the key to unlocking ‘The New 
Zealand Productivity Puzzle’. 
 
It should be noted that while economic policy is a key determinant of economic growth, 
so too is firm performance. It was recognised that ‘the competitiveness of nations has depended 
in an important way upon the organisational and financial capabilities of firms and their 
supporting institutions’ (Teece, 1993). McKinsey and Company (1997) also provided evidence 
for the existence of a virtuous cycle shareholder value with overall macroeconomic performance. 
Furthermore, they showed that a focus on shareholder value is second only to open and 
competitive product markets in accounting for high productivity growth. The ability of firms to 
create and grow its value through innovation-driven strategy, generating improvement in the 
productivity of the capital employed, means that the stock markets will ultimately reward its 
shareholders with a higher market value (Healy, 2003). The ‘Shareholder Theory’ provides the 
basis for this rationale. The shareholder theory emerges from an economic perspective focusing 
on the firm’s purpose of maximising shareholders’ wealth (Pfarrer, 2007). The ideas shaping 
shareholder theory emulates from Adam Smith’s (1776) The Wealth of Nations. More than 200 
years ago Adam Smith had postulated that:  
 
 
“The most productive and innovative companies would create the highest returns to 
shareholders and attract better workers, who would be more productive and increase returns – a 
virtuous cycle. On the other hand, companies that destroy value would create a vicious cycle and 
eventually wither away.” 
 
(as cited in McKinsey & Company, 1997)  
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Hence, theoretically, the main purpose of business should be about generating profits and 
increasing shareholder wealth. Shareholders, in this sense, expect management to generate value 
over and above the cost of resources consumed, including the cost of using capitals. This means 
if management performs their functions well, increasing firm performance and profitability, 
shareholders would receive higher returns on their investment. If the returns on their investments 
are greater than the expected rate of return necessary to compensate for the risk they are 
undertaking, shareholders will not withdraw their capital. Additionally, the higher returns on 
their investments may even induce investors to invest more capital. However, if shareholders do 
not receive a fair return on their investment to compensate for the risk they are undertaking, they 
will withdraw their capital in search of better returns.  
 
Consequently, a firm that is enhancing value will always attract further capital to finance 
expansion, since its good performance means that it will be benefit by a share price that stands at 
a premium to the underlying value of its assets and by lower interest rates on debt. On the other 
hand, a firm that is destroying value will always struggle to attract further capital to finance 
expansion, since its poor performance means that it will be hamstrung by a share price that 
stands at a discount to the underlying value of its assets and by higher interest rates on debt. In 
sum, these suggest that the association between firm/corporate governance and equity returns is a 
positive one (Healy, 2003; Gompers et al., 2003).   
  
Evidently, a study by Gompers et al. (2003) of 1500 companies found a striking 
relationship between corporate governance and equity returns. Using an index of 24 difference 
provisions to build a ‘Governance Index’ and regressing this over firm value, they found a strong 
positive correlation between the Governance Index and firm value. They concluded: ‘firms with 
weaker shareholder rights were valued lower and were associated with lower profits, lower sales 
growth, higher capital expenditure and a higher level of corporate acquisitions’. A previous study 
of 47 countries also found a strong correlation between the size and liquidity of stock exchanges 
and economic growth (Levine & Zervos, 1998). Healy (2003) explained that higher share prices 
make consumers feel wealthier, encouraging them to spend and save more. Likewise, highly 
valued equity makes firms appear healthier and the firms’ equity owners feel wealthier, giving 
them the confidence and the ability to expand production and explore growth opportunities. This 
is because a highly valued equity signals high firm performance making investment more 
attractive to potential (and existing) investors looking for better returns. Additionally, because 
creditors, typically, based lending criteria on the credibility of the firms, a track record of good 
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firm performance also help to reduce the costs of borrowing. The combination of better access to 
capital and lower costs of borrowing would make expansion and investment in innovation for 
further growth and development an attractive economic proposition for the firms.  
 
Increasingly international bodies have come to recognise the important role in which the 
stock market plays in the competitiveness of nations (Garelli, 2001).  Unlike before, increasing 
globalisation and ever increasing international competition means that today stock markets are 
no longer just a mirror reflecting the performance expectations of firms, they have become a 
major actor in the economy, fuelling growth by injecting capital into the economy, or triggering 
a slowdown by depriving the economy of equity (Healy, 2003; Treasury, 2008a). Hence, in a 
world of global capital markets and for an economy in which foreign investment may hold the 
key to further growth and development, a reputation for good managerial practice and 
managerial effectiveness along with policies protecting shareholders can make a difference in 
attracting international capital and in reducing the cost of capital. Studies examining corporate 
NZ revealed that there are fundamental issues related to the structure of firm governance and 
managerial performance in some companies. They suggested that where there are serious 
weaknesses they have been a major cause of poor firm profitability and productivity that NZ has 
experienced (Healy, 2003; World Management Survey, 2010; Chartered Secretaries New 
Zealand Inc., 2011; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2013). 
 
After all, organisations as an entity do not succeed or fail, the individuals who lead and 
manage them do. Nobel-Prize-winning economist Professor Joseph Stiglitz makes an explicit 
statement on this point:  
 
 “Those who manage large corporations control enormous amounts of capital. If they perform 
their function well, the economy and the shareholders of the firms will prosper. If they do not 
perform their functions well, or if they divert the resources of the firms to their own personal use, 
both the economy and the shareholders will suffer.”  
 
(Stiglitz, 1985, p. 133-134)  
 
 
Hence, how well management function matter to firm performance and shareholders’ wealth. 
Evidence shows that over the long term, the most important drivers of stock price performance 
are the strategic and operational decisions of management and the extent to which those actions 
generate higher firm value (Healy, 2003). This indicates that management’s behaviour does 
matter and that their decisions do strongly influence the performance of their businesses.  
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Though it is commonly agreed that there is a need for managerial development in NZ28, 
some authors (Healy, 2003; OECD, 2012) argued that the issue of NZ’s firm governance is not 
necessarily a matter of managerial incompetence per-se or poor corporate governance in a 
conventional manner. Generally speaking, NZ firms do not suffer from the concerns that are 
typically subject of criticism by those promoting good corporate governance. In fact, with 
respect to governance practices, NZ ranked highly in the 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness 
Report29. Some key results are as follows. On the ground of ‘efficacy of corporate boards’, NZ 
ranked eighth out of 139 countries. On the strength of financial and auditing standards, NZ 
scored third overall30. Furthermore, NZ received the fifth highest ranking for protection of 
minority interests and scored highest for strength of investor protection amongst 189 countries 
(Fox et al., 2012; The World Bank Group, 2014).  
 
Moreover, according to Governance Metrics International, NZ was ranked fifth in the 
world for corporate governance (Fox et al., 2012). The issue here is not one of compliance, 
rather it is a question of why good firm governance with respect to compliance, at least as 
measured in such indexes, is not translate into good firm performance. In answering this 
question, one should note that the quality of managerial decisions depends not only on the ability 
of managers but also on the incentives that managers have to make effective choices to 
efficiently manage the resources under their stewardship.  
 
In this sense, the paper argues that NZ’s firm governance impedes the performance of NZ 
firms, may be two-fold. The first is related to the issue of managerial competency, the ability of 
managers to manage the assets and resources they have under their stewardship to create value 
for shareholders. The second is related to the issue of managerial effectiveness, the incentives for 
managers to efficiently manage the firm’s assets and resources such that the firm’s value or 
value-added may be maximised. The ultimate goal of any management team should be to 
maximise firm value. If so, then the differences in managerial ability would account for the 
divergence of performance across firms and countries. However, in practice managers are driven 
by other goals, not simply the pursuit for profits, and thus the divergence of performance across 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Business surveys conducted in 2007 and 2008 concluded that the most significant factor that hampered innovation 
activities in NZ firms was the lack of appropriately skilled management resources (World Management Survey, 
2010). 	  
29 World Economic Forum, ‘The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011’, 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-11.pdf 
30 Score 6.2 out of 7, whereby a rating of 7 indicated that investors and boards exert strong supervision of 
management decisions (See World Economic Forum, supra note 30, at 384).  
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firms and countries would be driven by the managerial incentives other than managerial ability 
alone.  
 
With respect to incentives, it has long been recognised that separation of ownership from 
control potentially has an adverse effect on firm performance. Beginning with the seminal work 
of Berle and Means (1932), which suggests that managers without significant ownership stakes 
in the firms they manage are likely to pursue activities that will enhance their own personal 
benefits at the expense of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) building on Berle and 
Means (1932) work propose the ‘convergence of interests’ hypothesis and argue that the 
propensity for managers to deviate from value maximisation decrease as managerial/insider 
stockownership increase. In other words, the cost of deviation from value maximisation is a 
decreasing function of managerial/insider ownership. Such an outcome is consistent with 
Leibenstein’s (1966) X-inefficiency theory, the notion that the firm is a ‘black box’ within which 
exist different objective functions, whereby principal and agent problems can be reduced with 
better alignment of interests.   
 
However, later works by Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that market 
discipline potentially ensures value-maximising behaviour at low levels of ownership, but 
entrenchment and thus value loss ensues at high levels of ownership. Stulz (1988) shows that 
entrenchment at higher levels of managerial/insider ownership reduces the probability of a 
takeover, and thus leave managers relatively free to exercise their discretions. More recently, 
Morck et al. (1998) also argue managers’ ownership of equity can have both a positive and a 
negative effect on the value of the firm. To date, much theoretical and empirical research has 
attempted to understand the costs and benefits of insider ownership by examining the cross 
sectional relation between insider ownership and firm performance (typically proxy by Tobin’s 
Q). This in turn had been taken as a proxy for managerial effectiveness (McConnell & Servaes, 
1995). Though the debate over the precise functional form of insider ownership and firm 
value/performance relationship is far from conclusive, most authors do lean more towards the 
existence of a non-linear relationship.  
 
The concern over the association between ownership structure and firm performance 
emulates from the shareholder-based ‘Agency Theory’ which focuses primarily on the principal 
(shareholder) vs. agent (manager) relationship and how to best align the competing interests of 
the two parties to maximise firm value. The Agency Theory (AT) has a ‘gloomy vision’ of 
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human interest in that it assumes human beings are opportunistic and therefore will put their 
interests before that of the firms’ (Pfarrer, 2007). Under the assumption that humans are self-
interested, AT focuses on mechanisms to monitor manager behaviour and provide incentives to 
align manager interests with those of the firm’s owners, with the aim to maximise shareholders’ 
wealth.  
 
To this end, it is likely that ownership structure of NZ firms has important implications 
for managerial effectiveness, and thus for firm performance. The link between private ownership 
and efficient resource utilisation guided by the profit maximisation constraint may be broken by 
a structure of ownership that reduces the incentives of corporate managers to maximise profits. 
Consequently, the divergence of actual performance from the predicted level based on 
compliance may arise largely as a consequence of inappropriate ownership structure that 
incentivises managerial entrenchment at the costs of firm performance. Hence, not only will 
management’s ability affect firm performance but the incentives that exist for management to 
perform their functions well also have important implications for businesses success, equity 
market development, and thus for growth and productivity in the economy. The next two 
sections explore each of these two issues: (A) managerial competency and (B) managerial 
effectiveness in detail, providing evidence for the above arguments and estimating the extent to 
which they explain NZ’s firm and related productivity under-performance vis-à-vis our OECD 
counterparts. 
4.  (A) Managerial Competency, Firm Performance and Productivity  
 
In practice, a major drawback in analysing the relationship between management 
practices and firm, industry and economic performance, has been the lack of reliable empirical 
data on management practices measured in a consistent manner across both firms and countries 
(Bloom & van Reenen, 2007). Other limitations include the context specificity of some 
management practices (Sousa & Voss, 2008), and the focus on different aspects of management 
(i.e. operations – Holweg, 2007; performance – Bourne et al., 2005; talent and people – Becker 
& Huselid, 1998). This has forced many researchers to rely on case studies for better inferences 
of managerial practices across firms and countries. A number of studies have also attempted to 
combine different management practices to investigate how they interact and operate in unison. 
However, these studies have not been validated in cross-countries contexts (Agarwal et al., 
2013). 
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Thanks to the development of the Management Practice Score (MPS) methodology, a 
survey instrument developed by Bloom and van Reenen (2007) with McKinsey & Company, the 
assessment of managerial practices across firms and countries have been made simpler. 
Subsequently, many of the recent studies analysing the effect of managerial practices on firm 
performance across firms and countries have adopted MPS as the assessment criteria (World 
Management Survey, 2010).  
 
4.1  Assessing Managerial Competency Using Managerial Practice Score (MPS)  
 
The Management Practice Score (MPS) approach introduces a set of standard 
management practices, which enables the concept of good and bad management to be codified 
into the measurement framework, applicable to different firms and countries. MPS research 
involves a double-blind/double-scored methodology and an interview-based scoring grid that 
defines ‘best practice’ (score = 5) and ‘worst practice’ (score = 1) across 18 of the key 
management practices that appear to matter to industrial firms judged by McKinsey’s expertise 
in working with thousands of companies across several decades (CentrePiece, 2005). An aspect 
of this double-blind technique is that managers are not told they are being scored or shown the 
scoring grid. They are only told they are being ‘interviewed about management practices” to 
which open questions are asked in the survey31. The interviewers continue with open questions 
focusing on actual practices and examples until they can make an accurate assessment of the 
firm’s practices. The other aspect of the double-blind approach is that the interviewers are not 
told in advance anything about the firm’s performance to limit preconceptions. They are only 
provided with a company name, phone number, and industry. Firms are selected randomly from 
a defined sample. In doing so, this method allows for consistent cross firm and country 
comparisons under all three broad areas of management – operations (monitoring), performance 
(target) and people (incentive) management. See Management Practices Dimension in Bloom 
and van Reenen (2007) and Bloom et al. (2012b) for further detail on the key management 
practices questions and the survey.   
 
The combined responses to the 18 key management practice questions are scored from 1 
to 5. For example, question 4: How is performance tracked? Firms score 1 if ‘measures tracked 
do not indicate directly if overall business objectives are being met. Tracking is an ad-hoc 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Open question such as ‘tell me how you monitor your production process’ as opposed to closed questions such as 
‘do you monitor your production daily [yes/no]’.  
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process where certain processes aren’t tracked at all’32. Firm score 3 if ‘most key performance 
indicators are tracked formally and is overseen by senior management’33. Firms score 5 if 
‘performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, to all 
staff using a range of visual management tools’34. The overall management scores are derived 
based on firm performance on these 18 management practice questions. The overall management 
scores can be separated into three broad aspect of management when one categorises the 18 
management practices into operations (monitoring) management, performance (target) 
management and people (incentives) management (for this categorisation see Bloom et al., 
2012a; 2012b).  
 
4.1.1 Managerial Practice Score (MPS) – Productivity Relation 
 
The validity of MPS has been compared directly with business performance across 17 
countries and is generally positively correlated with productivity and output in settings where it 
has been tested (Bloom & van Reenen, 2007; Green et al., 2011). Though rigorous arguments’ 
regarding the magnitude of any causal effect is yet to be offered, the results thus far do indicate 
the high explanatory power of management practices as a determinant of national productivity. 
Among these McKinsey and Company’s (2007), Bloom and van Reenen’s (2007; 2010) and 
Bloom’s et al. (2012a; 2012b) studies all suggested that in a cross-country ranking the ranking of 
countries’ MPS approximate to productivity ranking. Their regression of GDP per capita on 
management practices across 17 countries yielding an R-squared value of 0.81 (a strong positive 
correlation of 0.81 = 0.9) provided evidence for this.   
 
The finding that higher MPS is associated with better firm performance and productivity 
in several international settings is also consistent with the universalist conception that the 
adoption of more ‘best management practices’ is reflective of better management yielding higher 
performance and productivity (Agarwal et al., 2013). Across all the firms sampled in this 
research, a single point improvement in the MPS is equivalent to an increase in output as a 25% 
increase in the labour force (hours worked) or a 65% increase in invested capital (see Exhibit 4 
in McKinsey & Company, 2007, p. 5). Equivalently in terms of productivity, a one-point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 I.e. manager who tracked a range of measures when he didn’t think output was sufficient. He last requested 
reports eight months ago, checked them for one week, and then stopped checking once output had increased again.  
33 I.e. a firm bar-coded every product, and performance indicators were tracked throughout the production, but this 
information was not communicated to workers. 34	  I.e. firm that had screens visible to every line displaying hourly progress to target. The manager met daily with 
frontline staff to discuss these and monthly with the whole company to discuss overall performance.	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increment in a five-point management practice score is associated with about 23% greater 
productivity (GDP per hour worked; see the exhibit “The Return on Good Management” in 
Bloom et al., 2012a). Even after controlling for a variety of factors such as the firm’s country, 
sector and skill level, this observation holds (McKinsey & Company, 2007).  
 
4.1.2 Results and Analysis 
 
Based on the results of three studies, Bloom and van Reenen (2010), Bloom et al. 
(2012b) and World Management Survey (2010), on Management Practice Score (MPS) by 
country, on average, the resultant MPS for NZ and our selected OECD counterparts are as 
reported in Table 4. Table 4 highlights NZ’s relative poor ranking and position on MPS 
compared to our OECD counterparts in the sample.  
 
Table 4: Average Management Practice Score (MPS) Outcomes from Three Studies 
Country  
Overall 
Management  R 
Monitoring 
Management  R 
Targets/ 
Performance 
Management  R 
Incentive/ 
People 
Management  R 
No. Firm 
Interviews 
AUS 3.01 6 3.27 7 2.99 7 2.75 8 385 
CAN 3.15 5 3.44 4 3.02 5 2.98 2 355 
FRA  3.01 6 3.32 6 2.97 8 2.74 9 403 
GER 3.20 2 3.46 3 3.23 3 2.93 3 437 
GRC 2.68 12 2.91 12 2.59 12 2.53 12 197 
IRL 2.83 11 2.99 11 2.75 11 2.79 7 103 
ITA 3.00 8 3.14 10 3.00 6 2.72 10 224 
JPN 3.19 3 3.37 5 3.29 1 2.89 4 184 
SWE 3.19 3 3.56 1 3.21 4 2.82 6 307 
UK 3.00 8 3.22 8 2.94 10 2.85 5 913 
USA 3.33 1 3.50 2 3.23 2 3.26 1 862 
NZ 2.93 10 3.18 9 2.96 9 2.63 11 106 
Sample 
Average  3.04   3.28   3.02   2.82     
Note: R denoted Rank. Manufacturing firm sample. Overall management is the average score across all 18 
questions. See Bloom et al., 2012b for full list of questions and their descriptions. All questions are scored the same 
across all countries and industries. The highest to lowest scores in each column are ranked from 1 to 11, 
respectively. Data Source: Bloom & van Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012b; World Management Survey, 2010.  
 
 
The results in Table 4 highlight serious concerns about NZ, with NZ’s overall MPS 
having ranked below the sample average and ranked at the bottom of the league on 
‘Incentive/people Management’ (slightly above Greece). The outcomes in Table 4 also reveal 
management styles across countries. NZ appears to use monitoring and target setting more than 
incentives (relative to the average). In contrast, better overall management practices and 
productivity performers like the United States, Japan, Sweden, Canada and Germany appear to 
use a combination of all three and that all of these countries are ranked in the top percentile in 
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terms of the incentive management score. In order to obtain a better picture of NZ’s MPS 
performance on the different aspects of management relative to the sampled OECD countries, 
the results in Table 4 are presented as boxplots in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14: NZ's Management Practice Score (MPS) Relative to Our OECD Counterparts 
 
Note: New Zealand (NZ); Maximum (Max); Minimum (Min); Upper Quartile (UQ); Lower Quartile (LQ); Median 
(Med). Source: The graph is constructed from data in Table 4. 
 
 
The boxplots in Figure 14 read as follows. The box shows the interquartile range that 
contains values between 25th and 75th percentile of the sampled countries’ MPS for ‘Overall’, 
‘Monitoring’, ‘Target/performance’ and ‘Incentive/people’ aspects of management. The white 
box denotes the upper quartile range (containing the values between 50th and 75th percentile). 
The black box denotes the lower quartile range (containing the values between 25th and 50th 
percentile). The line in between these boxes is the median. The two whiskers show the adjacent 
values. The upper (lower) adjacent value is the largest (smallest) observation up to a maximum 
(minimum) at the end of the whisker, respectively. The grey diamond denoted NZ’s MPS on 
each of the different aspects of management examined. Overall, Figure 14 provides a graphical 
illustration of the points made earlier in the analysis of Table 4. In particular, NZ’s relative MPS 
under-performance on all aspect of management (monitoring, targets and incentives) vis-à-vis 
the sample median of the 11 OECD countries examined for the period 2004-2010.  
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The relatively small spread of these boxes, i.e. small differences in scores across 
countries, may be due to three factors. The first is related to the small sample size. The second is 
related to the sampled population. A small sample size that made up predominantly of high-
income and relatively well-developed OECD countries means relative differences in 
competencies (education and skills) would be small. Though the spread may be larger if the 
sample size is larger and if developing economies are included in the sample, one must also 
consider the importance of scale. In this set up, a single point differences in MPS is said to be 
equivalent to a 23% differences in productivity. Hence, a relatively small difference in the score 
(of 0.1) does means a lot in terms of productivity difference (of 2.3%).  
 
Table 5: Managerial Performance and Productivity Relation - Using Spearman 
Country  
GDP per hour 
worked (1)       
(USD 2005 PPPs) 
MPS 
(2) 
Rank 
(1) 
Rank 
(2) 
Difference 
(1) and (2) 
(Difference)2 
=𝒅𝟐 
𝒅𝟐 Spearman’s 
Rank 
Correlation 
Coefficient  
AUS 41.84 3.01 6 6.5 -0.5 0.25   
CAN 39.76 3.15 7 5 2 4 
FRA  47.9 3.01 2 6.5 4 16 
GER 47.34 3.20 3 2 1 1 
GRC 29.11 2.68 10 11 1 1 
ITA 37.29 3.00 8 8.5 -0.5 0.25 
JPN 34.04 3.19 9 3.5 5.5 30.25 
SWE 42.67 3.19 4 3.5 0.5 0.25 
UK 42.36 3.00 5 8.5 3 9 
USA 52.49 3.33 1 1 0 0 
NZ 28.29 2.93 11 10 1 1 63 0.71 
Note: Own calculation. *Formula used Spearman’s correlation = 1 − !∗ !!!∗ !!!! , where n = number of countries. 
Data (1) GDP per hour worked, USD, constant prices, 2005 PPPs for the period 2004-2010. Source: OECD, 2014b. 
Data (2) MPS on overall management score extracted from Table 4 above (studies’ period 2004-2010).  
 
The calculation of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (𝑟!) measuring the strength of 
the relationship between the sample countries productivity ranking (measured by GDP per hour 
worked) and their Management Practice Score (MPS) ranking verify the proposition that ‘in a 
cross-country ranking the ranking of countries’ MPS are approximates to their productivity 
ranking’ (McKinsey & Company, 2007). In Table 5 above, the paper shows the calculation of 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the sample countries’ productivity ranking and 
their MPS ranking yield a correlation result of around 0.71. Figure 15 below provides a graphical 
illustration of this.  
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Figure 15: GDP Per Hour Worked Rank vs. MPS Rank for 11 OECD Countries 
 
Data Source: Graph constructed from data in Table 5. Note: Sampled countries (where complete data are available) 
are ranked on their MPS and GDP per hour worked, from 1 – 11 (best to worse). List of country’s name 
abbreviation see Note to Figure 1 or see the list of abbreviations on page 5.  
 
 
This paper uses Spearman’s rank correlation instead of Pearson’s correlation because the 
data assumption of linearity may not hold35. Differing from Pearson’s correlation coefficient, 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a statistical measure of the strength of monotonic 
relationships between paired data. Nonetheless, the way one would interpret Spearman’s is 
similar to the way one would Pearson’s. That is−1 < 𝑟! < 1. Hence, the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient that yields the value of 0.71 indicates a strong positive association 
between countries’ ranking of managerial practice score (MPS) and their productivity (GDP per 
hour worked) ranking. Regressing MPS vs. GDP per capita across this sample of countries for 
the same period yields similar result. Bloom’s et al. (2012) regression result with a larger sample 
size shows a positive correlation of 0.9. These findings reinforce the prior results by McKinsey 
& Company (2007) and hence the assertion that ‘in a cross-country ranking the ranking of 
countries’ MPS approximate to productivity ranking’36.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The relationship between paired data, GDP per hour worked and MPS, appear to be a monotonic one.  
Monotonic function is a function that neither entirely non-increasing nor non-decreasing (Stover, Christopher. 
Monotonic Function. From MathWorld-A Wolfram Web Resource, created by Eric W. Weisstein. Retrieved from 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/MonotonicFunction.html).   
36 Like any other economic model, MPS is not without its limitations but it is the best management practice scoring 
methodology we have to date (McKinsey & Company, 2007).  	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Bloom et al., (2012a; consistent with McKinsey & Company, 2007) interpreted that a 
single point improvement in MPS – an equivalent of going from the bottom third to the top third 
of the group – is associated with 23% greater productivity. Following this logic, a 22% of a 
single point improvement (i.e. going from 2.93 to 3.15) in MPS, maneuvering NZ into the top 5 
position in the sample, would lead NZ’s productivity to be 5% higher than otherwise would be. 
However, closing the MPS gap between NZ and the top 5 OECD countries, yielding an 
improvement of productivity and thus income of this size, is not enough to close the substantial 
productivity gap between NZ and the top 5 OECD countries (illustrated in Figure 4 earlier). 
Hence, some others factors have to be at play in impeding NZ productivity performance, and 
thus income growth, beyond the issue of managerial competencies alone. 
 
4.1.3 Considerations 
 
 Management Practice Score (MPS) is derived from a large survey research program 
that’s generated a systematic measurement of management practice (quality) across firms and 
countries. Though MPS provides a far better general measurement of management quality than 
the case studies based method used to judge managerial quality in the past, one must recognise 
the limitation of the sample size. The surveys are based on the sample of manufacturing firms for 
inference of overall management quality (focusing on aspects of management like systematic 
performance monitoring, setting appropriate targets, and providing incentives for good 
performance) across firms and countries. Such an approach provides a consistent measure across 
firms and countries. However, because the sample is restricted to manufacturing some may argue 
the score reflected may be in part subject to countries structural bias. That is, the US might be 
highly ranked in part because it is relatively more industrial than the others. Likewise NZ might 
be low-ranked in part because it is less industrial and more agricultural.  
 
Nonetheless, the fact that countries’ MPS ranking and their productivity ranking is 
strongly correlated suggests that the noise created from such a bias may be small. McKinsey & 
Company (2007) when estimating the effect of a single point change in MPS on productivity 
change also corrected for such bias by controlling for a variety of factors such as the firm’s 
country, sector and skill level in their estimation. They show in the estimation, after controlling 
for these factors, a single point improvement in MPS would account for about 23% greater 
productivity. Hence, the effect of an incremental change in MPS on productivity estimated is 
considered to be robust to countries structural bias. However, more detailed data construction for 
NZ, for example, across sectors would be useful.  
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5.  (B) Managerial Effectiveness, Firm Performance and Productivity  
 
The ultimate goal of any management team should be to maximise the firm value, and 
thus generate the highest possible returns to their shareholders. However, in practice more often 
than not, firms may not maximise profit, not because they cannot but because they do not want 
to. Leibenstein (1966; 1973) argues the traditional profit maximising theory assumes away the 
internal efficiency implications of business organisations (Foss & Klein, 2005) and taking 
individuals’ efforts as fixed at some maximum (Altman, 2004; 2013). Leibenstein maintains that 
the existing traditional theory with its basic economic assumption of optimal input decisions has 
failed to consider one important type of distortion. That is, the sort of distortion that arises from 
managerial inefficiency, whether because of deficient motivation or inappropriate incentives, 
managers are not maximising their efforts to achieve productive efficiency (McNulty, 1967). In 
other words, people and organisations for various reasons would not work as hard or as 
effectively as they could.  
 
Leibenstein (1966) argues the actual distortion that would be generated from managerial 
inefficiency can be substantial because managers do not just determine their own productivity. 
They also determine the productivity of all co-operating units within an organisation. Leibenstein 
has termed this undefined distortion as X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency related to the firm not 
being as productive as it could be under a better set of incentives and/or preferences by 
management and workers. The existence of X-inefficiency, therefore, means that the 
improvement in X-efficiency to ensure optimal level of efforts is an important source of 
increased output.  
 
In Leibenstein’s X-efficiency theory (1966) social influences and norms play an 
important role in determining individual behaviour. In this sense, individuals’ non-profit 
maximisation behaviour may arise because they find themselves stuck in an inert area. 
Leibenstein suggested that individuals might find themselves in an inert area because the utility 
of changing behaviour is less than the utility of maintaining one’s patterns.  Hence, stuck in an 
inert area, behaviour can be in a less than fully rational equilibrium and the firm in a less than 
fully x-efficient equilibrium. To that end, though maximisation and rationality postulate are not 
rejected per-se, what is rejected in Leibenstein’s X-efficiency theory of the firm is that they are 
the only form of behaviour, which is traditional profit maximising.  
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This result is also echoed in Cyert and March’s (1963) investigation of the actual process 
of making business decisions and the ways in which organisations make these decisions. Cyert 
and March (1963) reported on several studies in their formulations of expectation and choice 
processes used to develop computer models. Their results highlight the complexity of 
organisation and suggest that the existence of unresolved conflict is a conspicuous feature of 
organisations since individuals’ priorities and information may vary. Hence, they argue to 
reconcile these conflicts in real firms, firm outcomes are a product of satisficing rather than 
maximising, whereby individuals settle for a good enough decision rather than striving for the 
best outcome. The notion of satisficing falls under the concept of bounded rationality (developed 
by Herbert Simon, 1955), suggesting that individual’s prudent behavioural decisions are made 
based on their circumstances. Consequently, in such a case, it is not a question of competence, 
but a choice under a given situation – sometimes a lifestyle choice (Healy, 2003).  
 
In this light we can see that unlike the behavioural approach to the theory of the firm, the 
firm of the conventional economic theory defines clear broad divisions to which resources may 
be put (consumption and production) and defined firms (households) as the theoretical institution 
in which rational decisions about production (consumption) take place. Demsetz (1983), 
following the behavioural theory of the firm, argued that such conventional economic 
assumptions ignore some characteristics of real firms and real households.  Some household 
activity is devoted to production and as such is guided by profit considerations. The persons who 
manage real firms may also consume while on the job and as such is guided by utility 
consideration. Consequently, when real firms are not so specialized in their activities 
(consumption or production) and with compensation received by the owner-managers potentially 
comprising of pecuniary wages of management and profit of owners, an outcome of sub-optimal 
profitability need not signal incompetent management on the part of the owners. This is because 
the owners may be willing to carry the cost of their incompetent if other interests offset it. That 
is, the owner-managers who consume on the job pay for their amenities by accepting a reduction 
in their implicit managerial compensation37. Given their circumstance, the owner-managers are 
satisficing – since this is simply a substitution of profit maximising utility function for a broader 
utility function.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 On the job consumption only take place if the cost of doing so, per unit of utility received, is less than if he/she 
consumed at home. 
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Evidence in the entrepreneurship literature, clearly suggests that entrepreneurs, a special 
kind of owner-managers, are motivated by both financial and non-financial considerations (see 
Gatewood et al., 1995; Kolvereid, 1996; Kuratko et al., 1997; Carter et al., 2003). Likewise, the 
family-business literature also indicates that family-owned firms tend to favour the preservation 
of family control, even at the expense of financial gains (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Hence, it is 
clearly an error to suppose that a firm is profit-maximising as postulated in the conventional firm 
model in economic theory, whereas in reality the owner-manager of a firm is guided by utility 
maximisation, not simply the pursuit of profits.  
 
Premise 1: If a wholly-owned firm is managed by the owner, he will make operating decisions 
that maximise his utility.  
 
 
Family and small private businesses38 form the basic building block of businesses 
throughout the world. In New Zealand (NZ) they are the dominant form of businesses, 
accounting for well over 95% of all business entities and represent the greatest source of 
employment and a considerable source of economic growth (Healy, 2003; cf. MBIE, 2014 – 
stated some 97% of enterprises in NZ are small businesses). Family businesses present a special 
challenge as both family and business relationships have to be managed and conflicting needs 
have to be resolved. For instance, owner-managers may find it more efficient for consumption to 
be carried out within the firm rather than the household – a substitution of profit maximisation 
(production activity) for utility maximisation (consumption activity). Such consumption may 
involve the use of a business account for consumption by the owners or family members, which 
may be more efficient because of the tax benefits and concessions on goods purchased for use in 
the business. However, a large part of on the job consumption is related to the owner-mangers 
consumption of non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. being one’s own boss, having flexibility over one’s 
hours worked) or sub-optimal risk-taking activities, whereby the owner-managers personally 
bear the cost of their value-reducing actions (managerial shirking or non-wealth maximising 
behaviour) (Hubbard & Palia, 1995). Hurst and Pugsley’s (2010) study shows a majority of 
small business owners report that non-pecuniary benefits were the primary reason that they 
started their business.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Small businesses take many forms, including sole proprietorships, family businesses, partnership, private 
companies, joint ventures, and unlisted companies.  
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The issue of profit maximisation and utility maximisation substitution goes beyond small 
private businesses and is evident in publicly listed firms. In publicly listed firms, as the 
manager’s fraction of the equity falls, his/her fractional claim on the outcomes falls. This will 
tend to encourage him/her to appropriate large amounts of the corporate resources for his/her 
own personal benefits because a manager will only bears a fraction of the costs of any non-
pecuniary benefits that he/her takes out in maximising his/her own utility (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Furthermore, manager’s incentive to devote significant efforts to creative activities such 
as searching out new ventures also falls because he/she will only bears a fraction of the benefits 
from the resultant gains. Consequently, the performance of the firm would be substantially lower 
than might otherwise be the case.  
 
Premise 2: The costs of deviation from value maximisation decreases as insider ownership 
increases. ‘The Convergence of Interest Hypothesis’ suggested that the more stock 
management owns the stronger their incentives to work harder to increase firm 
performance, which is what shareholder wants.   
 
 
However, later studies (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990) also point out the costs to significant managerial ownership. They 
argue a manager who controls a substantial fraction of the firm’s equity may have enough voting 
power or influence more generally to guarantee his/her employment with the firm at an attractive 
salary. Jiang et al. (2009), using data from NZ publicly listed companies for the period 2001 to 
2005, found that Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is negatively (positively) 
associated with firm performance in firms with high (low) concentrated ownership structure, 
respectively. Based on their investigation of the non-linear interaction between CEO 
compensation, firm performance and ownership concentration, Jiang et al. (2009) suggest that 
when ownership concentration is higher any individual shareholder has more power and may be 
more likely to attempt to expropriate firm resources. This is because large management 
ownership may insolate management from other forces that reduce agency costs such as threat of 
takeovers and the discipline of the board. Additionally, large managerial ownership is often a 
characteristic of family-controlled firms, which have shown to be notorious for putting the 
interests of the family above the interests of the shareholders.  
 
Hence, with effective control, managers may indulge their preference for non-value 
maximising activity in the form of high salary and empire building (Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Lee & Ryu, 2003). Wright’s et al. (1996) analysis of the impact of 
	  	  
	   63	   
	  
 
	   	  
corporate insider equity ownership on firm risk taking also found that financial and nonfinancial 
benefits or costs, at high levels of stockownership, might induce managerial decisions 
inconsistent with growth-orientated risk taking. They argue at high level of managerial 
ownership equity ownership may represent a significant proportion of a corporate managers’ 
total wealth, and thus increasing managerial equity ownership would result in an increasingly 
undiversified personal wealth portfolio. The potential of an undiversified personal wealth 
portfolio means that managers would make decisions based solely on the evaluation of their 
personal costs and benefits resulted from a particular firm strategy. Such a practice may leads to 
the selection of a set of non-value maximising projects for a firm at the cost of growth-orientated 
risk taking ones, leading to lower firm performance and shareholder wealth than otherwise might 
be the case (Wright et al., 1996).  
 
Premise 3: Ownership concentration at some level does not constrain excessive management 
power, but exacerbates agency problems associated with executive pay, perks and 
perquisites ‘The Entrenchment Hypothesis’.  
 
 
Nonetheless, a related set of literature focuses on the pressure that outside blockholders 
and institutional investors can induce to force the firm toward value maximisation suggests that, 
the expropriating activities of management could be limited (though not eliminated) by the 
expenditure of resources on monitoring activities by outside shareholders at a cost (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The price shareholders pay for shares will reflect the monitoring costs. 
Shareholders will find it desirable to bear the costs of monitoring as long as the welfare 
increment they experience from converting their claims on the firm into general purchasing 
power is large enough to offset them. Compared with small atomistic shareholders (dispersed 
ownership) holders of large blocks (i.e. institutional investors and blockholders) can exert 
takeover threats.  
 
Takeover bids in a market for corporate control is where alterative management teams 
compete for the right to control the assets of undervalued firms (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). This 
works as an effective disciplinary device for management teams who engage in opportunistic and 
ineffective behaviour. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) successful takeovers occur only 
when the bidder has already acquired a larger than minority ownership stake in the firm. This 
suggests that small atomistic (minority) shareholders cannot benefit from costly monitoring, 
whilst holders of large blocks can because they are able to capture the proportion of the wealth 
gains resulting from a successful takeover. In theory, wealth gain is assumed following the 
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change in control after a successful takeover because such action is assumed to allow the 
acquirer to replace managers who failed to serve the shareholders’ interests with managers who 
promise better value (Reis, 2006). Consequently, due to costly monitoring and the unlikeliness of 
a successful takeover, when the bidder has not acquired some significant ownership stakes in the 
firm, managers of firms with atomistic shareholder ownership structures are relatively free to 
exercise their discretion and to pursue their own interests. Subsequently, assets in this case may 
be deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders. In contrast, because of the potential 
takeover threat that holders of large blocks can exert, a higher level of block and institutional 
ownership can induce effective monitoring over a firm’s managerial decisions. This suggests that 
ownership concentration may enhance firm value (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Jiang, 2008). 
 
Premise 4: Dispersed ownership cannot enforce value maximisation, as monitoring activities 
may not be effective due to excessive monitoring costs.  
 
Premise 5: Outside institutional and block holders have greater expertise and resources that can 
monitor management at lower costs compared to small atomistic shareholders – ‘The 
Efficient Monitoring Hypothesis’: predicting a positive relationship between outside 
block ownership and firm performance.    
 
 
Holderness and Sheehan’s (1988) study compares Tobin’s Q ratios (the total market 
value of a firm divided by the replacement costs of its assets)39 and accounting profit rates of the 
sample of firms in which a single shareholder owns 50% or more of the firm’s outstanding 
common stock with those of a matching sample of firms in which no single shareholder owns 
more than 20% of the stock. Their study, however, revealed no significant difference between 
these two samples for either measure of performance. Hence, it is likely that monitoring may 
actually be ineffective over some regions, allowing entrenchment effect to dominate. Insofar, 
there are two hypotheses for this proposition, namely ‘the conflict-of-interest hypothesis’ and 
‘the strategic-alignment hypothesis’. The former predicts that due to other profitable business 
relationships with the firms, large block holders (controlling or majority shareholders) are 
effectively pressured into voting their shares with management. While the latter suggests that 
institutions, blockholders and managers find it mutually advantageous to work together (Maher 
& Andersson, 1999). In essence, both of these hypotheses postulated that, if block holders find it 
advantageous to work for management instead of monitoring them, concentrated ownership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Tobin’s Q is a well-accepted proxy for firm performance and widely used in the literature of corporate governance, since it 
allows one to assess the value of the firm through the market’s valuation of securities and can capture the long-run impacts of 
corporate actions (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Tobin’s Q might be vary by industry. The selected studies have controlled for industry 
type (see control variables on page 68).  
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structure would give rise to severe entrenchment effects leading to lower firm performance than 
otherwise could be.  
 
Premise 6: ‘Corporate assets can be less valuable when managed by an individual free from 
checks on his control’ (Morck et al., 1988) – The ‘Entrenchment Hypothesis’.  
 
 
Thus, when the co-operation between blockholders and management cripple the 
management monitoring function of blockholders, managers are free from checks on their 
performance. Without checks and control to enforce value maximisation, corporate assets may 
be deployed to benefit managers rather than shareholders. Fame and Jensen’s (1983) empirical 
study found that firm value is reduced after some level of high ownership concentration because 
the absence of checks on managerial control induces entrenchment and misallocation of 
resources. Brickley’s et al. (1988) empirical study reported that pressure-sensitive institutions 
including banks, insurance companies and nonbank trusts are more likely to vote with managers 
on anti-takeover amendment proposal irrespective of the proposal on firm value. 
 
Consequently, utility maximisation behaviour of manager enabled by certain ownership 
structure can lead to non-profit-maximising behaviour on the part of the firm under their 
stewardship (Vroom & McCann, 2009). The following subsection attempts to test the validity of 
the hypothesis that ownership concentration affects firm performance using Meta-analysis. In so 
doing, this paper aims to pin down the range of ownership structures that may negatively affect 
firm performance by affecting the extent to which managers can be entrenched. From there the 
paper investigates the NZ situation showing that the nature of firm ownership structure in NZ 
contributed in an important way to the nation’s “long tail of very low performers” firms (MBIE, 
2013, p. 3, 8).  
 
5.1 Assessing Managerial Effectiveness Using a Meta-Analysis  
 
This subsection investigates the effect on firm performance over the range of ownership 
concentration. To do this the paper focuses on the effect of managerial/insider equity on agency 
costs by comparing the behaviour of a manager when they own 100% of the residual claims on a 
firm with their behaviour when they sell off a portion of those claims to outsiders. Note as the 
managers’ fraction of the equity fall the fraction of the equity owned by outsiders increase. In the 
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past two decades many empirical studies40 have been carried-out in this area, thereby providing a 
good basis for a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis enables one to deduce better inferences on this 
issue than the result of one study alone. However, because the studies in this area are still 
evolving, it is premature to provide a complete survey. For this meta-analysis, the paper will 
confine its attention to several representative studies on ownership concentration – firm 
performance relation. That is, those studies that examine41:  
 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =   𝐹(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝,𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
 
 
Firm Performance is the dependent variable approximate by Tobin’s Q and/or Return on Assets 
(ROA). Tobin’s Q, a ratio devised by James Tobin, hypothesized that the combined market value 
of all companies on the stock market should be about equal to their replacement costs (Tobin, 
1969, p. 23, 29). In other words, capital should be valued at its reproduction cost and firms 
should be worth what they cost to replace (i.e. Q = 1). Tobin’s Q ratio equals the market value of 
a company (number of shares outstanding x share price) divided by the replacement value of the 
firm’s assets. Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance allows studies to use the replacement 
costs of assets as a yardstick against the market value of firms at a given level of ownership 
concentration. In this simple representation, Tobin’s Q ratio may be interpreted as follows. A 
given level of ownership concentration – a Q relationship that yields a Q value of one means that 
the market value of the firm equals the value of the recorded assets of a firm. When such relation 
yields a value of Q less (greater) than one, it costs more (less) to replace a firm’s assets than the 
firm is worth, respectively.  
 
Tobin’s Q Premise: Firms should be worth what their assets are worth  
(Q = 1 = !"#$%"&!"#$# , no resource wastage - efficient) 
 
 
ROA, on the other hand, is an accounting-based performance measure also used (mostly in 
earlier studies) as a measure of firm performance. ROA equals net income divided by total 
assets. It is an indicator of how profitable a firm is relative to its total assets. Some authors in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See http://e.viaminvest.com/A5OwnershipStructures/OwPerfStudies/Table_Ow_UVWXYZ.asp 
41 Studies: Jensen & Meckling (1979), Nuen & Santerre (1986), Kim & Lyn (1988), Morck et al. (1988), McConnell 
& Servaes (1990; 1995), Hermalin & Weisback (1991), Leach & Leahy (1991), Chen et al. (1993), Holderness et al. 
(1999), Bhabra (2007), Fauzi &Locke (2012), Wellalage & Locke (2011; 2012), Jiang et al. (2009), Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro (1998).  
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more recent studies included ROA along with Tobin’s Q for robustness (Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001; Bhabra, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009; Fauzi and Locke, 2012).  
 
Ownership is the independent variable and would be as classified in Table 6 (on page 66). Hu 
and Izumida’s (2008) paper, surveys much of the theoretical and empirical researches on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, showing the literature can be 
divided into two streams. The first is related to the efficacy of concentration of ownership. The 
second is related to the distinctive motivations, abilities and effectiveness of managerial 
ownership to influence firm performance. While the first examines the contending efficient 
monitoring hypothesis42 and the expropriation of monitoring shareholder hypothesis43 associated 
with outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN) concentration, the second examines the 
contending convergence of interest hypothesis44 and the entrenchment hypothesis45 associated 
with managerial/insider ownership (INOWN) concentration. Since the purpose of this meta-
analysis is about determining managerial effectiveness, this paper therefore focuses on the latter 
– managerial/insider ownership as a function of performance. That is, the cross sectional relation 
between insider/managerial ownership (INOWN) and firm performance (proximate by Tobin’s 
Q or ROA). This, in turn, uses as proxy for managerial effectiveness (McConnell & Servaes, 
1995). Nonetheless, for additional insights the issues related to the former will also be discussed.  
 
Since theoretical arguments alone cannot unambiguously predict the association between 
INOWN and firm performance (proxy for managerial effectiveness), with the convergence of 
interest hypothesis suggesting an uniformly positive association, the entrenchment hypothesis 
suggesting firm performance can be adversely affected for some range of high ownership stakes. 
It is, therefore, not possible, a priori, to predict which force will dominate at any level of 
ownership. Hence, the association between ownership structure and firm performance is an 
empirical issue (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). The aim of this meta-analysis 
exercise is to compile the empirical results drawn from a number of relevant studies on the 
association between insider ownership (INOWN) and firm performance (proxy by Tobin’s Q) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Efficient monitoring hypothesis: contends that higher concentration of ownership gives large shareholders 
stronger incentives and greater power at lower costs to monitor management.  
43 Expropriation of monitoring shareholder hypothesis: contends that concentrated ownership structure may permit 
dominant shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders.  
44 Convergence of interest hypothesis: contends that the propensity for managers to deviate from value maximisation 
decrease as managerial/insider stockownership increase.   
45 Entrenchment hypothesis: contends that while a manager with smaller shares can disciplined toward firm value 
maximisation by the market forces, a manager controlled a substantial equity can entrench himself from the market 
restriction (i.e. the takeover threat or the managerial labour market).  
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for inference on managerial effectiveness. In particular, this paper investigates whether a high 
level of INOWN in the firm increases the probability that the manager devotes significant effort 
to creative activities and immunises himself from misappropriating the firm resources due to his 
own interests. If so, why? And if not, why not?  Thus, essentially investigating Premise 1 to 6. 
Table 6 defines ownership structure classification used in this evaluation.   
 
Table 6: Ownership Structure Classification 
Category Description 
Insider Ownership/ Managerial Ownership (INOWN) 
Management member  Active member of management board including directors, officers and 
individuals actively involved in corporate decisions (may include family 
members).  
Outsider Block46 Ownership (OUTBLOWN) 
Corporates  Non-financial company  
Investment companies Investment companies, i.e. venture capital and buyout companies. 
Banks  Mortgage, credit or investment bank (for own account). 
Insurance companies Insurance companies provide coverage in the form of compensation in 
exchange for premium payments. 
Government Municipal, state and federal government. 
Outside Individuals Individual persons which are not insiders. 
Treasury Shares Shares held by the company itself. 
Institutionals Institutional investors, i.e. asset management companies, pension funds, banks 
(for third party account) and so on. 
Employees Employees of the company excluding members of the board.   
Others  All shareholders that hold at least 5% of equity ownership within the firm. 
Outsider Dispersed Ownership 
Freefloat  Freefloat portion of the shares calculated as 100% less sum of the 
shareholdings of all other categories. 
Note: The above classification is used in the selection of studies for this meta-analysis and is characterised by the 
explicit consideration of ownership concentration (insiders and outsiders). Other categories private households, 
individuals or families without further distinguishing among different types of individuals (e.g. outsiders and 
insiders) are not appropriate for this research purpose.  
 
Control variables refer to those variables held constant across firms in order to examine the 
influence of ownership structures on firm performance. Control variables include debt, R&D, 
advertising expenditures, replacement value of assets, firm size, industry type etc. Controlling 
for such variables helps to improve the precision of the estimates and to reduce much of the 
omitted variable bias that affects the studies.  
 
Many theoretical and empirical researches in this area are typically derived from studies 
on publicly listed firms in the United States (US). Among these Nuen and Santerre (1986), Kim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Block holder also called majority shareholder or controlling shareholder. 
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and Lyn (1988), Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990; 1995), Hermalin and 
Weisback (1991) and Leach and Leahy (1991), all found the association between insider 
ownership (INOWN) and firm performance to be non-linear. These studies show within some 
range of INOWN firm performance increases and within some other range firm performance 
decreases. For the few studies carried out more recently on New Zealand (NZ) publicly listed 
firms (Bhabra, 2007; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Jiang et al., 2009), the relationship between INOWN 
and firm performance is also found to be non-linear. However, the inflection points47 obtained 
from the NZ studies were different from those obtained in the US’s. Evaluating the cross 
sectional relationship between INOWN and firm performance (uses as proxy for managerial 
effectiveness) and investigating why NZ experienced different inflection points compare to those 
experienced in the US is the subject of the rest of this section.  
 
5.1.1 Meta-Analysis: Insider Ownership-Tobin’s Q Relation 
 
To deduce better inferences on the issue of managerial effectiveness, approximated by 
the cross sectional relationship of Insider/managerial ownership (INOWN) and firm performance 
(proxy by Tobin’s Q), one needs to go beyond the examination of a single study. This is because 
the results of a single study can be influenced by characteristics of the study setting, sampling, 
timing, methodology and the subjective bias of the researchers. Robustness can only be 
unearthed by a synthesis of multiple studies. General trends and underlying principles can only 
be deduced across a large body of case studies or empirical studies.  Meta-analysis is an 
analytical approach with which to gain such additional scientific insights from previous research. 
The first recordable publication of a ‘Meta-analysis’ appeared in 1904, addressing the 
effectiveness of typhoid vaccine (Mak et al., 2010). Since then ‘Meta-analysis’ has become a 
widely used research tool, encompassing a range of procedures used in a variety of disciplines, 
namely psychology, environmental science, and transportation science. At the present time, 
meta-analysis has increasingly been used in the field of economics, particularly labour and 
environmental economics. In essence, Meta-analysis can simply be thought of as ‘conducting 
research about research’ (Bergeijk & Lazzaroni, 2013).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The inflection point is the percentage of ownership of equity at which value of Q reaches its maximum or 
minimum in the estimated regressions.  
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In this subsection, I adopt meta-analysis techniques as a statistical and analytical 
procedure for combining and comparing research findings from different studies, focusing on 
similar phenomena. In this case, the focus is on the cross sectional relationship between INOWN 
and the Tobin’s Q, which in effect uses as proxy for managerial effectiveness. Therefore, the 
paper takes the definition of “meta-analysis” as “…an analytical framework for comparative 
research that aims to draw inferences on common issues with different but allied empirical 
backgrounds” (Matarazzo & Nijkamp, 1997). In so doing, I hope to identify patterns among 
these studies’ statistical results or relationships that may come to light in the context of multiple 
studies on INOWN–Tobin’s Q dynamics for better inferences on the issue of managerial 
effectiveness in NZ.  
 
5.1.2 Search and Selection of Studies for Analysis  	  
Much theoretical and empirical research has attempted to understand the costs and 
benefits of insider ownership (INOWN) by examining the cross-sectional relation between 
INOWN and Tobin’s Q (proxy for firm performance). This, in turn, is viewed as a proxy for 
managerial effectiveness. Studies that consider the INOWN–Tobin’s Q relation without 
considering the effect of block and/or institutional ownership in their regression provide a good 
basis to test the validity of Premise 1, 2, 3 and possibly 6. Studies that also include block and/or 
institutional ownership also enable one to test the validity of Premise 4 to 6. Because of the 
contending views in Premise 1 to 6, it is not possible, a priori, for one to predict which force will 
dominate at any level of ownership concentration. Hence, it would be a mistake to use a 
specification that constrained ownership to affect performance linearly. Therefore, theoretical 
and empirical studies selected are those using piecewise linear specifications in their analyses.  
 
The primary proposition to test in this meta-analysis is that firm performance is a 
function of the distribution of equity ownership among corporate insiders, outside blockholders, 
and individual atomistic shareholders (consistent with the classification in Table 6). Such a 
function is necessarily non-linear. That is, firm performance does not entirely increasing or 
decreasing with INOWN. The effect of increasing INOWN on firm performance can be a 
double-edged sword (Stulz, 1988). That is, while a manager who held smaller equity could be 
disciplined toward firm value maximisation by the market forces, a manager who controlled 
significant shares, however, can entrench himself/herself from the market restriction (i.e. 
takeover threat or the managerial labour market) (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Hence, the incentive 
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effect vs. the entrenchment effect. Table 7 on the next page outlines the sample of studies 
selected for the analysis. In the empirical studies in Table 7, firm performance variable (i.e. 
Tobin’s Q) is regressed against various measures of ownership (and other control variables) to 
gauge their impact on firm performance. For the few descriptive studies in the literature included 
in this paper are included to provide further insights. Note in Table 7 insider ownership 
(INOWN) and outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN) would be as the percentage of beneficial 
shares held by insiders and outsiders as defined in Table 6 unless stated otherwise.    
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Table 7: Selected Studies on Firm Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This suggested that both the CEO and the outside board members with equity respond to financial incentives 
could become entrenched.  
Paper 
No.  
Paper Source (i) Ownership 
Variable  
(ii) Firm 
Performance 
Variable 
Relationship between  
(i) and (ii) 
PI.1 Jensen and 
Meckling 
(1976) 
Insider 
Ownership 
(INOWN)  
 
Descriptive 
firm value 
Firm performance increases with INOWN: 
showing partial INOWN provides incentives for 
consumption of excessive perquisites, but such 
incentives decrease as INOWN stake increases 
(suggesting convergence of interests as INOWN 
increases). However, if the firm is 100% owner-
managed, owner-manager will make operating 
decisions that maximise his/her utility (suggesting 
substitution of profits for utility maximisation 
when INOWN is 100%).  
[Evidence for: Premise 1 and 2] 
PI.2 Nuen and 
Santerre (1986) 
 
Sample (1980): 81 
Fortune 500 firms 
 Outside Block 
Ownership 
(OUTBLOWN) 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
Non-linear: ROA decreases when blockholder 
ownership is below 20%, increases when it is 20-
50%, and decreases when greater than 50% 
(suggesting monitoring efficiency with increases 
outside block ownership, OUTBLOWN, but the 
entrenchment effect sets in when ownership 
reaches some significant level).  
[Evidence for: Premise 4, 5 and 6] 
PI.3 Kim and Lyn 
(1988) 
 
Sample: 391 US 
firms (1976-78) 
INOWN  
 
Tobin’s Q  
 
Non-linear: When INOWN<5% Q decreases as 
INOWN increases; when INOWN>25% Q 
increases with INOWN. This is consistent with 
PI.1, suggesting that managers of low INOWN 
firms would consume more perks (shirking), and 
thus firm values would be lower compared to 
those of inside-controlled firms.  
[Evidence for: Premise 2] 
 
PI.4 Morck et al. 
(1988) 
 
Sample: 371 of 
the largest US 
firms [Fortune 
500] (1980). 
INOWN  
[as by officers 
and directors on 
the board; as by 
officers; as by 
other directors 
on the board] 
Tobin’s Q  
 
Non-linear: At low INOWN range (0-5%) Q 
increases with INOWN; at intermediate INOWN 
range (5-25%) Q decreases with INOWN; at high 
INOWN (>25%) Q increases with INOWN. 
INOWN defines as shareholding by BODs or 
INOWN defines as holding by CEO or by other 
member of the board – produced similar pattern48. 
Similar results cited in Wruck (1989) (for 
incentive and entrenchment effect).  
[Evidence for: Premise 2 and 3] 
 
PI.5 McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) 
 
Sample: US firms 
listed on NYSE or 
AMEX, 1173 
firms in 1976 and 
1093 firms (1986).  
INOWN  
[as by officers 
and board of 
directors, 
BODs; consider 
the effect of 
Institutional 
investors  
Tobin’s Q Non-linear: Q first increases with INOWN then 
turn downward. Results cited to be consistent with 
Stulz (1988), explaining at 50% INOWN the 
probability of a hostile takeover is zero – absence 
of managerial discipline (for incentive and 
entrenchment effect).  
 
[Evidence for: Premise 1, 2, 3 and 6] 
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49 The authors explained: the negative sign in the valuation ratio revealed where ownership is concentrated the 
market for shares is not developed and this is reflected in an adverse market valuation irrespective of the return on 
shareholders’ capital.  
 Authors also show the inclusion of institutional 
ownership as an independent variable increases 
the inflection point of INOWN–Q relation from 
38% to 43% (in the 1976 sample); from 50% to 
60% (in the 1986 sample), suggesting institutional 
ownership reinforces the positive effect of 
INOWN on Q (insider/managerial ownership on 
firm performance).  
[Evidence for: Premise 5] 
 
PI.6 Hermalin & 
Weisback 
(1991) 
 
Sample: 134 firms 
listed at NYSE 
(1971, 1974, 1977, 
1980, 1984) 
INOWN   
[as by all 
present and 
former CEO’s 
still on the 
BODs] 
Tobin’s Q  Non-linear: INOWN (as CEO) in 0-1% range Q 
increases with INOWN; 1-5% range Q decreases 
as INOWN increases; 5-20% range Q increases 
with INOWN; and decreases thereafter. Authors 
suggest even if on average higher ownership 
allows deeper entrenchment diminishing return 
might set in well before the 50% INOWN rate. 
Hence, the problem of entrenchment is not just a 
consequence of voting power. CEO by virtue of 
their tenure with the firm, status as a founder, or 
even personality, can be entrenched with 
relatively small stakes. 
[Evidence for: Premise 1, 2, 3 and 6] 
PI.7 Leach and 
Leahy (1991) 
 
Sample: 470 UK 
large industrial, 
firms  
(1983-85) 
Herfindahl 
index and 
concentration 
ratios: 𝑐! 
(largest 
holding), 𝑐!, 𝑐!", 
and 𝑐!" (the 
combined 
holding of the 
largest 5, 10, 
and 20 
shareholders)  
Valuation ratio 
(VAL); 
Returns on 
shareholdings’ 
capital 
(RSHC)  
More concentration caused significantly less 
performance: concentration has negative 
coefficient in VAL (ratio reflects market 
discipline effect), suggesting adverse effect on 
disciplinary force 49 . Positive effect on RSHC 
(proxy for shareholder incentives) but near zero, 
indicating that the effect of ownership 
concentration via shareholder incentives is 
unimportant.  
[Evidence for: Premise 6] 
 
PI.8 Chen et al. 
(1993) 
 
Sample: Fortune 
500 (1976, 1980, 
1984) 
INOWN [as by 
officers and 
directors] 
Tobin’s Q Non-linear: When INOWN <7% Q increases 
with INOWN. Q reaches it maximum when 
INOWN is about 7%; beyond 7% Q decreases as 
INOWN increases; Q increases with INOWN 
again when INOWN ≥20%.  
 
[Evidence for: Premise 2 and 3] 
 
PI.9 Holderness et 
al. (1999) 
 
Sample: 1236 US 
listed firms in 
1935 and 3759 in 
1995.  
 
 INOWN  
[as by officers 
and directors] 
Tobin’s Q Non-linear: When INOWN< 5% Q increases 
with INOWN; 5%< INOWN< 25% Q decreases 
as INOWN increases; INOWN> 25% Q increases 
with INOWN again but at a slower rate. Authors 
suggest, thereafter, at some high level of INOWN 
Q would decline again due to issue of managerial 
discipline (high managerial control reduce the 
probability of a takeover).  
[Evidence for: Premise 2, 3 and 6] 
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Source: Own collaboration based on quoted studies.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Data made available by the Management Research Centre at the University of Waikato. (2011): unbalanced panel 
dataset given high attribution rate for SMEs, comprises of 1099 observations from a total of 100 businesses (1998-
2008); (2012): balanced panel dataset, comprises 2640 observations from a total of 240 businesses (1998-2008). The 
random sample is drawn from accounting practices that prepare end of year financial returns for small businesses, 
and thus avoiding selection bias of using bank related data or survey those businesses submit to government 
agencies. Firms included in both studies come from a range of industries, categorised as primary, energy, goods, 
services, and others. 	  
51 CAN 8.8%; UK 12.9%; US 60.7%; FRA 8%; GER 9.6%; 11 industrial sectors (1986-91). 
PI.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McConnell & 
Servaes (1995) 
 
Sample: US firms 
listed on NYSE or 
AMEX: firms - 
990 (1976), 876 
(1986), 780 
(1988). 
 
INOWN  
[as by officers 
and BODs]; also 
consider the 
effect of 
blockholder and 
Institutional 
investors 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Non-linear: relationship between Q and INOWN 
for both samples of low-growth and high-growth 
firms, whereby Q first increases and then 
decreases, as the fraction of shares owned by 
INOWN increases. Pattern consistent with 
previous studies, but likely to be more important 
for low growth firms.  
[Evidence for: Premise 1, 2, 3 and 6] 
PI.11 Bhabra (2007) 
 
Sample: NZ’s 
listed firms panel 
data over 1994-
1998 
INOWN [as by 
directors]  
Tobin’s Q  Non-linear: When INOWN is less than 14% and 
greater than 40% Q increases with INOWN; but 
when INOWN is between 14% and 40% Q 
decreases as INOWN increases. Author shows 
results are robust to different measures of firm 
performance and several different estimation 
techniques and to differences in governance 
structures across markets.  
[Evidence for: Premise 2 and 3] 
PI.12 Fauzi and 
Locke (2012) 
 
Sample: 79 NZ 
listed firms, 
balanced panel 
(2007-2011) 
INOWN 
[as by officers]; 
also considering 
the effect of 
outside 
blockholder 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Non-linear: when INOWN<15.4% Q increases 
with INOWN; when INOWN>17.4% Q decreases 
as INOWN increases; result consistent with 
previous studies for a non-linear relationship.   
[Evidence for: Premise 1, 2, 3, and 6] 
PI.13 
 
 
 
 
 
Wellalage & 
Locke (2011; 
2012)50 
 
Sample: small 
unlisted NZ firms 
(1998-2008) 
INOWN  
 
 
 
 
Infer firm 
performance 
from ownership 
concentration-
agency cost 
relation.   
Non-linear: when INOWN is negligible (<0.2%) 
or too high (≥75%) agency costs (both Principal-
Agent and Principal-Principal costs) increases, 
and thus firm performance would be lower.  
[Evidence for: Premise 2, 3 and 6] 
PI.14 Jiang et al. 
(2009) 
 OUTBLOWN Tobin’s Q; 
ROA 
Non-linear: finds high ownership concentration 
in NZ does not constrain excessive management 
power, but execrates agency problems associated 
with executive pay; providing evidence for the 
debate – whether ownership concentration 
encourages efficient monitoring or rent seeking 
with respect to executive pay. 
[Evidence for: Premise 3 and 6] 
     
PI.15 
Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro (1998) 
 
Sample: 1030 
medium to large 
sized public and 
private sector 
firms, drawn from 
5 countries51 
(1986-91).  
INOWN 
OUTBLOWN 
ROA Evidence for differences across countries: Non-
linear: United States, United Kingdom, Germany. 
No effect: Canada and France. Authors suggest 
such differences indicate that the constraints on 
managerial discretion do vary in effectiveness 
across countries. They suggest this may be due to 
differences in the level of diversification and 
internal constraints across countries.  
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5.1.3 Results and Analysis – The United States Studies  
 
The objective of this meta-analysis exercise is to determine the extent to which there is a 
generalisable pattern of the cross sectional relationship between insider ownership (INOWN) and 
Tobin’s Q (proxy for firm performance) drawn from a number of relevant studies for inference 
on managerial effectiveness. Recall that Tobin’s Q (hereafter Q) is the ratio of the firm’s market 
value to the replacement cost of its assets. This means that a Q above (below) one would indicate 
that the market views of the firms’ internal organisation as exceptionally good (poor) or the 
expected agency costs are particularly small (large), and thus the firms would be valued higher 
(lower), respectively. A statistical compilation of the U.S. empirical studies by Morck et al. 
(1988), Chen et al. (1993) and Holderness et al. (1999), from Table 7 reveal the following 
pattern, as illustrated in Figure 16. While Nuen and Santerre (1986), Kim and Lyn (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990; 1995) and Hermalin & Weisback’s (1991) findings help validate 
the pattern in Figure 16 and provide further inferences regarding their implications. Jensen and 
Meckling’s (1976) theoretical study on the other hand, also helps explain the statistical pattern in 
Figure 16.  
 
In Figure 16 below, the boxplot is constructed from the reported statistical results of 
Morck et al. (1988), Chen et al. (1993) and Holderness et al. (1999), PI.4, 8 and 9 in Table 7. As 
in Figure 14, the boxplots in Figure 16 read as follows. The box shows the interquartile range 
containing the values between 25th and 75th percentile of the sampled studies’ estimated effect of 
INOWN on Q. Recall that this, in turn, is taken as proxy for managerial effectiveness. That is, at 
a given level of INOWN how effective is management in managing the resources under their 
stewardship to generate value for their shareholders (through higher firm performance). The 
white and black areas in the box are the upper quartile and lower quartile range, respectively. 
The line in between the white and the black area is the median. The upper and lower whiskers 
are the upper and lower adjacent values. The distance between the highest adjacent value 
(maximum) and the lowest adjacent value (minimum) gives the spread of the estimated effect of 
INOWN on Q at a given level of INOWN.  
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Figure 16: Tobin's Q as a Function of Insider Ownership (The US Studies) 
	  
Note: INOWN denoted Insider Ownership. Boxplot constructed from empirical studies PI.4, 8 and 9 mapped out 
Tobin’s Q as a function of INOWN after controlling for variables likely to be correlated with firm performance. 
Regression specification: Tobin’s Q = {𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 +   𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 ! + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 !}  𝑜𝑟  𝑄 = {𝛽! +𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁0 − 5 +   𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁5 − 25 + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 > 25 }. Control variables include debt, research and 
development advertising expenditures and replacement value of assets, total assets. Source: [PI.4] Morck et al. 
(1988), [PI.8] Chen et al. (1993), and [PI.9] Holderness et al. (1999). Dataset available upon request from 
p_sodany@yahoo.co.uk  
 
Overall, the pattern in Figure 16 shows managerial effectiveness (proximate by the cross 
sectional relationship between INOWN on Q) are positive and increasing over some range of 
INOWN (insider/managerial ownership) and negative and decreasing over some range of 
INOWN. Figure 16 reports that, on average, when INOWN is less than 5% Q increases by 0.05 
with each additional 1% increase in INOWN. However, when INOWN is between 5% and 25% 
Q decreases, on average, by 0.006 with each additional 1% increases in INOWN, and beyond 
25% INOWN Q increases again but at a slower rate, on average, by 0.004 with each additional 
1% increase in INOWN. This implies that, on average, when insider/managerial ownership 
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(INOWN) is low increasing insider/managerial ownership lead to higher managerial 
effectiveness. The explanation of this is grounded in the Agency Theory (AT), which defines a 
firm as a nexus of contracts in which the relationship between managers (agent) and shareholders 
(principal) is inherently pervaded with conflicts of interest. AT predicts that when managers own 
little or no stake in their firm they would engage in opportunistic behaviour for their personal 
benefits at the cost of firm performance. Hence, consistent with the convergence of interest 
hypothesis (Premise 2) increasing managerial/insider ownership (INOWN) from a negligible 
level to a higher level would incentivise managers to devote significant effort to creative 
activities because they bear greater fraction of the benefits from the resultant gains.  
 
However, as managerial ownership increases beyond some level where managers have 
enough voting power or influence more generally to guarantee their employment with the firm 
managerial effectiveness worsens. This is because the absence of the potential threat of takeover 
to serve as a disciplinary device for ineffective and entrenched managers leaves managers 
relatively free to exercise their discretions. Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
this would come at the cost of firm performance when the expected benefits derive from 
managers’ other interests (i.e. pay, perks and perquisites) offset the benefits gain from profit 
maximisation encourage managers to engage in opportunistic and inefficient behaviour (as cited 
in Hu & Izumida, 2008). That is, the entrenchment effect (Premise 3). Nonetheless, at high level 
of INOWN, i.e. after 25%, firm performance, once again, increases with INOWN. Cho (1998) 
suggests, ceteris paribus, this is because managers prefer equity when they expect their firm to 
perform well, and thus higher level of managerial ownership is expected in firms with high 
performance.  
 
Overall, the pattern in Figure 16 confirms the non-linear relationship between insider 
ownership (INOWN) and firm performance (proxy by Tobin’s Q), showing evidence for the 
convergence of interest or incentive effect occurring at low and high INOWN range and the 
entrenchment effect occurring at the intermediate INOWN range. The extent to which managers 
can be entrenched and how long they remained entrenched varied across studies, as illustrated by 
the large spread reported in the boxplot when INOWN is between 5% and 25%. This is 
consistent with Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) who point that it is not 
possible, a priori, to predict which force will dominate at any level of ownership, and thus the 
association between ownership structure and firm performance is an empirical issue. 
Consequently, though the findings of Nuen and Santerre (1986), Kim and Lyn (1988), and 
	  	  
	   78	   
	  
 
	   	  
Hermalin and Weisback (1991) suggest a similar pattern, the inflection point when entrenchment 
sets in and how long managers remained entrenched reported by these studies do varies. 
 
Notice that the magnitude of the incremental change in Q is quite small. This may be due 
to the fact that the sampled firms are predominately large firms (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). In 
this sample, while entrenchment can be expected to increase with the size of managerial 
shareholdings, keeping this fraction constant, managerial entrenchment will also increase with 
the size of the firm (Gugler et al., 2003). This is because, ceteris paribus, with imperfect capital 
markets it costs disproportionately more for an outsider group to take over a ten billion dollar 
firm than one worth one billion. There are also other reasons why firm size and performance 
might be related. To the extent that firm size is related to market shares a positive relationship 
between size and performance might be expected, due to market power or efficiency effects of 
scale and scope. This may reduce the observed negative effect of managerial entrenchment. 
Consequently, one would expect the size of the entrenchment effect to be higher for an economy 
with smaller firms.  
 
 Additionally, the regression results used in Figure 16 also do not account for the 
presence of block and institutional investors. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Morck et al. 
(1988) suggest that in absence of block and institutional investors, monitoring activities may not 
be effective because of excessive monitoring costs in firms where ownership is widely dispersed 
among many shareholders. Hence, ineffective monitoring may also explain why Q (firm 
performance) increases with INOWN (insider ownership) but the observed increase is small and 
even smaller as INOWN increases beyond 25% rate. Such results are consistent with Premise 1, 
4, 5, and 6. There are reasons to suspect that in absence of monitoring, higher equity ownership 
by insiders allows managers greater discretion, as Williamson (1988, p. 567) pointed out “debt 
governance works mainly out of rules, while equity governance allows much greater discretion”. 
 
In fact, McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that if one considers the cross sectional 
relationship between INOWN and Tobin’s Q (proxy for managerial effectiveness) with the 
presence of institutional investors (INSTO), diminishing returns set in much later and the 
magnitude of the effect of INOWN on Q appeared to be much higher. For both their 1976 and 
1986 samples the point of inflection increased approximately by 15% with the inclusion of 
INSTO as additional independent variables. They suggest that the presence of INSTO reinforces 
the positive effect of insider ownership (INOWN) on firm performance (Q) because institutional 
	  	  
	   79	   
	  
 
	   	  
investors (INSTO) provides an effective mechanism to safeguard against managerial 
entrenchment over and above what can be achieved by small atomistic shareholders. The 
positive effect occurs because INSTO are more efficient monitors of managers than are atomistic 
shareholders. Such a result reinforces the efficient monitoring hypothesis of Pound (1988), and 
consistent with Premise 4 and 5. McConnell and Servaes (1995) further suggests that the 
presence of INSTO is likely to be more important for low-growth firms than for high-growth 
firms, after having compared the differences in the effect of INOWN on Q for firms with many 
growth opportunities (high-growth) to those with few profitable growth opportunities (low-
growth).  
 
Nonetheless, McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that if outside block owners were 
merely passive investors with a relatively inactive role in monitoring managerial activities, 
managerial effectiveness would be lower. They suggest such blockholders may be a descendent 
of the firm founder and might most appropriately be considered as insiders. This specification 
may also holds if blockholders co-operate or operate in conjunction with managers instead of 
monitoring them. In either case, whatever the underlying assumption may be, the passivity of 
blockholders that result, in effect, means managers are left relatively free from checks on their 
controls. Consequently, under such circumstance one would expect greater managerial discretion 
with outside block ownership, leading to lower firm performance than otherwise would be the 
case (consistent with Premise 6; see evidence of this in Table 2 of McConnell & Servaes, 1990).  
 
Furthermore, although typically an individual or group must own at least 51% of the 
shares to gain control of the firm, in practice entrenchment is not just a consequence of voting 
power. Some CEO, by virtue of their tenure with the firm, status as a founder, or even 
personality, can be entrenched even with relatively small stakes. Weston (1979) reported that no 
firm with insiders owning over 30% had ever been acquired in a hostile takeover (as cited in 
Morck et al., 1988). Hence, even if we believe that, on average more ownership allows deeper 
entrenchment it is possible for diminishing returns to set in well before 50% ownership is 
reached (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Stulz, 1988; Hermalin & Weisback, 1991).  This explains 
why the point of diminishing returns across all studies take place before 50% of insider 
ownership (INOWN) and why in absence of effective monitoring on managerial control 
entrenchment would set in far earlier and its effect can be much deeper than would otherwise be 
the case (Hermalin & Weisback, 1991).  
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In sum, irrespective of the managerial stake in the firm, the absence of checks on 
managerial control would reduce managerial effectiveness and hence firm performance would 
necessarily be lower. At this level of aggregation, such results are not inconsistent with the 
conjecture that large blockholders and inside owners operate in conjunction with each other to 
influence firm value. Holderness et al. (1999) also highlight a similar proposition in their 
analysis, suggesting that when blockholders (majority shareholders) collude with corporate 
managers against the best interests of atomistic (minority) shareholders, either because it is in 
their interest to do so or because corporate managers coerced them into doing so, firm value 
would be lower. Thus, one would expect that at some high level of ownership concentration Q 
declines.  
 
A UK study by Leach and Leahy (1991) echoed similar findings. They found more 
concentration caused statistically significantly less performance in terms of historic market 
value/ordinary share capital and return on sales. Overall, these results illustrate that managerial 
shareholding may have two contrary effects: an incentive effect and an entrenchment effect. 
Though the above analysis suggests that the former would dominate at low and high ranges of 
insider ownership (INOWN) and the latter dominates at the intermediate range of INOWN, the 
inflection points at which the insider ownership-firm performance (INOWN-Q) relation curve 
changes from being concave to convex to concave again, however, do vary across samples. More 
importantly, the extents to which managers can be entrenched and for how long they can remain 
entrenched also vary (see PI.1 to PI.10 in Table 7 for the summary of these studies’ results; for 
further detail refer to the original papers). From this one can infer that at what level of INOWN 
in which the entrenchment effect may set in and for how long managers can be entrenched 
depends on the characteristics of the insiders (whether they are CEO or directors or outsiders on 
the board) and the characteristics of outside shareholders (i.e. dispersed or concentrated) and 
their behaviour (i.e. monitoring or colluding with management).  
 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro’s (1998) investigation of the effect of outside block ownership 
(as percentage of ownership held by the largest shareholders, institutional and/or block) in the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and France brings to fore further implications 
of the association between INOWN and Q (proxy for managerial effectiveness). They show the 
effect of outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN, as classified in Table 6) differs across 
countries, suggesting that constraints on managerial discretion do vary in effectiveness across 
countries. They find strong ownership concentration effects in the United States (US), weaker 
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effects in Germany, some effects in the United Kingdom (UK), and no effects at all in Canada or 
France. They explain that differences may be driven by the differences in the level of 
diversification 52  and internal constraints 53  across countries. Given such cross-countries 
differences on the effectiveness of outside block owners in reinforcing managerial effectiveness, 
it is essential to investigate the cross sectional relationship between insider ownership and 
Tobin’s Q with the inclusion of OUTBLOWN (and control variables) in the New Zealand (NZ) 
context. Comparing the results found in NZ to those evidenced in the US (the subject of the 
majority of empirical studies in this area) would enable one to better assess the extent to which 
post reform NZ’s high ownership concentrations influenced its managerial effectiveness and thus 
firm performance.  
 
5.1.4 Results and Analysis – The New Zealand Studies  	  	   Unlike the United States (US), New Zealand (NZ) has a smaller market and so its listed 
firms are likely to perform differently. Additionally, the NZ economy comprises mainly of small 
and medium enterprises, which is different to other developed countries. Bhabra’s (2007) study 
of the effect of insider ownership (INOWN: as a percentage of equity ownership by directors) on 
firm performance (proxy by Tobin’s Q) in NZ publicly listed firms reported a range of 14-40% 
within which managerial entrenchment might occur. Though consistent with Premise 2 and 3, 
the results reported in Bhabra’s (2007) NZ study, as illustrated in Figure 17 below, differs from 
that of the US studies (cf. Figure 17 vs. Figure 16) in three ways. Firstly, the entrenchment effect 
in NZ sets in at a higher INOWN rate than that reported in the US (i.e. 14% in NZ vs. 5% in the 
US). Secondly, the period in which managers can be entrenched is shown to be longer in NZ 
than that reported in the US (i.e. the range reported in NZ is between14-40% vs. the 5-25% range 
reported in the US studies). Thirdly, the magnitude of the entrenchment effect is also reported to 
be much greater in NZ than that reported in the US (i.e. the lowest Q reported in Figure 17 is less 
than 0.4 vs. the result reported in Figure 16 whereby the median Q never fell below 0.75).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Author showed for the United States (US), ownership concentration does not exert a positive marginal effect on 
profitability unless the firm is either highly diversified or highly concentrated. They showed the interaction between 
ownership concentration and diversification positively affects profitability in the US. 
53 E.g. compared to the US, the United Kingdom (UK) managers faced stronger internal constraints from their 
boards since UK directors are legally required to represent the interests of employees as well as shareholders (Clark, 
1985 as cited in Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998).  
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Figure 17: Tobin's Q as a Function of Insider Ownership (The NZ Study) 
 
Note: The function constructed from empirical studies by Bhabra (2007) mapping out Tobin’s Q (proxy for firm 
performance) as a function of INOWN after controlling for variables likely to be correlated with firm performance. 
Regression specification: Tobin’s Q ={𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 +   𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 ! + 𝛽! 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑊𝑁 !, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠}. 
Control variables include debt, block and firm size. Dataset available upon request to p_sodany@yahoo.co.uk   
 
 
The effect of entrenchment may set in later in NZ because the NZ market is much smaller 
than the US, and thus managerial actions may be more transparent in such an environment 
(Bhabra, 2007). The major legislative reforms in 1993 on the governance of securities, including 
the Companies Act in 1993 that substantially increased director accountability may also explain 
why entrenchment effect set in at a much higher rate of insider ownership (INOWN) at 14% in 
the NZ study (cf. the 5% INOWN rate largely reported in the US studies). Additionally, Bhabra 
(2007) defined insiders as directors (in Figure 17), while the US studies examined in Figure 16 
defined insiders as officers and directors. Hermalin and Weisback’s (1991) suggest that the 
problem of entrenchment is not just a consequence of voting power, Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) by virtue of their tenure with the firm or status as a founder can be entrenched with 
relatively small stakes. Hence, by definition of INOWN, one would expect entrenchment to set 
in at a relatively higher rate of INOWN in the NZ study compared to the US.  
 
However, the extent to which NZ’s managers can be entrenched (be inefficient) is much 
greater than the 5 to 25% insider ownership (INOWN) range largely reported in the US studies. 
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Even after considering the presence of outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN as classified in 
Table 6), the range in which managers can be entrenched reported in Bhabra’s (2007) NZ study 
is between 14% and 40% INOWN. This result, supported by Healy (2001), supports the 
proposition that large block and institutional ownership (OUTBLOWN) in NZ do not reinforce 
the positive effect of insider ownership on firm performance hypothesized by the monitoring 
efficiency hypothesis. The negative association between block ownership and Q reported in 
Bhabra (2007) also reinforces this proposition. A number of authors suggest that this is because 
NZ institutional investors and blockholders play a very passive role in monitoring firms (Healy, 
2001; Bhabra, 2007; Jiang et al., 2009). They argue the possible reasons for this are two-fold.  
 
Firstly, local institutions seem to place less confidence in the NZ equity market and tend 
to invest their capital in foreign equity markets because of NZ’s relative equity market under-
development. Secondly, foreign financial institutions and corporations account for the majority 
of investments in NZ. Healy (2001) reported that as of 31 March 2001, foreign institutions and 
corporations collectively held 54% of NZ equities while local institutions held a meager 15%. 
Other investors whom are not institutional investors hold the rest. The release of the 
Deloitte/Management Top 200 Company list for excellence in New Zealand business 
management and governance in 2012 showed that 102 of the Top 200 firms are at least 50% 
foreign owned (New Zealand Herald, 2012b). Healy (2001), Bhabra (2007) and Jiang et al. 
(2009) argue the geographical separation of those foreign institutional investors from their 
invested firms make collaboration and monitoring among block and institutional investors 
difficult and costly. Such barriers might largely be responsible for the lack of shareholder 
activism and ineffective institutional monitoring observed in NZ.  
 
The lack of shareholder activism and ineffective institutional monitoring might also be 
related to the fact that the presence of foreign ownership in NZ are not as they are, for example, 
in Canada. Foreign ownership in Canada comes from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) where 
foreign multinationals, says from the US, have a branch in Canada with their staffs in Canada to 
monitor their firms’ operations (Brune & Sweeny, 2012). Hence, a further question to ask is 
whether foreign ownership in NZ is a direct foreign ownership where foreign block/institutional 
investors actually have a stake in the firm or whether it is a portfolio foreign ownership where 
foreign block/institutional investors just owned shares in the firm? And how are they monitoring 
firms in NZ? Therefore, a more detailed study investigating the structure of foreign ownership in 
NZ firms relative to other advanced OECD countries would be useful.   
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The magnitude of the entrenchment effect is shown to be higher in Bhabra (2007) than 
the results reported for the US even after having controlled for firm size and block holdings. 
Tobin’s Q is not binary. This means the value far below (above) one would be relatively worse 
(better) than the value being only slightly below one. Consequently, the greater magnitude in 
effect shown for NZ indicates that without scale efficiency (because NZ’s firms are 
predominantly small) to offset the adverse effect of entrenchment, firm performance would be 
lower than might otherwise be the case. Hence, managerial ineffectiveness would be more 
detrimental to NZ firm performance than that of the US (where firms are larger).  
 
The difference in firm ownership structure in NZ before and after the reform and its 
effect on managerial effectiveness largely explain why firm performance and productivity differs 
between these periods. From 1962 to 1993, there had been a major shift to OUTBLOWN (or 
majority control) among the NZ publicly listed firms, increasing from 16.3% in 1962 to 50% by 
1993. Whilst the proportion of Insider/managerial ownership (INOWN) in NZ’s publicly listed 
firms declined from 39.5% in 1962 to only 2.6% by 1993 (Fox, 1996). Healy (2001) reported 
outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN) in NZ’s publicly listed firms further increased to 69%, 
much higher than that of the US (39.8%) and the UK (60.8%) (as cited in Bhabra, 2007, p. 144-
5). Additionally, Hossain et al. (2001) reported that the mean proportion of stock held by the top 
20 shareholders in NZ is 73%. At least up to 2001, NZ’s publicly listed firms in the post reform 
era typically are one of low INOWN and high OUTBLOWN (cf. moderate INOWN and 
relatively dispersed-moderate OUTBLOWN before the reform).  
 
Using a balanced panel of 79 NZ publicly listed firms for the period 2007 to 2011 Fauzi 
and Locke (2012) verify that the association between INOWN and Q with the presence of 
OUTBLOWN found in NZ had been different to that found in the US. That is, the presence of 
OUTBLOWN had not induced effective monitoring expected to smooth out the entrenchment 
effect as found in the US McConnell and Servaes’ (1990) study. McConnell and Servaes’ (1990) 
analysis show with the inclusion of OUTBLOWN, the entrenchment effect can be smoothed out 
and managerial effectiveness continued to increase until diminishing returns set in at 40% 
INOWN. By contrast, Fauzi and Locke (2012) found even with the inclusion of OUTBLOWN 
the entrenchment effect cannot be smoothed out in NZ and thus managerial effectiveness 
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declines after 17.4% INOWN54. Fauzi and Locke (2012) also report a negative association 
between OUTBLOWN and Q, while McConnell and Servaes’ (1990) US study report a positive 
association. These echo Bhabra’s (2007) assertion that contrary to what is found in the US, large 
outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN) in NZ does not reinforce the positive effect of insider 
ownership (INOWN) on firm value (Tobin’s Q). Thus, Premise 5 does not hold for NZ.   
 
Consequently, despite the higher institutional and concentrated shareholdings 
(OUTBLOWN) in NZ, and contrary to the results reported for the US and in the larger literature, 
for some reason the overall effectiveness in OUTBLOWN’s ability (and willingness) to monitor 
management is at best weak. Bhabra (2007) argues that the geographical separation of large 
(foreign) institutional investors from the firms they own stocks in (NZ) largely account for this. 
This result is similar to what is found in Fitzsimons (1997) and Hossain et al. (2001). Hence, 
consistent with Premise 6, the absence of checks on managerial control (monitoring) on the part 
of outside block holders would leave managers relatively free to exercise their discretion and 
thus the extent to which managers can be entrenched. This in effect leads to lower firm 
performance than otherwise would be the case.   
 
Of course, publicly listed firms are not the only firms in NZ. Small businesses account 
for over 90 per cent of business entities in NZ with more than 586,000 people (30% of the 
workforce) employed in enterprises with fewer than 20 employees. These figures do not account 
for the 380,000 self-employed in NZ (MBIE, 2014). Ownership structures of private and small 
businesses vary. MBIE’s (2014, p. 15) Small Business Sector Report revealed ownership 
structures adopted in these smaller firms range from sole proprietorship, partnerships and trusts, 
to limited liability companies. The allocation of equity ownership may vary from 100% insider 
ownership (INOWN) to a much lower level. Nonetheless small businesses in general are owner-
managed. That is, owners/founders more often than not would be part of the management team. 
Due to lack of reliable data on small businesses, the association between ownership structure and 
Q in this area remains relatively unexplored.  
 
Limited as it, a study by Wellalage and Locke (2011; 2012) of small-unlisted New 
Zealand companies (1998-2008) provides a good basis for one to deduce some important 
inferences from. Wellalage and Locke’s (2011, 2012) study shows, when insider ownership 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Note: Fauzi and Locke (2012) defined INOWN as percentage of equity ownership held by managers (officers). 
The inflection point may be higher if INOWN is measured as the percentage of equity ownership held by directors 
as in Bhabra (2007) – according to Hermalin and Weisback’s (1991) suggestion discussed previously.  
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(INOWN: defined as equity ownership by owner-manager) is between 0% and 50%, agency 
costs decrease (implying firm value increase) with increasing INOWN. This is consistent with 
Premise 2. However, when insider ownership (INOWN) is at the range greater than 50%, agency 
costs increase (implying firm value decrease) with increasing INOWN. This is consistent with 
Premise 1, 3 and 6. Although, on average, higher equity ownership allows deeper entrenchment 
but given the nature of private and small businesses in New Zealand (NZ) which are typically 
family owned and managed by the owners, the lack of governance structure (and external 
pressure) means diminishing return may set in well before 50% INOWN is reached. More 
exploration in this area is called for given the importance of small businesses in NZ.  
 
A further investigation into the structures and types of co-operatives, their behaviour, and 
impact on firm performance would also be helpful. Co-operatives are major players in NZ. They 
come in many kinds and sizes, ranging from craft co-operatives with a single shop-front to NZ’s 
largest commercial business, Fonterra. Co-operatives are user owned and controlled with owners 
(often producers or employers or consumers) whom supposedly monitoring the managers (Co-
operative Business New Zealand, 2014). Yet, the performance of our largest commercial 
cooperative, for instance, in terms of growth enhancing innovation and value-added appeared to 
be lower by international comparison (see Box 3 on page 100 for example). Hence, 
understanding the behaviour of different types of co-operatives would provide further insights on 
this issue55, 56.  
 
In sum, contrary to the US, block and institutional investors in NZ firms do not reinforce 
the positive effect of insider ownership (INOWN) on firm value because of ineffective 
monitoring. The geographical separation of NZ’s foreign institutional investors (which account 
for the majority of investments in NZ) from their invested firms may be responsible for this. 
Reflected in the literature, in absence of effective monitoring (irrespective of the level of 
managerial stakes in the business) high outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN) concentration 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For instance, whether problems for co-operatives, in particular, are due to the structure of the firms or their 
practices. If problems are due to firm’s practices: may be there’s certain culture or attitude in NZ that is hurting the 
NZ industries? May be there is a problem in managerial education – e.g. managers have the wrong model in their 
mind of what ‘best practice’ is? (E.g. how to increase competitiveness – firms can be competitive on the basis of low 
price and low quality but this is not the best practice from the point of view of high quality and high productivity.)  
56 In order to understand the overlap between management and efficiency one has to go into the ‘black-box’ of the 
firm to figure out what is going on. Economic models need to be more sophisticated, just having a profit maximising 
function is not going to tell us the full story. It is important to understand how firms are managed. One cannot 
simply assume (as in the conventional economic model) that somehow everything suppose to workout, that 
everyone have the same preference function, and that somehow ones’ utility maximising function is consistent with 
their profit maximising function. 
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would be detrimental to managerial effectiveness, and thus firm performance. They do so by 
exacerbating the agency costs associated with managerial entrenchment – pay, perks and 
perquisites. Recall that the passivity of large block holders may warrant such investors to also be 
classified as insiders, as suggested by McConnell and Servaes (1990). In this respect, one can see 
why high block ownership in NZ firms would indirectly give managers substantial control of 
firms irrespective of the managerial stakes in the business. This combined with ineffective 
monitoring on the part of institutional investors (INSTO) because of the geographical separation 
of such investors from their invested firms in NZ gives managers much greater discretion, 
leaving them relatively free from pressure to deliver on performance, and thus leading to lower 
firm performance than might otherwise be the case.  
 
Consequently, in absence of effective monitoring, the link between private ownership and 
efficient resource utilisation guided by the profit maximisation constraint would be broken by a 
highly concentrated ownership structure that reduces the incentives of corporate managers to 
maximise profits by maximising productivity. The divergence of actual performance from the 
predicted level based on compliance, in effect, would arise largely as a consequence of 
inappropriate ownership structure that incentivises managerial entrenchment at the cost of firm 
performance.  This would explain the “long tail of very low performers” firms in NZ (MBIE, 
2013, p. 3, 8). This provides evidence for the proposition that the incentives for managers to 
perform their functions well (effectively and efficiently), is critically important. This is because 
outcomes depend not just on their ability. This has important implications on firm performance, 
growth and productivity.  
 
5.1.5 Considerations 	  
Under the condition of underinvestment, Tobin’s Q might be inflated (Dybvig & 
Warachka, 2010). This is because underinvestment would lead to a proportional reduction in 
capital that lowers the denominator (replacement costs) of Tobin's Q, but a less than proportional 
reduction in the numerator since the combination of decreasing marginal revenue and increasing 
marginal costs reduces the marginal profit of additional output, and thus the value of the firm. 
Consequently, the smaller reduction in the numerator relative to denominator leads to a higher 
Tobin's Q in the face of deteriorating firm performance. Hence, under the condition of 
underinvestment a higher Tobin’s Q may not reflect higher firm performance. Exploring how 
such a condition can be accounted for in a measure of firm performance would enhance the 
robustness of the estimated results in the literature thus far. 
	  	  
	   88	   
	  
 
	   	  
 
Afkhami, Locke and Reddy (2013) report that, to date, NZ’s managerial (insider) 
ownership is 12% and block (outsider) ownership is about 49%. Although, NZ publicly listed 
firms had begun to track back to the moderate range of outside block ownership (OUTBLOWN), 
the issue of ineffective monitoring remained. Unless, the overall effectiveness in the ability 
and/or willingness of outside block holders to monitoring managers improves, pressuring 
management to deliver on performance, firm performance would remain weak. The evidence 
from the split share structure reform in China provides a good exemplar of how incentivising 
greater monitoring on the part of outside block holders (including block and institutional 
investors), can significantly improve firm performance. The Chinese reform provided a natural 
experiment of how, by converting shares owned by the controlling shareholders from non-
tradable shares to tradable shares, removes market friction and induces better monitoring on the 
part of outside block holders giving managers more incentives to improve firm performance (see 
Chen et al., 2014). Considerations of such an example is important because it illustrates for NZ 
how it is possible with a change in policy to induces a better set of incentives and/or preferences 
by shareholders to be more active and engage much more in their firm activities as effective 
monitors, which in effect incentivises managers to deliver on performance.  
 
On the other hand, for small businesses, MBIE (2014) cited more than 100 government 
initiatives to support small businesses, including actions in the Business Growth Agenda and 
Result 9 work programme. These were to help businesses access to the key ingredients they need 
to grow and succeed. Yet our small-medium sized businesses are still struggling to grow into 
larger firms. Further exploration in these areas to assess the viability and effectiveness of these 
mechanisms and/or policies would be profitable for future research and one where intervention 
may be beneficial.  
6. New Zealand’s Low Firm Performance and Productivity  
 
A stylized fact is that high performing or high-growth firms are rare in New Zealand 
(NZ). When firm performance matters to growth, the rarity of high-performing firms in NZ 
means growth, let alone high-growth, would also be an uncommon occurrence. In fact, high-
growth firms only make up a small proportion of the business population in NZ. Provisional 
figures from Statistics New Zealand’s Integrated Data Infrastructure capturing the distribution of 
growth (measured in sales revenues) across the NZ economy in 2011 show that the population of 
	  	  
	   89	   
	  
 
	   	  
firms in NZ has a skewed growth distribution (MBIE, 2013). They illustrate that in 2011 the 
median firm actually experienced negative growth and suggested that such relationship has held 
since at least 2001. Consistent with these results, Hull and Arnold (2008) also found that from 
2000 to 2005 only a tiny percentage of NZ firms experienced an increase in turnover and that the 
majority actually experienced a reduction (as cited in MBIE, 2013). Above all, MBIE’s (2013, p. 
3, 8) report cited recently unpublished research on business productivity growth showing that NZ 
has “a long tail of very low performers that may be able to survive because of weak competitive 
forces”. More than that, in the previous section this paper showed they might be also able to 
persist because of lack of pressure on management to increase performance.  
 
The reality is good firm performance is a necessary condition for commercial survival. 
Profitability and good firm governance leading to high firm performance and value to 
shareholders do make a difference to a given economy’s ability to attract international capital. 
Hence, poor firm performance, due to poor exposure to pressure and competition in the domestic 
market would impede NZ’s ability to attract international capital. Such inability is not such a 
problem if extra capital is not required. However, if firms come to the equity market for capital, 
equity market under-development would drive up the costs of capital as firms compete for the 
limited available capital in the thin equity market (Treasury, 2008b; Afkhami et al., 2013). In 
fact, one of the difficulties facing NZ’s most productive and successful firms is access to, and 
attracting, investor capital (Healy, 2001; Castalia Strategic Advisors, 2003; Hall & Scobie, 2005; 
Capital Market Taskforce, 2009; New Zealand Herald, 2014a). NZ’s relative difficulty in shoring 
up its capital position and access to funds for investment and innovation would help explain 
NZ’s weak international connections and low level and rate of innovation.  
 
Furthermore, the reality of dominant shareholders and dominant firms sheltering 
management from pressure and competition in the domestic market not only impedes firm 
performance by ways of entrenchment, it also inhibits performance by impeding the 
development of managerial competencies. The lack of effective management disciplines to 
correct weaknesses in their business model or to look for new and better ways to doing business 
greatly hinders the development of managerial competencies. This is the sort of development 
needed for successful growth and international competition and expansion. This helps explain 
NZ’s relatively low Management Practice Score (MPS) highlighted in Section 4. The rest of this 
section discuss how NZ’s relative low firm performance, due to NZ’s relatively lower 
managerial quality and managerial effectiveness (explained in Section 4 and 5), could account 
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for NZ’s weak international connections, low innovation and low managerial quality. The three 
main determinants (symptoms) of poor productivity performance identified by the New Zealand 
Productivity Commission’s (2014a) report to have accounted for the 27 percentage points 
productivity gap between NZ and the average of 20 OECD countries.  
 
6.1 Low Firm Performance and Weak International Connections  
 
The New Zealand Productivity Commission (2014a) showed that over half of New 
Zealand’s (NZ’s) productivity gap relative to the OECD average could be explained by 
weaknesses in NZ’s international connections. The lack of accessibility to large markets and 
limited participation in global value chains (where the transfer of advanced technologies now 
often occurs) facing NZ firms reflect NZ’s firms’ lack of activism in the international market. 
This paper argues that this is largely a consequence of firm under-performance. Evidence shows 
that better performing firms tend to enter international markets and that internationally active 
firms are larger, more productive, and pay higher wages than other firms in the same industry 
that are active only in their home market and vice versa (Wagner, 2014).  
 
Evidently, the performance of NZ’s large firms is poor by international comparison and 
NZ also has a shortage of large firms that can be found in a number of other OECD countries 
(Treasury, 2008b). Simmons (2004) showed, as measured by returns on assets or value added, 
large firms have been performing poorly in New Zealand (as cited in Treasury, 2008b). Though 
NZ has a similar proportion of people employed in large firm (250+), the number of large firms 
in NZ is less than the OECD average. NZ’s economy is made up predominately of Small-
Medium Enterprises (MBIE, 2013). Statistics New Zealand defined Small-Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) as firms that comprises of less than 100 employees (Corner, 2001, p. 52; MBIE, 2013). 
On productivity grounds, Fallow (2013) points to a Productivity Commission research report 
which found labour productivity in 10 of 16 NZ’s industries measured to be less than half of 
Australian levels. NZ sectors also compare unfavorably with the UK on Multifactor Productivity 
(MFP) performance (Treasury, 2008b, p. 10). Section 2 also highlights NZ’s productivity under-
performance relative to our OECD counterparts.  
 
Wages in NZ are also relatively lower than most advanced OECD countries. This has 
been highlighted repeatedly both in the media (headlines like “New Zealanders get low wages” – 
Rosenberg, 2011; and “David Clark: The PM’s cleaner deserves more pay” – New Zealand 
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Herald, 2012a) and in academic studies (Healy, 2003; Department of Labour, 200657; OECD, 
200758; also see ANNEX 2 for CEO and Average Male and Female Income Comparison). In 
sum, firms in NZ are generally smaller, less productive, and pay lower wages (characteristics of 
poor firm performance – see Wagner, 2014) than other firms in the same industry of the average 
OECD countries. One should note that larger firms in NZ are also poor performers (see Box 2 on 
page 99) and hence it is not simply a matter of firm size. That is, firm size may be a necessary 
but not sufficient condition (by itself suffice) to explain improved performance.  
 
Better Performing Firms ENGAGE in international activities. Wagner (2014) cited many 
empirical studies, written since the early 1990s, showing a positive association between firm 
performance and international market engagement. He suggested that because of the additional 
costs of participating in the foreign market, higher performing firms tend to self-select into 
international activities (i.e. exports, imports and offshoring59). For export activity, the additional 
costs include transportation, distribution, marketing, hiring of personnel with the skills to 
manage foreign networks and production costs of modifying current domestic products for 
foreign consumption. For importing, costs are largely associated with fixed costs involved in the 
search process for foreign suppliers, inspection of goods, negotiation, contract formation, and so 
on. For offshoring, the costs to the local economy may involve the issues associated with 
domestic jobs lost (particularly those of low-skilled) when production is relocated to countries 
where labour is cheaper.  
 
The costs associated with these international activities exist as an entry barrier that less 
successful firms cannot overcome (Wagner, 2012). Findings have generally been in favour of the 
self-selection hypothesis, which says firms that eventually became exporters (internationally 
active) tended to be more productive than firms that never ventured outside the domestic market. 
Furthermore, only those highly productive firms import intermediate goods. While offshoring 
need not generate negative impact on domestic employment if some tasks (low skilled) 
performed by a certain type of labour can be more easily done offshore increasing the 
profitability of these firms leading to such firms’ expansion. The increase in labour demand by 
these firms will in part fall on local workers who perform tasks (more skilled) that cannot easily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Provide an in-depth discussion of the minimum wage and comparisons between New Zealand wages and other 
OECD countries is found in a Department of Labour report, Minimum wage review 2006, from paragraph 43 
onwards. 
58New Zealand’s low wage environment is also examined in an OECD report comparing different countries, 
Minimum Wages, Minimum Labour Costs and the Tax Treatment of Low-Wage Employment.  
59 Offshoring is the relocation of activities previously performed by a domestic firm to a firm in foreign country.  
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be moved abroad. Hence, at the firm level, offshoring can generate positive impacts if the 
competitiveness of such firms increases through productivity increases. At the macro level, 
increases in the international division of labour and specialisation in products in which the home 
country has a comparative advantage would also foster growth. In most cases production that is 
relocated is no longer profitable in the home country and the employees would lose their jobs 
when firms shutdown whether or not they moved elsewhere. Nonetheless, the message is clear: 
high performing firms can expand and prosper abroad, while low performing firms cannot 
(Wagner, 2014).   
 
Moreover, one of the major causes of Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) failure in NZ as well 
as overseas is under-capitalisation of the company (Cameron & Massey, 1999, as cited in 
Corner, 2001). In other words, SMEs fail because they do not have an adequate amount of 
finance to cover the revenue shortfalls typical of start-ups or in the expansion phase of the 
business. Beyond their personal paid-in capital, the preference of SME owners in NZ is to secure 
additional finance through bank loans. Previous research shows that bankers rely heavily on the 
financial performance of a firm to make a loan decision (Berry et al., 1993; Reeve and van 
Peursem, 1998 as cited in Corner, 2001). Also consistent with this paper’s narrative, firm 
performance (specifically profitability) are used not only to judge the financial ‘health’ of the 
company, but also to judge the competence of the company’s management. Hence, poor firms’ 
performance, due to an ownership structure that fails to induce sufficient pressure on managers 
to increase performance, by exacerbating the agency costs associated with managerial 
entrenchment, inhibits the ability of such firms to access capital needed during the period of 
expansion. Consequently, poor firm performance by increasing the costs of borrowing and by 
making it even more difficult for such firms to attract further capital to finance expansion would 
exacerbate the scale problems of NZ’s SMEs.  
 
 New Zealand lack of pressure and competitive forces hurt global focus. The NZ domestic 
market size and its legacy of past statutory monopolies already mean a number of firms in many 
of its industries benefited from monopolistic or oligopolistic rents (Healy, 2003). The combined 
effect of high firm ownership concentration and deepening corporate consolidation that took 
place in the post 1970s further reduced firms’ exposure to competitive forces. The lack of 
management exposure to significant competition in the domestic market also ill-equipped firms 
with the necessary business strategy to successfully competes in the international market. 
Exposure of management to sufficient domestic market competition is vital to successful growth 
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and international expansion, especially when scale is a constraint. These essential conditions are 
lacking in the NZ economy. The scale constraint (of SMEs) need not be detrimental if one 
recognises, as per Watts (2008), that the challenge is one of both opportunity and strategy in 
overcoming such a constraint. In the last decade, Finland60 demonstrated this point (Jones, 2008). 
However, when scale is a constraint and the ability and incentives of firms to recognise, develop 
and implement strategies to overcome such a constraint is also problematic problems with 
international growth and expansion would result. These include the intent and ability of firms to 
launch themselves into international markets and their ability to maintain sustainable growth 
following an expansion. Both have proven to be problematic for NZ.  
 
Grant Thornton’s (2012) International Business Report shows that NZ sits second from the 
bottom in the number of companies that currently have international operations (only 9%), well 
behind that of Australia’s 16%. While this figure does highlight NZ’s geographic isolation, it 
also highlights NZ’s lack of international activism and the nation continued reliance on 
traditional markets. In fact, of those NZ firms surveyed in this report only 9% were planning 
overseas growth, and of this 9%, expansion plans are largely orientated toward traditional 
markets like Western Europe, United States, Canada and Australia. In contrast, the report 
revealed that 57% of those business leaders considering international expansion are looking at 
the five biggest emerging economies – China, India, Russia, Brazil and Mexico. Their report 
concluded that the barrier to NZ firms’ international expansion is largely to do with the firms’ 
intent to expand overseas, rather than the issue around red tape that is holding NZ firms back. 
Red tape is less of an issue for NZ because NZ firms tend to deal in the more traditional markets, 
instead of the frontier markets in which overseas firms are trying to open up.  	  
Wang and O’Grady’s (2013) overview of NZ firms based on their analysis of the Business 
Operation Survey 2011 data also reveal that about 20% of firms surveyed were not interested in 
generating overseas income. The reason is being not productive enough to export or it is too 
risky for the firm to do so. NZ’s long tail of very low performing firms has made international 
expansion very costly and highly risky, which in turn hurts NZ international expansion. Why? 
Because poor performing firms have to borrow at a higher premium and the lack of knowledge 
due to the lack of managerial exposure to pressure and competitive forces also increase the 
possibility of failure. This would explain why the history of NZ firms expanding into Australia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See Gabrielsson et al. (2004) on the influence of financing strategies and the commensurate finance management 
capabilities on the globalization of Finnish Born International and Born Global SMEs.  
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and other geographical markets has generally not been a success story (Healy, 2003, p. 121; See 
Box 1 on page 98, for Recent Evidence) and why to date “NZ companies fail to focus on global 
expansion” (Grant Thornton, 2012; see Box 2 on page 99, for The Story).  
 
 6.2 Low Firm Performance and Low Innovation 
 
Consistent with the New Zealand Productivity Commission’s (2014a) report this paper 
argues that most of the rest of the gap could be due to under-investment in “knowledge-based 
capital”, namely Research and Development (R&D). R&D undertaken by both the public and the 
private business sector in New Zealand (NZ) is reported to be among the lowest in the OECD. 
The low R&D investment may to some extent be due to the absence or small share of R&D 
intensity demanded from NZ’s key traditional agricultural industries. However such a structural 
bias does not completely account for the low ranking to the extent experienced in NZ. NZ ranked 
18th of the 19 advanced OECD countries sampled (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 
2014c, p. 13). Furthermore, there is evidence that successful firms in Scandinavian traditional 
sectors do invest heavily in R&D (Edquist, 2011). The same can also be said for Canada (see 
Natural Resources Canada, 2014). Hence, the real problem should be about the issue of firm 
performance.   
 
Recall the argument in previous sections, that the performance of a business is strongly 
influenced by managerial decisions and that the quality of managerial decisions depends on both 
the ability of managers and on the incentives that they have to make these decisions (managerial 
effectiveness). Given that unresolved conflict is a conspicuous feature of organisations, as 
highlighted by Cyert and March (1963), profit maximisation is not the only form of behaviour. 
Hence, under a structure of ownership which fosters managerial entrenchment incentivising rent 
seeking at the cost of firm value, R&D investment which is deemed as value enhancing may not 
take place and those non-value maximising may be over-invested for reasons of controlling 
agents (managers) pay, power and prestige.  Consequently, the effects of R&D on controlling 
agents’ position means that they might under-invest (over-invest) in R&D projects regardless of 
their potential positive (negative) impact on firm value.  
 
The association between firm value and R&D investment suggests that causality may run 
the other way, whereby poor firm performance leads to low R&D investment. Empirical research 
on the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in Table 7 (and elsewhere, Beyer et al., 
	  	  
	   95	   
	  
 
	   	  
2011) shows that the association between ownership structure and firm performance is non-
linear. Ceteris paribus, implying the association between ownership structure and R&D 
investment may also be non-linear, assuming the property of transitive relation holds. That is, if 
element A (ownership structure) is related to element B (firm value/performance), and B is in 
turn related to an element C (R&D investment), then A is also related to C. This means that 
when concentrated ownership in NZ negatively affects firm value/performance, R&D investment 
would also be negatively affected, leading to lower innovation.  
 
The negative effect on R&D investment would impede NZ’s capacity for ‘frontier 
innovation’ and affect the ability of NZ firms to absorb new technologies developed elsewhere – 
‘technology catch-up’ (Griffith et al., 2004). This impedes the extent to which the NZ economy 
is exposed to external technologies on the one hand and the efficiency with which it absorbs 
them on the other hand. This would explain NZ’s relative low level of technological change (low 
innovation) and low efficiency change (lagging behind), and thus low productivity change 
evidenced in Figure 6.  More recently, the New Zealand Productivity Commission’s (2014a) 
empirical estimates indicate that the large gap between NZ’s R&D intensity vis-à-vis the average 
of 20 OECD countries would explain between 3 to 11 percentage points of the 27 percentage 
points productivity gap between NZ and the average of 20 OECD countries. The report also 
shows that NZ’s weak international connections and low investment in innovation (as measured 
by R&D intensity) together could explain between 17 to 22 percentage points of the 27 
percentage points productivity gap vis-à-vis the average of 20 OECD countries, and that the rest 
of the gap can be accounted for by NZ’s relative lower managerial quality.  	  
Better performing firms ARE innovative. An INSEAD61 (2013) report reveals that better 
performing firms are those that continuously invest in learning how to use technology as well as 
in operating and innovating more effectively and efficiently. Their research results show that on 
average, firms that have strong business enablers62 and are high investors in technology have 
significantly greater chance of being high performers, and vice versa. To date, across the board, 
the fast growing and high achieving sector is Information Communication Technology (ICT). 
The OECD (2002, p. 81) defines “the ICT sector as a combination of manufacturing and services 
industries that capture, transmit and display data and information electronically”. Within this 
sector, IT services in particular are generating significant innovation, attracting investment from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 INSEAD is a graduate business school with campuses in Europe, Asia and the Middle East.  
62 Two key business enablers are sufficient access to technology-focused talent and management-focused talent.  
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established firms and start-ups and creating wealth and high-skilled employment opportunities. 
In NZ, the number of firms in computer system design has grown rapidly with more than 3300 
such firms started in the last twelve years (Project Management Institute, 2014). ICT, much more 
than our traditional industries, strongly engage in R&D investment. Exports of computer and 
information services have experienced a dramatic increase, by 85% since 2006, with incomes in 
computer system design twice the NZ average and are growing faster than the average (New 
Zealand Sectors Report, 2013). This sector has traditionally received less attention than that of 
our primary and manufacturing sectors despite the sector’s potential growth. With ICT growing 
significantly and its deep and extensive linkages with the rest of the economy (see Table 3), 
increased focus in this sector will prove essential for future growth and productivity.  
 
New Zealand Lack of pressure and competitive forces hurt innovation. High performing/high-
growth firms, which add dynamic and competitive pressure within the economy, make up only a 
small proportion of NZ’s business population. Their numbers and proportion also appear to be 
declining over time (see Figure 563 and Figure 9 in MBIE, 2013, p. 13 and p. 29)64. According to 
the Business Growth Agenda (2012), the following facts imply that not enough innovative high-
growth firms: (i) are being created in NZ; and (ii) are staying located here; and (iii) are growing 
to the point where they generate significant economic benefits as well as stimulate innovation in 
other businesses (as cited in MBIE, 2013, p. 3). The lack of pressure on managers to increase 
performance unintentionally generated by NZ’s highly concentrated firm ownership structure in 
addition to the lack of competitive forces in the NZ economy crucially contributes to these 
problems. Firstly, this is because the lack of pressure on managerial performance which 
negatively affect firm performance, act as a barrier to internationalisation faced by small firms. 
NZ’s small domestic market means that internationalisation is an important way in which small 
firms can grow into medium or large firms either by growing extremely fast in a short period or 
by maintaining steady growth over a number of years. Secondly, Castellacci’s (2009) 
econometric analysis of CDM model65 using rich firm-level panel dataset based on the three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Showed ‘Percentage of high-growth businesses in the total population of New Zealand enterprises by sales, 
employment and value added. Where high-growth is defined as all enterprises with a minimum of $50,000 in sales 
at the beginning of a 3-year period that record average annualised growth (in employment or turnover or added 
value) greater than 20% per annum over the 3-year period. Sales and value added are derived from IR10 data 
(adjusted to exclude GST).    
64 Figures are in real dollars based on 2009 dollars.  
65 CDM model studies the effect of competition on four interrelated stages of the innovative chain: the choice of 
whether or not to engage in innovative activities; the amount of resources it decides to invest in R&D; the effects of 
these R&D investments on innovative output; and the impacts of innovation output on the productivity of the 
enterprise. 
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recent waves of the Innovation Survey for Norway66 found that the impact of innovative efforts 
on firm performance (technological output and productivity) is stronger in competitive sectors 
than in oligopolistic industries. This result supports the ‘escape-competition effect’67 proposition, 
which postulates that competition may also spur innovation. This is because competition may 
increase the incremental profits that firms obtain by investing in R&D activities (see also Aghion 
et al., 1997; 2005; 2009). The escape-competition effect asserts that the relationship between the 
degree of market competition and innovation maybe positive, and even more so in neck-to-neck 
industries where competition between rival firms is fierce.  
 
In contrast, the lack of pressure and competitive forces in NZ’s key traditional industries 
and the existence of dominant firm dominating the industry tend to discourage innovation 
because these firms’ monopolistic position tend to encourage them to “become fat and happy and 
fall asleep” (Boyes, 2012). Consequently, under such a circumstance innovation need not occur. 
This explains why NZ dairy giants lack a track record of innovation and product development in 
difficult value-added dairy categories, such as Infant Formula. See Box 3 on page 100, Lack of 
Competition and Low Innovation: Example from Infant Formula. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 CIS3 (period: 1998-2000; N=3899), CIS4 (period: 2002-2004; N=4655) and CIS5 (period: 2004-2006; N=6443) 
67 Contrary to the traditional ‘Schumpeterian effect’ that postulates the negative association between the degree of 
competition in an industry and the R&D intensity of firms; Castellacci (2009) finds such effect to be a mechanism 
that relates to the ex-ante incentives to innovate to be found in the early stages of the innovation process. While the 
‘escape-competition effect’ is one of ex-post effects of innovation, i.e. the incremental profits that a firm effectively 
achieves, given its prior decision to invest in R&D and to join the innovation race – occurred at later stages of the 
innovation chain. Consequently, though the probability that a firm engages in innovation and the amount of 
resources it decides to invest are higher in oligopolistic sector than in competitive industries, the impact of 
innovations efforts on firm performance (technological output and productivity), however, is stronger in competitive 
sectors than in oligopolistic industries.   
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Box 1. Recent Evidences 
“Traditionally, New Zealand businesses have performed poorly when it comes to international 
expansion. The 2013 Grant Thornton International Business Report placed New Zealand second 
from the bottom in a global ranking of countries, when it comes to the percentage of 
organisations that have expanded overseas.”   
(Stuff, 2013)  
 
“In many traditional sectors, New Zealand has failed to forward integrate along the value chain, 
example from the meat industry shows despite sending meat to the UK for over 120 years, we 
own no major in-market processors…New Zealand still significantly makes the ingredients, 
which are sold to food manufacturers, who add-value by turning them into processed foods”. 
 
(Coriolis, 2010b, p. 18-19).  
 
“Many New Zealand franchises find it hard to *generate enough cash flow locally to fund 
overseas expansion…you can’t just go and be an international franchisor; you’ve got to invest 
hundreds of thousands. Money not the only factor that affects a company’s ability to franchise 
internationally…successful export strategy requires … *key senior management executive focus 
exclusively on international growth … sadly too many approach the international scene with no 
more resource than that used for domestic expansion. … Third non-negotiable is *sufficient 
domestic market strength to enable it to expand successfully overseas. The measure of readiness 
for international expansion is not solely the output or size of the franchise operation in its home 
country – it’s more the infrastructural development and operational capability within the group”.  
 
(Franchise New Zealand, 2011).  
 
“Two factors about New Zealand … make the job of capital markets more difficult in New 
Zealand than overseas. Firstly, the high proportion of small firms may cause difficulties for the 
capital market. Capital markets all over the world do not finance many small firms due to the 
fixed costs and risk involved. Small firms traditionally rely on owner or angel capital. Secondly, 
the small domestic market may lead to a lack of specialized expertise in the New Zealand 
venture capital market rather than lack of capital per se. This may be a contributing factor behind 
firms turning to foreign purchasers in the same industry for expertise and networks”.   
 
(Treasury, 2002)  
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Box 2. The Story 
One of the biggest issues facing New Zealand (NZ) investors is the inability of the country’s 
business leaders to create long-term growth firms. Many of our listed firms have achieved strong 
short-term growth but have failed to grow over the longer term. A survey of the largest NZX 
listed firms between 1984 and 2004 shows how poorly NZ’s largest firms have performed. In 
this 20-year period 10 companies were ranked in the top three in terms of market value: Fletcher 
Challenge, Brierley Investments, NZ Forest Products, Chase Corporation, New Zealand 
Insurance, Carter Holt Harvey, Telecom, Lion Nathan, Fletcher Energy and Contact Energy. But 
only Contact Energy and Telecom remain listed on the NZX. Fletcher Challenge was split into 
separately listed energy, forestry, paper and building divisions. Brierley Investments now called 
GuocoLeisure and NZ Forest Products was taken over by Carter Holt Harvey (later acquired by 
Graeme Hart). New Zealand Insurance is now owned by Australia's IAG, Chorus was split from 
Telecom, Lion Nathan was acquired by Japanese interests and Fletcher Energy was sold to Shell. 
Ironically Fletcher Building, which was originally the smallest of the four Fletcher Challenge 
divisions, is the only one to remain under New Zealand ownership. By contrast Australian 
companies have had a far greater survival rate. Between 1984 to the end of 1994, seven of the 
top 10 ASX firms remain listed, but only four of the top 10 NZX firms do so. Surveys show that 
NZX firms, as far as wealth creation is concerned, also perform poorly. Between 1984 to the end 
of 1994 their total value has fallen by $6.8 billion (22% drop). While ASX firms increased their 
total market value by A$437.7 billion (over 400%). There has also been substantial attrition - and 
minimum wealth creation - among the fourth and fifth ranked NZX companies by market 
capitalisation between 1984 and 2004. The latter group comprised ANZ Banking Group (NZ), 
Wattie Industries, Bank of New Zealand, DB Breweries, Goodman Fielder, Air New Zealand, 
Fletcher Paper, Fletcher Forests, The Warehouse, Fisher & Paykel Healthcare and SkyCity. The 
first four were acquired by overseas interests, as were the two Fletcher companies. Goodman 
Fielder migrated to Australia, Air New Zealand was in the top five before it was bailed out by 
the Crown in the early 2000s and The Warehouse was highly rated before its failed expansion 
into Australia. A large number of our companies have stalled badly when they moved offshore 
(Pumkin Patch, Rakon, The Warehouse and Tourism Holdings).  
Many of our firms simply don’t have overseas expertise. Consequently, they are poorly prepared 
and under resourced when they go offshore. The problems may be because extremely successful 
firms like Sir Ron, in the past, have been so successful with its asset stripping, downsizing and 
cost cutting strategies in the 1970s and 1980s, a large number of business people since then have 
copied this approach rather than going for growth through higher value-added innovation. Why? 
Saunders et al. (2011) suggested that as a consequence of NZ’s history of guaranteed access to 
and its distance from markets, NZ’s agricultural sector has yet to develop a good appreciation of 
the importance of value of marketing credence attributes. This inhibits NZ’s ability to charge a 
premium for its products. Faced with increasing international competition cutting costs is a quick 
fix in order to achieve margin. However, cost cutting in the long run is not the answer to 
prosperity, big profits lie elsewhere – in the ability of firms to charge a premium on their 
products and services. Additionally, NZ has been far too quick to sell companies with good 
growth prospects (Bank of New Zealand, Fletcher Energy and Trust Bank). Furthermore, the 
NZX is heavily populated with regulated utilities and companies with limited growth 
opportunities. In light of these factors, no wonder domestic investors are extremely enthusiastic 
about Xero and a number of other technology businesses with high growth aspiration.  
(Treasury, 2008b; New Zealand Herald, 2014b; Saunders et al., 2011) 
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68 Probiotics are friendly microorganisms/bacteria that provide health benefits by improving the balance of flora in 
the digestive system.  
69 DHA is an omega-3 fatty acid, which is a primary structural component of the human brain, cerebral cortex and 
retina.  
70 Hypoallergenic use amino acids (the building blocks of proteins) as their protein source, and are best for infants 
who have severe protein allergies and are suffering colic.  
71Lactobacillus rhamnosus GG is a bacteria that exist naturally in the body, primarily in the intestine, which helps to 
maintain a balance of ‘good bacteria’ needed to prevent the growth of harmful bacteria in the stomach and 
intestines. 
72 Acidified Liquid is an ultra-concentrated liquid human milk fortifier with extra nutrients.  
73 OptiGROTM is an exclusive blend of nutrients in Similac infant formula to support eyes and brain developments.   
Box 3. Lack of Competition and Low Innovation: Example from Infant Formula 
Infant formula, a difficult value-added dairy category, where New Zealand’s dairy firms 
(Fonterra, Meadow Fresh, Westland, OpenCountry, Synlait and TATUA) lack a track record of 
innovation and products development relative to the other international dairy firms (Nestle, 
DANONE, Mead Johnson and Abbott) (Coriolis, 2014, p. 15).  Over the last decade, some of the 
major innovations in infant formula that have come out of international dairy firms are formula 
with: probiotics68 for supporting the immune system, DHA/ARA (Docosahexaenoic acid)69 for 
brain and eye development, hypoallergenic amino-acid based70 for children with cow’s milk 
allergies, Lactobacillus rhamnosus GG71 probiotic for strengthening intestinal barrier, Acidified 
Liquid72 for premature babies, OptiGROTM (blend of DHA, Lutein and Vitamin E)73 for brain 
and eye development, eye health and to support cells development, and so on (Abbott, 2014; 
Coriolis, 2014, p. 15; Nestle, 2014; DANONE, 2014).  
 
In comparison, goat milk based formula is the only clearly identifiable innovation in infant 
formula to have come out of NZ and be in the market. Further NZ waited 15 years following the 
invention of Ultra-high-temperature (UHT) milk to launch a product.  NZ dairy firms, in this 
sense, clearly lag far behind (Coriolis, 2014). Such a lag reflects the reality of how incumbents 
who have not had disruptive competition will be slow to innovate. For a dominant unassailable 
incumbent, the pressure to deliver better and more innovative products is simply not there.  
Consequently, this means more often than not products and countries would go through 
lifecycles as follows. At the early life stage (i.e. during the pastoral boom), the opportunity to 
gain value from participating in co-operative agribusinesses is greatest when product innovation 
is strong and supply is fragmented. But this is only to be followed by rapid consolidation and 
domination by a few large firms to which a gradual decline in rates of innovation (and 
subsequently performance) becomes the single biggest risk to these mature businesses. Coriolis’s 
(2014) report comparing R&D expenditure of the top 4 global infant formula firms to the top 6 
NZ dairy firms in 2012 illustrates NZ dairy firms’ low R&D expenditure, both as a percent of 
global sales and in total value (see Coriolis, 2014, p. 14).  
 
The message here is that when there is not much domestic market competition, and combined 
with NZ’s history of guaranteed access to and its distance from markets, a good appreciation of 
the importance and value of marketing credence attributes can be an unusual occurrence 
(Saunders et al., 2011). Consequently, when faced with increasing international competitions a 
cost cutting strategy to achieve short-term margin becomes much easier (though not the answer 
to long term growth) than difficult high value-added innovation.  
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6.3 Low Firm Performance and Low Managerial Competency 
 
Lack of managerial exposure to pressure and competitive force not only directly affects 
firm performance by way of entrenchment, resulting in weak international connections and low 
innovation, it also inhibits the development of managerial competencies essential to international 
competition and expansion. The latter phenomenon would explain NZ’s relative low 
Management Practice Score (MPS), a proxy for managerial competency, evidenced in Section 4. 
The New Zealand Productivity Commission (2014a) also named NZ’s low managerial practices 
as the third main determinant responsible for NZ’s lower productivity gains from new 
technology, attributable for the rest of gap. Following weak international connections and low 
innovation, low managerial quality is capable of explaining the rest of the gap, even more so 
when such an effect is cumulative.  
 
My analysis in section 4 concludes that closing the overall managerial practices gap 
judged by MPS between NZ and the top 5 OECD countries would increase productivity by 5%. 
This together with NZ’s weak international connections and low innovation associated with poor 
firm performance, largely as a consequence of inappropriate incentives unintentionally generated 
by a certain ownership structure that encourage managerial entrenchment at the cost of firm 
performance, can potentially explain ‘The New Zealand Productivity Puzzle’74.  
7.  Conclusions 
 
Overall, by analytically piecing together key results and findings (from available data, 
literature, and empirical studies), this paper goes further than merely highlighting the 
determinants (symptoms) of poor productivity performance in New Zealand. The paper 
essentially brings to light the potential mechanism behind New Zealand’s relative poor 
productivity performance. In so doing, this paper answers the question ‘why’ these key 
determinants (symptoms) of poor productivity performance occur.  
 
Beginning with an overview of New Zealand’s productivity performance in Section 2, 
this paper highlights that given New Zealand’s policy settings, New Zealand’s GDP per capita 
should be about 20% above the OECD average, however it is actually 20% below (Barnes et al., 
2013; Fallow, 2013; New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014a). The extent to which New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See Diagrammatic Summary in ANNEX 3.  
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Zealand’s actual productivity growth rates have undershot its predicted rates based on policy 
setting, has generated spirited debates among experts seeking to provide an answer to this age-
old paradox. Solving ‘The New Zealand Productivity Puzzle’ is not a straightforward 
proposition. Previous studies in this area show that the main determinants behind New Zealand’s 
relatively poor productivity performance are weak international connections, low innovation and 
low managerial quality (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014a). No doubt, New 
Zealand is lacking in these aspects and of course we need to do more in these areas to improve 
our productivity performance. However, by puzzling together a richer picture of New Zealand’s 
productivity situation, this paper shows these key determinants are merely symptoms arising 
from perhaps a much deeper cause. In so doing, the paper answers the question, ‘why’ decisions 
makers in New Zealand make decisions that lead to poor performance in these areas.  
 
By investigating New Zealand’s relative productivity under-performance as an issue of 
corporate/firm governance in section 3, this paper reveals that firm governance issues in New 
Zealand is not one of poor corporate governance in a conventional manner. Rather one related to 
(A) low managerial competency and (B) low managerial effectiveness. The analyses carried out 
on these issues in section 4 and 5 verified this proposition, showing firm performance would be 
lower when managers lack the ability and the incentives to manage the assets and resources they 
have under their stewardship to create value for shareholders. The analysis in Section 4, based on 
Management Practice Score (MPS) from the World Management Survey (2010) on managerial 
practices across a number of OECD countries showed closing the MPS gap between New 
Zealand and the top 5 OECD countries could increase productivity by 5%.  However, when the 
quality of managerial decisions depends not only on the ability of managers, but also on the 
incentives that managers have to make decisions such that profits can be maximised by 
maximising productivity, managerial effectiveness therefore also matters. In Section 5, the paper 
explored the available theoretical and empirical research that examined the cross sectional 
relationship between insider ownership (INOWN) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) to draw 
inferences for managerial effectiveness.  
 
The results from the analysis in Section 5 suggested that high ownership concentration 
(i.e. high outside block ownership) at the level experienced in New Zealand had been detrimental 
to firm performance. This result supports Healy (2001) argument that outside block ownership 
(OUTBLOWN including institutional and block holdings) in New Zealand does not support the 
proposition that institutional and block ownership reinforces the positive effect of insider 
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ownership on firm value added when New Zealand institutional and block holders play a very 
passive role in monitoring firms. Such a result in New Zealand is contrary to those found in the 
United States (the subject of previous studies). This may be because foreign financial institutions 
and corporations account for the majority of investments in New Zealand equity market, but the 
geographical separation of those foreign institutional investors from their invested firms and the 
dispersion in institutional ownership makes monitoring and collaboration among outside block 
holders difficult. Therefore, the costs of monitoring may outweigh the benefits they hoped to 
gain. This would explain the ineffective institutional monitoring and the lack of shareholders 
activism observed in New Zealand compared to the United States.  
 
This paper also highlights how the absence of effective monitoring leaves managers 
relatively free from checks on their control reduces managerial effectiveness, and thus lowers 
firm performance. Without the monitoring pressure to enforce and incentivise managers to 
deliver on performance managers would be relatively ineffective, and thus firm performance 
would be lower. This paper shows irrespective of the nature of the firms (publicly listed or small 
businesses) or managerial stakes in the firm, the absence from checks on managerial control 
would exacerbate the agency costs associated with managerial entrenchment. In theory, 
Leibenstein (1966) and Altman (1993) have made these points. The problem of ineffective 
monitoring, therefore, potentially explains the “long tail of very low performers” firms in New 
Zealand (MBIE, 2013, p. 3, 8).  
 
The reality is firm performance matters to growth and a necessary condition for 
commercial survival, which matters a lot to a given economy’s ability to attract international 
capital and the development of a more vibrant equity market. Hence, poor firm performance 
arises largely as a consequence of managerial incentives to be entrenched generated by a highly 
concentrated ownership structure that fails to induce effective monitoring. This impedes an 
economy’s ability to attract international capital and the development of its equity market. If 
firms come to the equity market for capital, equity market under-development would drive up the 
costs of capital as firms compete for the limited available capital in the thin equity market 
(Treasury, 2008b; Afkhami, Locke & Reddy, 2013).  
 
Consequently, New Zealand firms’ relative difficulty to shore up their capital position 
and access to funds for investment and innovation would explain the economy’s weak 
international connections and low innovation. Moreover, the effect of high ownership 
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concentration in an already weak competitive domestic market further enhances the scope in 
which management can be sheltered from pressure to deliver on performance. The lack of 
effective management discipline to correct weaknesses in their business model or to search for 
new and better ways to doing business, further impedes the development of managerial quality in 
New Zealand. In Section 6, this paper explains how together weak international connections and 
low innovation and poor managerial quality associated with lower firm performance potentially 
explains ‘New Zealand’s 27 percentage points productivity gap vis-à-vis the average of the 20 
OECD countries’ (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2014a).  
 
Finally, this paper shows that New Zealand productivity under-performance is not 
paradoxical, but is rather largely a function of firm governance. The sort of causal variables 
uncovered here is neither one of corporate governance in the conventional manner or an issue of 
managerial competency alone. Rather what is key is that as consequence of inappropriate 
incentives unintentionally generated by an inappropriate ownership structure, managers are left 
relatively free from checks on their behaviour. This provides managers greater scope to exercise 
their preferences and entrenching such behaviours even if these are not in the best interest of 
their firms.  This leads to relatively low overall firm performance, much of this related to a 
relatively low productivity performance.  
 
This paper is a first attempt to explain the New Zealand productivity under-performance 
being largely a function of firm governance. The paper was only able to provide a thorough 
survey of the problem. Hence, going forward an in-depth analysis of ‘New Zealand’s 
Productivity Under-Performance as a Function of Firm Governance’ is necessary; in order to 
give greater weight to the argument and to verify the extent to which New Zealand country’s 
performance could be improved if firms are being as productive as they positively could be 
under a better set of incentives and/or preferences by management and workers. Such an in-depth 
analysis not only entails a comprehensive investigation of the existing literature, recent available 
firm-level data and findings on the association between ownership structure and firm 
performance, it also involves the considerations of what other factors may be in play. Factor(s) 
that could positively propel (i.e. the initiatives toward high value-added productions – Saunders 
et al., 2011) or negatively impede (i.e. the barriers to internationalisation, Shaw & Darroch, 
2004) New Zealand improved firm’s capability in relation to a better set of incentives and/or 
preferences by management and workers to translate into improved country’s performance.  
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ANNEX  
1. OECD Member Countries  
 
On 14 December 1960, twenty countries signed the Convention to become members of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and since then fourteen 
more countries have become members of the Organisation.  
 
The current ‘OECD Member Countries’ (and the year in which they deposited their instruments 
of ratification) are: Australia (1971), Austria (1961), Belgium (1961), Canada (1961), Chile 
(2010), Czech Republic (1995), Denmark (1961), Estonia (2010), Finland (1969), France (1961), 
Germany (1961), Greece (1961), Hungary (1996), Iceland (1961), Ireland (1961), Israel (2010), 
Italy (1962), Japan (1964), Korea (1996), Luxembourg (1961), Mexico (1994), Netherlands 
(1961), New Zealand (1973), Norway (1961), Poland (1996), Portugal (1961), Slovak Republic 
(2000), Slovenia (2010), Spain (1961), Sweden (1961), Switzerland (1961), Turkey (1961), 
United Kingdom (1961) and United States (1961).  
 
The 20 OECD Countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States.  
2. New Zealand’s Firm Size, Productivity and Pay 
 
Tower Perrins Worldwide Total Remuneration (2000) 
Source: Tower Perrins (2000) as cited in Healy (2003, p. 174). The table showed in 2000, relative to the sampled 
countries, NZ executives are badly paid on average (at US$258,000), and also paid badly with about 80% of NZ 
executive’s income is in the form of a fixed base with no long-term incentives and poor bonus component.  
Country Salary US$000 Breakdown of CEO Remuneration 
 Level Base (%) Bonus (%) Long term 
Incentive (%) 
Other (%) 
NZ 258 80% 12% - 8% 
CAN 752 43% 16% 36% 5% 
AUS 646 44% 38% 12% 6% 
USA 1404 35% 16% 43% 6% 
UK 720 44% 15% 17% 24% 
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‘Badly paid’ – NZ as a low wage economy makes attracting and retaining managerial talents in 
NZ difficult. The reality is NZ’s firms must compete with other firms internationally to retain 
and attract the best management talent. The demand for good management talent far outstrips 
supply. Therefore top talent should (must) be paid internationally competitive market rates if it is 
to be retained. NZ’s low pay culture is clearly a strong deterrent to attracting and retaining 
talents and as a consequence it acts as a self-imposed constraint on economic growth. Good 
managers can make a significant difference to a business and not only grow shareholder wealth 
but expand employment opportunities and further productivity. 
 
‘Paid badly’ – Even if the market for executives is deemed efficient in the sense that the rate of 
pay offered for jobs ensures optimal supply of executive talent, this does not mean that 
compensation is efficient in the sense of getting optimal effort. In reality, effort is not fixed and 
executive contracts are inevitably incomplete. This bears no or little relation to the assumption of 
fixed effort and optimal contract assumed under the conventional economic theory. 
Consequently, there are opportunities for shirking. To this end, it is clear that a promise to pay a 
fixed wage for unobservable effort is counterproductive because there is no incentive to perform, 
let alone outperform. The disconnectedness between pay and performance, in this respect, 
explained why CEO compensation is insensitive to shareholder wealth creation as observed in 
Andjelkovic et al. (2002), but instead correlated with size of firms (see Healy, 2003 p. 173; Lau 
& Vos, 2004). 
 
 
NZ and other selected OECD countries Incomes Comparison (in Annual Income PPP, in USD) 
Country Average Income Male Average Income Female 
NZ $26,960 $18,379 
AUS $34,446 $24,827 
CAN $37,572 $23,922 
UK $33,713 $20,790 
US $46,456 $29,017 
Note: PPP denoted Purchasing Power Parity. Source: The World Economic Forum Gender Gap Index 2006.  
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3. Summary 
	  
